The subject of how Chinese and Japanese officials and intellectuals learned of events in each other's country late in the Qing and Tokugawa periods, respectively, and the earliest Sino-Japanese contacts in the mid-19th century has attracted moderate scholarly attention in Japan. Several landmark essays, reviewed below, have been published and have greatly enhanced our knowledge. Recently, Chinese scholars have become interested in this subject and a number of fine studies have been published, several of which are reviewed below. The set of reviews which follow is meant as a critical introduction to this fascinating topic.

This remarkable essay by one of Japan's leading scholars of modern Chinese history examines in great detail how information about the Taiping rebels in China reached Japan. He also looks at how the various reports were received and understood by Japanese of various persuasions. Before 1862, none of these reports were firsthand Japanese accounts; they were usually transmitted from Chinese or Dutch merchants at Nagasaki.

The earliest information in Japan of the rebellion was a report to the shogunal administrator in Nagasaki from Chinese merchants in 1852. According to this and other early accounts, the Taiping Rebellion was a Ming reviv alist effort of the descendants of Ming remnants and led, not surprisingly, by a man surnamed Zhu, who had assumed the reign title Tiande 天德. In fact, the report continued, this was all an elaborate cover for a band of ruffians. By the spring of 1853, however, Chinese merchants in Nagasaki had changed their tune; the rebels were no longer being labelled "bandits," and it was expected that they might defeat the Qing dynasty. It was at this time that Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰 reported on this band of rebels, led by a 24-year-old (Japanese style) man named Zhu, that had amassed "an overwhelming army of over 300,000 troops," was "following Ming dress codes and Ming laws" (p. 457), and had genuine prospects for victory, all of this based on hearsay.
News gleaned from Commodore Perry when his ships arrived in June 1853 confirmed that the uprising was essentially a war against the Qing, begun by a "descendant of the Ming." The same month information from a Korean source at Tsushima confirmed this report. Ming revivalist information continued to pour into Japan through June 1854, although a different sort of report did first appear in late 1853. What had transpired was a conflation of two stories. There was a Ming revivalist movement at the time in China—not the Taipings, but a Triad uprising in South China. Hong Xiuquan and his followers rose in revolt at about the same time and in the same part of China, and the two movements became confused. English, American, and French sources made the same mistake.

In early 1854, bakufu officials learned from a Russian ship that "Beijing is under siege, and the Tartars have run off," a report dismissed as "unconfirmed" (p. 463). Nonetheless, further reports tended to confirm that the Qing court was doomed and that a Taiping victory was soon to become reality. Added to this was the firsthand evidence now presented by a high official, Buntai, whose ship had run into trouble on its return to Edo in 1850; he and his group were rescued by an American ship on route to San Francisco where they spent a year; they then boarded the Susquehana for passage to Hong Kong where they again spent about a year before heading for Shanghai; there they spent roughly 18 months (1853-1854), just at the time that the Taipings occupied Nanjing. The American ship had obtained this information upon trying to enter the port of Nanjing, where it was repulsed and forced to return to Shanghai. Fearing that if they were to appear in Nagasaki on board an American vessel, they would not be allowed to come ashore, Buntai and his colleagues waited and took a Chinese ship home, which was the reason it took a year and one-half waiting time in Shanghai. He was questioned closely when he finally did return in 1854 about his experiences and about the events in China.

Buntai confirmed in his Hyōryū kidan 漂流記談 [Account of Drifting at Sea] that the fighting in China was between "Ming" and Qing forces and that the former were likely to win because the British had supplied them with weaponry. Since the Opium War, the British had never given up their desire to take China for their own. Other reports about the offer of British assistance in the fighting claimed that it was going to the Qing, not the rebel, forces. As a rule, though, the idea of British help to the "Ming" side seemed to have garnered more popularity in Japan. Sufficient fear on the part of the authorities concerning foreign involvement in an East Asian rebellion, which might spread to Japan, drove the bakufu to order a thorough investigation of the rebellion in June 1854.

Through a variety of sources available to the bakufu, it was clear by the end of 1853 that the Taipings were not led by someone named Zhu, but by Hong Xiuquan, and that they aimed not at a revival of the Ming, but at a Christian kingdom. In early 1854 when Perry's
flotilla arrived at Kanagawa, among the written materials found on board and secured by the Nagasaki authorities was a diary, Nanjing jishi 南京記事 [Account of the Events at Nanjing], by a Guangdong native by the name of Luo Sen. It covered a period from the late Daoguang period through the middle of 1853 and presented a wide assortment of new information. Luo had earlier been a strong supporter of Lin Zexu 林則徐 and his hard-line policy prior to the Opium War. He too confused the Taiping and Triad rebellions, arguing that the former aimed at a Ming revival. He did confirm, though, that their leader was named Hong and that they were devoted Christians. Luo's pamphlet was widely handcopied in Japan and its name changed before being printed. Yoshida Shōin was even able to secure an untitled copy in prison. It was translated into Japanese in the spring of 1855 under the title, Shinkoku Kanpo ran ki 清国咸豐乱記 [Record of the Uprising in China during the Xianfeng Reign]. By this incarnation, however, the old theory of a Ming-Qing conflict in China had disappeared from the text.

Luo's booklet was seen in its day as a warning to the Japanese to defend against the overflow of the rebellion in China eastward. Yoshida Shōin, while in prison, claimed that he learned from Luo's pamphlet, as well as from Wei Yuan's 魏源 Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志 [Illustrated Gazetteer of the Sea Kingdoms], the causal relationship between domestic and external order. A state could not ignore one and concentrate on the other.

When the first Chinese ships in over a year arrived in Nagasaki in the middle of 1854, one of them carrying Buntai and his fellow castaways, qualitatively different information was laid before the authorities about the nature of the troubles in China. The most influential report in Japan was the Etsuhi tairyaku 信乎大略 [General Account of the Guangdong and Guangxi Bandits]; it was based on conversations with Chinese merchants and Korean information, and it was altogether different from Buntai's report. It noted that many local braves, in the years after the Opium War, were scattered about the Guangxi region and that they had risen as bandits in revolt. It denounced the Taiping regime in Nanjing, claiming they were all bandits. By far the most factually accurate report then in Japan, the Etsuhi tairyaku also reported the Taipings' Northern Expedition and the great victory sustained by the Qing.

Published in Japan several months after it first appeared, the Etsuhi tairyaku radically changed Japanese ideas about the Taipings. With each successive report from Chinese ships docking in Nagasaki, the information in this book continued to be reaffirmed. From this point, predictions of Qing victory began to appear. The more detailed the reports of battles in China, the more evidence of the Taipings' failing fortunes, the greater was the pessimism in Japan about the rebels' fate.

In 1862, the bakufu sent its famous mission to Shanghai (see the review of the essay by Etō Shinkichi below), allegedly to survey the
prospects for foreign trade. Although Takasugi Shinsaku, the most famous traveler on this voyage, had occasion to hear fighting between the Taipings and the Qing forces, he foresaw both a Qing victory and signs of an ultimate Qing collapse. He and others were especially upset by the role played by Christianity both in the Taiping movement and by the apparent ubiquitousness of missionaries in China. In 1864, the bakufu sent another mission to Shanghai, and those who reported on this trip agreed with the views of their 1862 predecessors. All saw the Taiping Rebellion from the perspective of possible Japanese domestic disorder, a giant warning to get their own house in order.

Despite the great detail he presents in this essay, Ichiko argues that the Japanese were less interested by the Taiping Rebellion than they were in the Opium War, which was clearly not a civil war. At first the uprising was seen as a revived Ming-Qing contest, and the Japanese knew well of the earlier Ming-Qing war at the time of Koxinga, a figure of fact and fiction by the late Tokugawa era. Then, as they learned the the English were (again) involved in this supposedly civil war, the Japanese became much more concerned, for the British were supporting the Taipings, and if the latter won, that might mean trouble for Japan.

What Ichiko demonstrates here was that Japanese "observers" of the Taipings filtered the information they received second-hand through the only ideas available to them. They understood well a Ming revivalist uprising, British incursions into the region, and the like. What this essay and the piece by Haga Noboru (reviewed below) confirm is that, when the information from sources in China began to stress the British help and the Taipings' affection for Christianity, the rebellion began to look less like a traditional Chinese uprising, of which history had recorded so many, and more like a foreign infection with potential trouble for Japan. There is much room for more detailed studies of many of the texts discussed by Ichiko. For instance, one would like to see a fuller study of the trials and tribulations of Buntai and his group.


This is one of those pioneering essays to which scholars are continually drawn. ETÔ Shinkichi, the "dean" of Sino-Japanese studies in Japan, was one of the first scholars to go through the diaries and records left by those aboard the Senzaimaru 千歳丸 when
it made its famous 1862 voyage to Shanghai, the first authorized Japanese trip to China in 223 years. He analyzes the travel accounts of three men in particular as a vehicle for assessing these early Japanese views of China: Takasugi Shinsaku, "Shanghai zakki" [Notes on Shanghai]; Notomi Kajirō "Shanghai nikki" [Diaries from Shanghai in 1862]; and Hibino Teruhiro "Zeiyū roku" [A useless record]. These three chronicles were finally edited and published together after the war as Bunkyu ni nen Shanhai nikki [Diaries from Shanghai in 1862], ed. Tōhō gakujutsu kyokai (Osaka: Zenkoku shobo, 1946).

Prior to this trip, the Japanese had little firsthand knowledge of China, save reports from merchants whose ships went astray and ended up in China or from books or Chinese residents in Nagasaki. There was, of course, secret trade along the Chinese coast, but no Japanese made a point of publishing an account of China based on contacts of this sort, because such a violation of the sakoku edict would have (obviously) been sufficient to warrant execution. By 1862, the bakufu had had over two decades to assimilate, albeit in piecemeal fashion, China's fate after trying to withstand European penetration; and it was a handful of years following Commodore Perry's forced opening of Japan. The time was ripe for an investigative mission, with representatives from each of the domains, into business conditions in what was already reputed to be China's most bustling port city. One must assume that the Japanese authorities somehow learned that Shanghai had already outstripped Canton as a center of international trade.

Eto concentrates on how these particular three men understood and tried to assimilate what they witnessed in China. He excludes from consideration the accounts each gave of the Taipings, because it has been magisterially dealt with by Ichiko Chūzō (see above). Upon arrival in Shanghai, all three were immediately stunned by the tremendous prosperity, with countless ships in the harbor and countless merchants engaged in business. Apparently nothing prepared them for this experience, and it interestingly had a largely negative impact on all three.

Because these three men had all received Confucian educations, they were able to communicate with Chinese via the instrument of the "pen conversation" (hitsudan; Chinese, bitan) through the medium of literary Chinese. Takasugi was the most critical of what he perceived in China and the most concerned about what it all meant for Japan. He saw Europeans swaggering about the streets as if they owned the country, while the Chinese seemed meekly to wander or cower in the shadows. Hibino thought the Chinese looked utterly ridiculous with their queues, and he expressed great sympathy for their poor masses. Notomi similarly wrote of rampant hunger, death, illness, and floating corpses in the Huangpu River. He well understood the toll that the Taiping Rebellion was exacting on poor Chinese
peasants.

All three men, especially Takasugi, despised the presence of Christian missionaries in China. He lauded the valiant but unsuccessful efforts of Lin Zexu 林則徐 and others in expelling these foreign enemies from Chinese soil. He scoured the bookstores for a copy of Lin’s collected writings, but without success. It was simply unbelievable for them to find China—"the country of unparalleled literature," according to Nōtomi, and "the country of...Yao and Shun," according to Hibino—so thoroughly weak and apparently in fear on the hated Westerners. How could China have declined to this state of decay? Hibino answered this rhetorical question most clearly: the Chinese had erred by violating the admonitions of their sages and currying favor with the barbarians. The latter had fooled the Chinese people with their false faith and their drugs; their ultimate wish was to annex China, and thus it had been wrong to allow the opening of any ports other than Canton. Nor would the Taipings offer substantive relief of China’s major problems, for they believed in the venomous "false faith" of the barbarians. Nōtomi offered a less logical, if ultimately more dispassionate, analysis of China’s predicament. He felt badly that China was weak and poor, but he failed to explain why he thought that situation had come about.

Takasugi Shinsaku adopted a much more radical and much more practical line of attack. He saw countless foreign ships in the Shanghai harbor and went out and ordered a warship from the Dutch for his native domain of Chōshū 長州. When he found that the writings of Wei Yuan 魏源 were out of print in China and that the Chinese were not forcefully preparing to drive the foreigners out of their country, rather than derive from this a long analysis of the failures of the Chinese people, he extracted lessons for the future of Japan. Contemporary China became an enormous negative example for him. His only critique of the Chinese was for their failure to abandon ways that were proven failures and to adopt from the strengths of the enemy. Japan could not, in his opinion, maintain sakoku, and he envisioned trade with Canton, Hong Kong, Shanghai, London, and Washington. The issue was no longer retaining Confucianism versus abandoning it; it was now East Asia versus a Western invasion.

Although Takasugi’s trepidations lest what he witnessed in China should spread to Japan were the strongest of the three, all of them shared this perspective. As Hibino noted (citing the oft heard line from the Shijing 詩經): "A Inkan tokarazu, chikaku issui no soto ni ari" 問殷豈トカラズ, 近ケ水ノ外ニアリ [Ah, the dangerous lesson {literally, "the mirror of the Shang dynasty," implying the lesson of why the Shang collapsed can be learned from the reflection of history} is close at hand, only separated from us by a stream] (p. 68). A sense of crisis was at hand. Even assuming that China was not jettisoned from the picture, there were (at least) two possible responses to this crisis. Takasugi’s response, and Etō argues that he would later influence Kusaka Genzui 久坂玄瑞 in this regard, was to reaffirm the
call for expelling the foreigners (jōi 撤退). Yokoi Shōnan 濱口雄三 would conclude several years later that Japan had to open up the country (kaikoku 開国) and develop a strong Sino-Japanese mutual reliance.

Yokoi and Kusaka shared a belief in Sino-Japanese cooperation (shinshi hosha 唇齿相依, suggesting the close bond between lips and teeth), albeit with different conclusions concerning Japanese policy. They and others agreed that East Asia had to be strong to resist the West; not just Japan, but China too had to be strong, and that required domestic reforms. This idea continued into the 1870s; but, by the 1880s it began rapidly to be eclipsed by the idea that, if Japan did not hurry up and strengthen itself, all of East Asia would collapse to the Westerners. China was just too weak, too conservative, and too slow to modernize. When the famous Miyazaki Tōten 宮崎滔天, Sun Zhongshan's 孫中山 friend and source of funds, appeared on the scene at the end of the century, he too reaffirmed Sino-Japanese cooperation but now it had to lead to a revolution in China. Etō diagrammatically represents this development of changing Japanese perspectives on China as follows:

Inkan

\[ \downarrow \]

- shinshi hosha

- jōi

\[ \rightarrow \]

kaikoku

Chinese reform possible

\[ \downarrow \]

Sino-Japanese friendship

Chinese reform impossible

\[ \rightarrow \]

Japanese conquest of China

Chinese revolution

One may not buy this overly schematic presentation, but it certainly is extremely suggestive. One problem is that the picture is not so perfectly unilinear as one might conclude from this chart. More detailed studies of the travel accounts from this 1862 trip in comparison to later 19th-century Japanese views of China, with attention to the metaphors, the language, and the classical referents used will begin to open this immense issue to greater scrutiny. I think that, when we have more detailed studies, we will see that one cannot draw a simple line from Meiji views of China to Tōjō Hideki 東條英機 or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as is often attempted.
Haga Noboru is one of the most prolific and important contemporary Japanese historians of the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. In this excellent essay, he touches on one of his newer interests, that of Japanese responses to the earth-shaking events of nineteenth-century China and the impact those events (via the responses) had in subsequent bakumatsu and early Meiji political developments. Using the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion as foci for his analysis, Haga attempts to show what concerns and fears underlay Japanese responses and the framework for their understanding. One of the more interesting aspects of such an analysis, which remains implicit in this essay, is the simple fact that until 1862 no Japanese of the period under discussion actually saw Chinese soil. All the information from the mainland was gained second-hand through a variety of interlocutors--Chinese, British, Dutch, and French--at the port of Nagasaki. In a sense, Japanese reactions and efforts to understand what was transpiring resemble the three blind men and the elephant or, more recently, Western China-watching prior to the early 1970s.

One of the unresolved, and frequently mentioned, issues in this essay involves Haga's effort to weigh the relative impact of news of the Opium War and that of the Taiping Rebellion. Which had greater effect back in Japan? Although he does not successfully answer this question, he does offer intriguing ways for us to assess "influence." He also demonstrates in both cases how wildly incorrect reports surfaced and circulated in Japan, but how increased access to correct information brought increasingly sober reactions.

The first hard news of the Qing defeat in the Opium War arrived from Dutch and Chinese shipmen. The bakufu was keenly interested in the information; and, after interviewing Chinese extensively in Nagasaki, it learned that the war was a result of China's refusal to trade in opium. From the very start, Japanese thinking was guided by the logic of neiyou gaikan 内憂外患 (Chinese, neiyou waihuan) or "domestic disorder and foreign disaster." The phrase is not simply a listing of two items, but implies a connectedness in which one of the two elements is linked to the other in a cause and effect relationship. Haga might have been wise to point this out; perhaps it is too obvious to deserve mention to a scholarly Japanese audience.

Early reports to the bakufu stressed that the Qing loss was due primarily to poor military preparation; with the clear implication that Japan was similarly weak in artillery and needed to make the necessary ordinance reforms. Mizuno Tadakuni 水野忠邦, who had
gained control over the Grand Council (Rōjū 豊中) in 1841, solicited and received a number of position papers on how to go about making such reforms; this was tantamount to an admission that the Opium War would be the cause of a basic change in Japanese foreign policy, for the Qing loss had really shaken up Japanese leaders. The fear in Japan was, of course, that the domestic lack of artillery would enable foreign aggression (gaikan) to spread from the mainland to the sacred islands; and from there cause domestic disquiet (neiyū).

Close to Mizuno was Satō Nobuhiro 佐藤信浩, who was to become famous later when he developed plans for Japanese expansion onto the mainland. In Satō's estimation, the Opium War was "a rare event completely unprecedented since the creation of heaven and earth; I stood before it in total wonderment" (Tenchi kaibyaku irai mishō no chinji nari). Yo hanahada kore o kyōi seri 天地関端以来未尚有の珍事なり. 不意の此事を驚異せり [p. 95]). Japan had long been able to fight off foreign invaders, Satō noted. Paraphrasing a well-known passage from the Zuozhuan 左伝, he pointed out that the Europeans were as insatiable as jackals and wolves (the English especially so); hence, Japan would have to beef up its defenses against potential attack from the "barbarians." But, in fact, the Qing defeat was due, he argued, not to England's superior firepower, but the China's poor preparedness.

Satō realized that the Qing, like the British, was run by "barbarians," but with a difference. "The reason I wish for a crushing of Great Britain and the continued existence of the Qing regime is that the Manchus unified China [lit. the "central efflorescence" Chōka 中華], continued the benevolent rule of the Ming dynasty for successive generations, and effected government in the service of heaven's will; thus, it has enabled the Chinese to flourish and multiply" (p. 96).

Sakuma Zōzan 佐久間象山, pioneer kaikaku advocate and a Kangaku scholar, blamed the defeat of the Qing on the decadence of Chinese scholars. Rather than serve the government, they had eschewed official service, a value earlier Chinese scholars had taken as second nature for over 1000 years, and pursued lives solely of scholarship. Furthermore, the scholarship in which they were engaged was merely textual exegesis or kaozhengxue 考証学 (Japanese, kōshōgaku) to prove this or that section (or edition) of a classic was spurious. This critique of textual criticism for lack of attention to "real learning" (jitsugaku 実学; Chinese, shixue) was also a trend in the first half of the 19th century in China. To what extent was Sakuma influenced by Chinese critiques? What role did his initial respect for Wei Yuan and his magnum opus, the Haiguo tuzhi, play in Sakuma's arguments? Haga does not address these questions, undoubtedly because his approach is entirely from the Japanese side of the equation.

Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 later argued, as an effective mouthpiece for the British, that the Opium War had not started because foreigners arbitrarily violated Chinese markets and begun importing
opium. It was a confrontation between Europe's spirit of free trade and the "narrow, conservative, self-satisfaction of the Qing" (p. 97). The Qing had simply been unable to accept the foreigners as diplomatic equals. Lord Palmerston, Okuma continued, had not commenced hostilities over the importation of opium, but over the Qing's unfair view that all foreign governments were barbarians.

Nativist scholars (kokugakusha 国学者) weighed in on this issue as well. Haga cites the work of Sarube Hiromori 佐渡宏盛 who came to the realization that, in the mechanical area of shipbuilding, Japan might adopt certain things from the Europeans, and she could still retain her native "national polity" (kokutai 国体). Thus, the Opium War necessitated, in his view, shogunal reforms; otherwise, a crisis consciousness would mount at home, which might lead to civil war and domestic collapse in Japan. The sense in Sarube's argument was that foreign pressure alone was not a major problem unless it led to the threat of invasion. Japan had to take any measure necessary to protect her autonomy and not follow the Qing's disastrous fate: "The ruts of the overturned front axle of the Qing offers our rear axle a powerful warning" (p. 100).

So, what was the relationship between the Opium War and Japan's decision to open her ports to trade? Without answering this question, Haga notes that many commentators have doubted a direct link. As early as 1815, whalers from the United States tried to force Japan to open her doors to the whaling trade, albeit unsuccessfully. Okuma Shigenobu himself claimed that the Opium War was the most important single event, but then cited other important elements: the invention of the steamship, the discovery of gold in California, and the like. Was the Japanese response to the Opium War really a recognition that international circumstances had led to a crisis of such a magnitude that it necessitated Japan's opening her doors? If this is so, then why did kaikoku not actually occur until over twenty years after knowledge of China's defeat in the Opium War reached Japan? Haga does not answer these questions; he does not even ask some of them.

The initial reports of the Taiping Rebellion came to Japan in 1852 when two Chinese ships carried the news into Nagasaki. One report told of a rebel from Guangxi (at least, the province was correct) who had assumed the surname Zhu 朱 in imitation of the long-deposed Ming house. Such stories of an anti-Manchu Ming revival gained such popularity and circulation that Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰, for one, wrote a note in which he welcomed the return to China of the decorum of Ming, once these rebels had completed their conquest. The next year reports from Korea correctly named the bandit leader Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全, but still insisted that he was trying to reinstitute the Ming. As it became clear that Hong and his followers were not Ming restorationists but Christian fundamentalists—who had, apparently on the basis of incorrect missionary reports, been confused with the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui 天地会)—a truer picture of the Taipings began to emerge in Japan, still, it must be
added, without any personal contacts.

When it was learned further in Japan that the Qing had received British and French help in trying to quell the rebels, China's incapacity to put down "domestic disorder" was laid bare. While in prison, Yoshida Shōin, who was always interested in news from China, radically changed his views and wrote in a letter (in Kanbun) to a friend that: "I cannot tell if Hong will be victorious, but the Chinese people are to be deeply mourned because of him. The Chinese have always praised themselves as the central effluorescence, while debasing foreigners as dogs and sheep; but, since the great change brought about by the Mongols and Manchus, the Chinese people cannot remain at peace" (p. 106). After delineating how China's moral fabric has been torn to shreds, Yoshida concluded that, because of the poor rule of the Manchus, the Taipings' uprising was an outward sign of domestic disorder in China.

The next step would be for him to see the Taipings as "bandits." The catalysts for taking this step were his extreme antipathy for Christianity and, even more important, the realization that a single spark can light a prairie fire: it could lead to domestic disorder in Japan. For the man who was soon to be beheaded for contributing to the climate of anti-shogunal consciousness in Japan, this was a remarkably ironic realization. Indeed, Yoshida eventually welcomed news of stinging Taiping defeats at the hands of Qing forces. He even developed plans, fairly hair-brained to be sure, of Japanese advances in Korea, Manchuria, and China, as part of a plan for self-strengthening before the inevitable confrontation.

Following the Arrow War (also known as the Second Opium War) of 1856, the bakufu began to make tentative plans toward revitalization and for opening Japan's ports, by sending a ship (with representatives from each of the han) on a mission of observation to Shanghai in 1862. In reviewing the essay by Eta Shinkichi above, we examined some of the responses of this group, especially those of the most famous occupant of a berth on that ship, Takasugi Shinsaku. Takasugi was the first Japanese actually to witness scenes from the Taiping Rebellion and to hear fighting in the distance. But, unlike his now deceased teacher, Yoshida Shōin, Takasugi vented all his rage at the Europeans who appeared with frightening ubiquity in Chinese cities, especially Shanghai. His response marks a turning point in Japanese reactions to events in China. He was, of course, concerned (indeed, obsessed) with what the rampant decay in China would mean for Japan, but he did not look for scapegoats in China. He blamed all of China's ills on the evil Western "barbarians." Takasugi was beginning to break through the constraints of the simplistic logic of nei'yū gaikan. He was able to distinguish positive and negative features of the Taiping rebels; they were dangerous because of their links to Christianity, but they were fighting the Qing's European allies, and for that they deserved considerable praise.

As the social and political goals of the Taiping movement became
known in Japan, sympathy for it grew. As Kusaka Genzui 久坂玄瑞 noted, without resistance from the Taipings, there would have been no security for Japan; the Taiping resistance provided a great bulwark preventing the flow of foreign aggression eastward to Japan.

Haga drops a number of nuggets toward the end of his essay, all of which deserve attention. Why was it, he asks, that the Japanese government never articulated an overall policy to deal with the rapidly developing situation in China? He suggests that the bakufu was content that its sakoku stance would provide the strength for national security, but the 1862 mission was in fact a preparatory step to the abrogation of sakoku. Study of this issue is a desideratum.

Haga notes in passing that a certain amount of opium did penetrate Japanese ports after the kaikoku policy went into effect. However, the Japanese leaders realized that, while the British might compel the Japanese to sell the drug, the United States was against it (despite the fact that United States ships were transporting it to China). Thus, these leaders concluded, Japan had to conclude a treaty with the United States. The issue of opium and Japan in the early period is a desideratum for research.

By mid-Meiji times, Fukuzawa Yukichi 柏尾鴻一 would offer his opinion on the Opium War. He, not surprisingly, blamed the Chinese for refusing to trade with the British. They could have maintained peace, even if that included trade in opium and the conclusion of an unequal treat. What did they ultimately get for their stubborn insistence? China, in his estimation, was the bulwark that failed, a negative paragon for Japan to avoid at all costs.


This book takes a giant step forward in beginning to fill in the research gaps suggested as desiderata in the reviews of the three essays above. It is the fullest treatment to date, in any language, of the general topic under discussion. The review that follows cannot do justice to the richness of this book; I only hope to describe it in summary and make some observations. Wang Xiaqiu teaches in the History Department of Beijing University, and he spent a year affiliated with Keiō University in Tokyo. Use of the term "modern" in his title carries with it a strict, traditional Marxist designation of "Opium-War-to-May-Fourth-Movement." No discussion is offered for why this periodization, long applied by Chinese and others to Chinese history, should also be applied to Japanese history. Should not a book dealing with both countries seek to locate "modernity," if indeed this nebulous subject must be dealt with at all, in both cultures? Furthermore, should not a work in Sino-Japanese relations try
to ascertain if we can, in fact, even speak of a "Sino-Japanese modernity," when it might have begun, and what criteria one might employ to discern modernity when studying the history of two countries simultaneously. To be sure, this is far from Wang's central theme. Readers interested in this problem should look at Wang Xiangrong's extremely suggestive essay, "Zhong-Ji guanxi de fenqi wenti" [Issues in the periodization of the history of Sino-Japanese relations], in Riben de Zhongguo yimin [Chinese Refugees in Japan] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1987), pp. 5-18.


While some of this material covers familiar ground, it does so with a thoroughness heretofore absent in this area of research. One of the major contributions of this work, though, such as in the section on the Opium War and Japan, is Wang's introduction of manuscripts and other writings discovered in China that open new vistas for research. For example, he found in the Beijing University Library two extremely rare texts from Edo-period Japan that describe the Opium War--two texts never mentioned in scholarship before, it should be added: "Haiwai xinhua 海外新话" [New Stories from Overseas] by Mineta Fuko 岐田枫江, a work that was privately published because it failed to receive the bakufu's permission and so was banned in Japan; the author eventually died in prison. The second text was entitled "Haiwai xinhua shiyi 海外新话拾遗" [Emendations and Additions to Haiwai xinhua], but its author remains unknown to us.

Like the other works reviewed above, Wang is concerned with how information from China found its way to Japan (and vice versa) and the routes through which it was filtered: the means, the intermediaries, the rumors and stories (true or false) that circulated, and how hard information was finally obtained. To Wang's credit, subjects that have long been examined and reexamined, such as the role played by certain Japanese in the 1911 Revolution, are not belabored and well-known details not repeated. By the same token, his longest chapters, on the Opium War and Japan, is a welcome addition to the
Wang's real strength as a scholar shines in his two highly textual chapters on the rare editions of works by Huang Zunxian and Kang Youwei. For further evidence of this, see the essay he co-authored with Feng Zuozhe 冯佐哲, translated in this issue of SJSN. The latter of these two chapters sheds considerably further light on the role of the Meiji Restoration as a model for the 1898 Reform Movement. One can only agree with Wang (p. 210) that we need a full-length study of this important work. Of the eleven short pieces, each concerned with one Chinese travel account of Japan (from 1854 until 1908), some are more valuable than others. Several of these, such as that of Huang Qingdeng, are extremely rare documents recently uncovered in Chinese libraries; and, thus, the very mention of their existence is valuable in and of itself.

A comparative chart of major events in modern Chinese and Japanese history (1840-1919) comprises the final 60 pages of this book. Although compiled from an assortment of eleven readily available sources, it is very useful nonetheless, and contains plenty of information specifically of import to those of us interested in the history of Sino-Japanese relations.

This work is volume six in the series of thirteen entitled "Higashi Ajia no naka no Nihon rekishi" 東アジアのなかの日本歴史 presently planned by Rokkō shuppan, about half of which are now out (see SJSN, I.1, p. 5 for the titles all the volumes). Each of these volumes is the work of a Chinese scholar writing in Japanese, and despite the rather ambiguous title of the entire series, every one of them specifically concerns Sino-Japanese relations. Professor Lü teaches at Nankai University in Tianjin and is in the Institute of Japanese Studies of the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences. He is one of China's leading scholars of modern Japanese history and modern Sino-Japanese relations, having published widely in Chinese journals. This volume is generally a valuable addition to the scholarly record, although it is a strange work in the sense that it covers unexpected topics in great detail. One should know from the start that this is only partially a work on the mutual Sino-Japanese impact of the Meiji Restoration and events in China. It is much more a work on the "meaning" of the Meiji Restoration both for Japan and for China. Only one chapter deals specifically with the events of the Restoration, while the rest of the work obsesses over such tiresome questions as modernization, the essence of the Meiji reforms, views on the differences between China and Japan in their modernization efforts, and remnants of the Meiji Restoration in the contemporary
There is one central chapter (pp. 117-208), bearing exactly the same title as the entire book, which is fascinating and worth the price of the book. The first part of it covers similar terrain to the first chapter of Wang Xiaoqiu's book, reviewed above. In fact, he examines the very same rare books by Japanese on the Opium War which were discovered in the Beijing University Library. Then, he takes us through a series of brief looks at the standard sights on this oft-covered trip--Wei Yuan and the Haiguo tuzhi in Japan, news of the Taiping Rebellion in Japan, influence of the Taiping rising on the Meiji Restoration. A close reading of this section, though, is worth the effort, for much new information is to be found there.

The second section of this chapter concerns the policies of the Meiji government toward China. Here, Lü deals with early Meiji (and some late Tokugawa) ideas concerning an alliance with or the management of China, including those of Aizawa Seishisai 会沢正志喜, Satō Nobuhiro 佐藤信雄, Shimazu Nariakira 島津大輔, and others. He follows the debates in the early Meiji years over the conquest of Korea and the invasion of Taiwan, and he has a relatively long subsection on Fukuzawa Yukichi's福澤諭吉 idea of Datsu-A ron 脫亜論 or ridding Japan of the legacy of the Asian mainland.

The third and final section of this chapter concerns the role of the Meiji Restoration in the "awakening of the Chinese people." Interestingly, he begins his discussion of this awakening prior to the Restoration, by examining a document by the Taiping leader Hong Ren'gan 洪仁玕 (dated 1859) and one by the early advocate of reform Feng Guifen 冯桂芬 (dated 1861). As Lü shows, both texts demonstrate a clear awareness that, despite the compulsion by the West to sign unequal treaties and engage in trade, Japan was using the opportunity to learn technology from the West and plan for more that just the immediate future. Lü moves next into the 1870s and looks at Chinese travel accounts of Japan in the early Meiji years. He also looks at the influence of Japanese on the early Westernization program (yangwu yongdong 洋務運動) in China. Some of the texts examined here are discussed as well in Wang's book; many are not, and many of them have never been discussed before.

After brief analyses of the now famous texts, by Huang Zunxian and Kang Youwei, described above, Lü carries the discussion into the early years of the 20th century. Here he covers the travels of Chinese students to Japan, the activities of Japanese educators such as Shimoda Utako 下田歌子 in Japan and Matsumoto Kamejiro 松本亀次郎 in China, and the impact of the Meiji Constitution on the drafting of a late-Qing constitution. The section culminates with a short segment on the influence of the Meiji Restoration on Sun Zhongshan and the 1911 Revolution. The 147 footnotes alone make this chapter extremely interesting. One discovers numerous citations to works in Chinese, heretofore unknown outside China, about Japanese history or Sino-Japanese relations.
Some of the remaining material in this book is clearly aimed at another audience. Lengthy recitation of what past scholars have to say about why the Meiji Restoration "succeeded" and the 1898 Reform Movement "failed" struck me as tedious. This may be new information for Chinese readers, but this book is written in Japanese. The views of Satō Seizaburō 佐藤誠三郎, Edwin O. Reischauer, and the like are well-known (to say the least) and rather outdated. And, other than a small group of scholars presently housed at a great university in New Jersey, few of still care much about "modernization." Lű deals as well with the comparative impact of the West in China and Japan, early studies of Western technologies in China and Japan, and other expected topics. Sadly (in all senses of the term), this chapter culminates in V. I. Lenin and the rise of the Materialist Conception of History, as if that is the final word.

The fourth chapter also covers tiresome terrain, the essence of the Meiji Restoration, which may be the single most discussed scholarly topic in Japan. Lű wisely inserts a highly interesting sub-section of various Chinese views of the Meiji Restoration, from the 1950s through the present. Here, he examines the considerably less well-known views of Zhou Yiliang 周一良 (incomplete bourgeois revolution, 1962), Wu Tingqiu 吴廷璆 (included stages of both reform and revolution, 1964), Wan Feng 万峰 (bourgeois reform, 1979), Wu Tingqiu and Wu Anlong 武安隆 (bourgeois revolution in a backward country, 1981), and others. This section would have been even more interesting for these historiographic insights had Lű not chosen to devote space to such exceptionally uninteresting themes as the role of "feudalism," "absolutism," "nationalist revolution," and the like in this discussion. And, I for one would have been much happier not to have seen Joseph Stalin appear, uncritically, at the pinnacle of the discussion of ethnicity and culture. One can be a Marxist--even a Chinese Marxist--without having to cite the Little Father as some sort of expert on this subject.

Yet, even with all the reservations mentioned above, this book is a more than welcome addition. Had it been written in Chinese, it is more than likely that few, if any, Japanese scholars would ever have read it. Perhaps it may lead to a genuine Sino-Japanese dialogue on the many interesting themes it raises.