

Trends in Chinese Research on Modern Japanese History: The Fifteen-Year War¹

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Introduction

For the Japanese 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in World War II, but for the Chinese it marked the fiftieth anniversary of victory in “The War of Resistance Against Japan.” This fifty-year postwar period, however, has not seen steady development in Japanese studies within China. Civil war from 1945 to 1949 and the decade-long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution starting in 1966 brought paralysis and stagnation not only to Japanese studies, but also to academic research as a whole. Chinese historians have been able to work on Japan in an atmosphere of calm only after Sino-Japanese relations normalized in 1972, after the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, and after the Third Plenum of the CCP’s Eleventh Party Congress launched a program to “pursue facts and liberate thought” in 1978.²

Thereafter, several universities and social science research institutes created centers for Japan studies, mainly in the northeastern provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. Societies for the study of Japanese History, Sino-Japanese Relations, Japan-Northeast China Relations, and Japanese Studies in general have provided

¹ Translators’ note. This article, “Chûgoku ni okeru Nihon gendai shi kenkyû no dôkô: Jûgonen sensô ki no Nit-Chû kankei shi o chûshin ni” 中国における日本現代史研究の動向：十五年戦争期の日中関係史を中心に, appeared in Awaya Kentarô 粟屋憲太郎, Toyoshita Narahiko 豊下梢彦, Mori Takemaro 森武磨, and Yoshida Yutaka 吉田裕, eds., *Nenpô: Nihon gendai shi* 年報：日本現代史 1 (May 1995), pp. 249-63. We wish to thank the editors and publisher, Azuma shuppan, for permission to translate the Japanese original. Throughout the article, Kobayashi follows the left-wing Japanese convention of placing quotation marks around the terms “Manchuria” and “Manchoukuo” in deference to the sensibilities of Chinese who may be offended. We have omitted these quotation marks in this English translation for the sake of simplicity.

² See T’ang Ch’ung-nan 湯重南, “Jih-pen shih” 日本史, in Hsiao Li 肖黎, *Chung-kuo li-shih-hsüeh ssu-shih-nien* 中国歴史学四十年 (Shu-mu wen-hsien ch’u-pan-she, 1989); and Wu An-lung 武安隆 and Hsiung Ta-yün 熊竜雲, *Chûgokujin no Nihon kenkyû shi* 中国人の日本研究史 (Rokkô shuppan, 1989).

scholarly forums for research.³ And, in general, when Chinese historians do study Japan, they are interested mainly in Sino-Japanese relations--not Japanese political history. That being said, the past decade has produced a remarkably changed climate for studies of modern and contemporary history.

First, the Chinese have eagerly hosted and attended international conferences where delegates from the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Europe, and North America freely exchanged views. For example, in 1985 Peking hosted a conference to mark the fortieth anniversary of "Victory over Japanese Agression and of Worldwide Anti-Fascism." In 1987 Tokyo, Kyoto, and Tsinan hosted conferences to commemorate the July 7th (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident. And in 1991 Shenyang (formerly, Mukden) hosted a conference to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the September 18th Manchurian Incident. Participants did not fully overcome differences in nationality, ideology, and political perspectives, but the conference still marked a big step forward in furthering mutual communication and identifying points of controversy.

Second, over the past ten years, many scholars from the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan have studied in Japan for extended lengths of time. There used to be severe restrictions on access to primary sources in China, so students of modern Japan had to rely mainly on secondary works. Now, studying in Japan permits them to gather primary materials and to establish personal contacts easily. As a result, they have to publish empirically grounded studies of high quality, some of which they even write in Japanese. These trends will surely intensify hereafter.

Below, I will survey trends in modern Japanese history and Sino-Japanese relations on the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan since the 1980s. These fields account for but a fraction of Chinese scholarship on Japan, but there are still a great number of books and articles to be consulted.⁴ So I do not presume to attempt a truly comprehensive

³ See Li Yü 李玉, Liu Yü-min 劉玉敏, and Chang Kuei-lai 張貴來, eds., *Chung-kuo Jih-pen-hsüeh lun-chu so-yin: 1949-1988* 中国日本学論著索引: 1949-1988 (Pei-ching ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1991). According to them, books on history outnumber those on language and economics, but articles on economics far outnumber those on history.

⁴ To review trends in Chinese studies on modern and contemporary Japanese history written in Japanese, see the following: Yü Hsin-ch'un 俞辛焯, "Chûgoku ni okeru Nihon gaikô shi kenkyû" 中国における日本外交史研究, *Aichi daigaku kokusai mondai kenkyûjo kiyô* 愛知大学国際問題研究所紀要 730 (June 1983); Yü Hsin-ch'un, "Chûgoku ni okeru kindai Chûgai kankei shi kenkyû no dôkô" 中国における近代中外関係史研究の動向, *Rekishigaku kenkyû* 歴史学研究 518 (July 1983); Liao Lung-kan 廖隆幹, "Chûgoku ni okeru Nihon kindai shi kenkyû no genkyô" 中国における日本近代史研究の現況, in *Kindai Nihon kenkyûkai* 近代日本研究会, ed., *Nenpô kindai Nihon kenkyû 10: Kindai Nihon kenkyû no kentô to kadai* 年報近代日本研究 10: 近代日本研究の検討と課題 (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1988); Wu Mi-ch'a 吳密察, "Taiwan ni okeru Nihon kindai shi kenkyû no seika" 台湾における日本近代史研究の成果, in *ibid.*; Yamane Yukio 山根幸夫, Fujii Shôzô 藤井昇三, Nakamura Tadashi 中村義, and Ôta Shôkô 太田勝洪, *Kindai Nit-Chû kankei shi kenkyû nyûmon* 近代日中関係史研究入門 (Kenbun shuppan, 1992); and Lu I 魯義, "Chûgoku ni okeru Nihon kenkyû" 中国における日本研究, *Kokusai Nihon bunka kenkyû sentâ kiyô: Nihon kenkyû* 国際日本文化研究センター紀要: 日本研究 10 (August 1994).

In preparing this article I consulted the following: Hsü Yung 徐勇, "Jih-pen ch'in-Hua shih yen-chiu tsung-shu" 日本侵華史研究綜述, *Shih-chieh shih yen-chiu tung-t'ai* 世界史

bibliographic survey. Instead, I will focus on the Fifteen-Year War from 1931 to 1945 and the period leading to it.

The 1920s

Chinese studies of the 1920s center on Japan's policies of continental expansion as pursued under Shidehara and Tanaka diplomacy, on railway negotiations, and on the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) in Northeast China.⁵ The so-called "Tanaka Memorial" remains a key topic of research.⁶ In Japan almost everyone agrees that the document is specious, so few people discuss the issue. But in China, controversy over the document's authenticity has been raging since the mid-1970s.

First, historians such as I Hsien-shih, Shen Yü, Kao Tien-fang, and Liu T'ing-hua insist that the document is authentic and that Tanaka actually submitted it to Emperor

研究動態 (March 1989); Chia Pao-po 賈寶波, "Erh-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo hsüeh-che tui Chung-Jih kuan-hsi shih ti yen-chiu" 二十年来中国学者对中日關係史的研究, *Shih-chieh shih yen-chiu tung-t'ai* (September 1992); I Hsien-shih 易顯石, "Min-kuo shih-ch'i Chung-Jih kuan-hsi shih yen-chiu shu-p'ing" 民国時期中日關係史研究述評, in Ts'eng Ching-chung 曾景忠, ed., *Chung-hua Min-kuo shih yen-chiu shu-lüeh* 中華民國史研究述略 (Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1992); Chin Kuang-yao 金光耀 and Chang Chi-shun 張濟順, "K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i lun-hsien-ch'ü yen-chiu shu-p'ing" 抗日战争時期淪陷區研究述評, in *ibid.*; Pai Ya-ch'in 白雅琴, "Chiu-i-pa' shih-pien yen-chiu tsung-shu" 九一八事變研究綜述, *She-hui k'o-hsüeh chan-hsien* 社会科学戰線 1 (1991); Chang Ching-sung 張勁松 and Ma I-hung 馬依弘, "Chiu-i-pa shih-pien yen-chiu tsung-shu" 九一八事變研究綜述, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 抗日战争研究 1 (1991); Jung Wei-mu 榮維木, "Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-pien yen-chiu tsung-shu" 盧溝橋事變研究綜述, *ibid.* 3 (1992); Ch'i Fu-lin 齊福霖, "Chin-liu-nien-lai Chung-Jih chan-cheng shih yen-chiu chuang-k'uang yü chin-hou chang-wang" 近六年来中日戰爭史研究狀況與今後展望, in Yamada Tatsuo 山田辰雄, ed., *Nit-Chü kankei no 150 nen: sôgo izon, kyôzon, tekитай* 日中關係の150年: 相互依存競存敵対 (Tôhō shoten, 1994). For reprints of many of these, see *Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih* 中国現代史 (Chung-kuo jen-min ta-hsüeh shu-pao tzu-liao chung-hsin). However, I have cited the original date and place of publication for each article.

⁵ I Hsien-shih 易顯石, *Nihon no tairiku seisaku to Chûgoku tôhoku* 日本の大陸政策と中国東北 (Rokkô shuppan, 1989); Shen Yü 沈予 and Hsieh Hsüeh-ch'iao 謝雪橋, "T'ien-chung wai-chiao' ti tui-Hua cheng-ts'e" 田中外交的對華政策, *Li-shih yen-chiu* 歷史研究 1 (1988); Wu Yin 武寅, "Lun Pi-yüan wai-chiao ti hsing-ch'eng yü pu-wen-ting-hsing" 論幣原外交的形成不穩定性, *Jih-pen wen-t'i* 日本問題 6 (1989); Wang Ying-nan 王英男, "Chiu-i-pa shih-pien ch'ien Tung-pei chih (t'ieh-lu) chien-she yü Jih-pen so-wei 't'e-shu ch'üan-i'" 九一八事變前東北之(鐵路)建設與日本所謂特殊權益, *Chin-tai Chung-kuo* 近代中国 85 (1991); Hsi Wu-i 習五一, "Man-Meng t'ieh-lu chiao-she' yü Jih-Feng mao-tun ti chihua" 滿蒙鐵路交涉與日奉矛盾激化, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 近代史研究 5 (1992); Jen Sung 任松, "Ts'ung 'Man-Meng t'ieh-lu chiao-she' k'an Jih-Feng kuan-hsi" 從滿蒙鐵路交涉看日奉關係, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 5 (1994).

⁶ For the most concise treatment of this issue, see Soejima Shôichi 副島昭一, "Chûgoku tôhoku shinryaku to jûgonen sensô no kaishi" 中国東北侵略と十五年戦争の開始, in Fujiwara Akira 藤原彰 and Imai Seiichi 今井清一, eds., *Jûgonen sensô shi I: Manshû jihen* 十五年戦争史I: 滿州事變 (Aoki shoten, 1988).

Hirohito.⁷ For the most part, they base their assertions on memoirs left by Ts'ai Chih-k'an who reputedly stole his way into the imperial palace archives and made a copy of the document, or by Wang Chia-chen who reputedly smuggled the copy into China, and translated and edited it.⁸ This school stresses that Japanese actions after the Far Eastern Conference (1927) fully bear out the document's contents. Or, they say that there was a separate "secret conference," and that the Foreign Ministry did not record these discussions in its official proceedings.

By contrast, historians such as Yü Hsin-ch'un and Tsou Yu-heng agree on the aggressive aims of the Far Eastern Conference. But they nevertheless assert that the memorial was forged or that its authenticity cannot be proven.⁹ Yü studied Foreign Ministry documents of the period to prove that the Conference's actual proceedings never reached positions outlined in the "Tanaka Memorial." Tsou has made a detailed study of the text to show that it is not drafted in the form properly used in memorials submitted to the throne, and that it contains numerous factual errors which Tanaka could never have committed.

Although one can easily understand the difficulties created by poor accessibility to Japanese sources until recent years, I was still taken aback by the scant regard for empirical analysis shown by one school in this debate. Tsou Yu-heng points out these reasons to explain why Chinese hold fast to their belief in the document's authenticity despite evidence to the contrary. First, Japan's aggression in China, and especially in the Northeast, followed the "Tanaka Memorial" all too closely. Second, the existence of this document cannot be denied simply because of factual errors in it. Third, to reject its authenticity might lead to absolving the criminality of Japanese imperialism.¹⁰ Thus, the "Tanaka Memorial" controversy is deeply rooted in Chinese historical and national

⁷ I Hsien-shih 易顯石, Chang Te-liang 張德良, Ch'en Ch'ung-ch'iao 陳崇橋, and Li Hung-chün 李鴻鈞, *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shih* 九一八事變史 (Liao-ning jen-min ch'u-pan-shi, 1981) (This volume has been translated into Japanese by Hayakawa Tadashi 早川正, published by Shin jidai sha in 1986); Kao Tien-fang 高殿芳, "Kuan-yü 'T'ien-chung tsou-che' ti lai-lung ch'ü-mai" 關於田中奏折的來龍去脈, in Chung-kuo jen-min k'ang-Jih chan-cheng chi-nien-kuan 中國人民抗日戰爭紀念館, ed., *Chung-kuo jen-min k'ang-Jih chan-cheng chi-nien-kuan wen-ts'ung* 中國人民抗日戰爭紀念館文叢 (Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1991); Liu T'ing-hua 劉庭華, "*Chiu-i-pa*" *shih-pien yen-chiu* 九一八事變研究 (Chieh-fang-chün kuo-fang ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1986). See also Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS], ed., *Jih-pen ch'in-Hua ch'i-shih nien shih* 日本侵華七十年史 (CASS, 1992), of which the relevant section is authored by Shen Yü 沈予.

⁸ Ts'ai Chih-k'an 蔡智堪, "Wo tsen-yang ch'ü-te T'ien-chung tsou-chang" 我怎樣取得田中奏章, *Tzu-yu jen* 自由人 (Hong Kong, August 29, 1953); Wang Chia-chen 王家楨, "Jih-pen liang chi-mi wen-chien Chung-i-pen ti lai-li" 日本兩機密文件中諷本的來歷, *Wen-shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi* 文史資料選輯 11 (1961).

⁹ Yü Hsin-ch'un 俞辛焯, "Tung-fang hui-i chen-hsiang yü 'T'ien-chung tsou-che' wen-t'i" 東方會議真相與田中奏折問題, *Nan-k'ai hsüeh-pao* 南開學報 1 (1985); Tsou Yu-heng 鄒有恆, "Tui Ts'ai Chih-k'an ch'ü-de T'ien-chung tsou-chang ti chih-i" 對蔡智堪取得田中奏章的質疑, *Wai-kuo wen-t'i yen-chiu* 外國問題研究 4 (1987); Tsou Yu-heng, "'T'ien-chung tsou-chang' chen-wei lun" 田中奏章真偽論, *ibid.* 1 (1994).

¹⁰ Tsou Yu-heng, "'T'ien-chung tsou-chang' chen-wei lun."

consciousness. So, the “forgery thesis” will not attain the status of scholarly consensus in China for some time to come.

The September 18th Manchurian Incident

In 1991 international conferences commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of this incident. These meetings took place in Shenyang under the auspices of the Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang provincial social science academies, and in Taipei under the auspices of the Center for Historical Studies. Many publications appeared in what can only be described as a China-wide “September 18th boom.” And, adding fuel to the flame was Chang Hsüeh-liang’s 張學良 sudden appearance before the media in December 1990.

Various studies of the September 18th Incident had appeared earlier, beginning with Liang Ching-ch’un 梁敬鎔, *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shih-shu* 九一八事變史述 [An Account of the September 18th Incident], published in Taiwan by Shih-chieh shu-chü in 1964 with a revised edition in 1968. Other works include: 1) I Hsien-shih 易顯石, et al., *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shih* 九一八事變史 [A History of the September 18th Incident], which has been translated into Japanese; 2) Ma Chung-lien 馬仲廉, ed., “*Chiu-i-pa*” *tao “Ch’i-ch’i”* 九一八至七七 [From September 18th to July 7th] (Chung-kuo ch’ing-nien ch’u-pan-she, 1985); Liu T’ing-hua 劉庭華, “*Chiu-i-pa*” *shih-pien yen-chiu* 九一八事變研究 [A Study of the September 18th Incident] (1986); and Yü Hsin-ch’un 俞辛焯, *Manshü jihen ki no Chû-Nichi gaikô shi kenkyû* 滿州事變期の中日外交史研究 [A Study of the History of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy During the Manchurian Incident] (Tôhō shoten, 1986). Yü Hsin-ch’un’s work made full use of not only Chinese Mainland and Taiwan sources, but Japanese Foreign Ministry and Imperial Army sources too. It is a tome that has yet to be surpassed on this topic.

Nevertheless, there is new scholarship that dates from the sixtieth anniversary, such as *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien ts’ung-shu* 九一八事變叢書 [Compendium on the September 18th Incident] (Liao-ning jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1991)¹¹ and *Wu-wang kuo-ch’ih li-shih ts’ung-shu* 毋忘國恥歷史叢書 [Historical Compendium to Never Forget Our National Humiliation] (Chung-kuo hua-ch’iao ch’u-pan-she).¹² As well there is

¹¹ Lin Sheng 林聲, ed., “*Chiu-i-pa*” *shih-pien t’u-chih* 九一八事變圖志; Ma Yüeh-shan 馬越山, “*Chiu-i-pa*” *shih-pien shih-lu* 九一八事變實錄; T’an I 譚詠, ed., “*Chiu-i-pa*” *k’ang-chan shih* 九一八抗戰史; Ku Ming-i 顧明義, Chang Te-liang 張德良, Yang Hung-fan 楊洪范, and Chao Ch’un-yang 趙春陽, eds., *Jih-pen ch’in-chan Lü-ta ssu-shih-nien shih* 日本侵佔旅大四十年史; Liao-ning-sheng tang-an-kuan 遼寧省檔案館, ed., “*Chiu-i-pa*” *shih-pien tang-an shih-liao ching-pien* 九一八事變檔案史料精編; Liao-ning-sheng tang-an-kuan and Liao-ning she-hui k’o-hsüeh-yüan 遼寧社會科學院, eds., “*Chiu-i-pa*” *shih-pien ch’ien-hou ti Jih-pen yü Chung-kuo Tung-pei: Man-t’ieh mi-tang hsüan-pien* 九一八事變前後的日本與中國東北：滿鐵密檔選編。

¹² Kuo Ta-chün 郭大鈞 and Chang Pei-ken 張北根, *Wu-wang chiu-i-pa: Liu-t’iao-hu shih-chien ch’ien-ch’ien-hou-hou* 勿忘九一八：柳條湖事件前前後後 (1992); and Ch’ü Chia-yüan 曲家源, *Lu-kou-ch’iao shih-pien ch’i-yin k’ao-lun: chien yü Jih-pen yu-kuan li-shih-hsüeh-che shang-ch’üeh* 盧溝橋事變起因考論：兼與日本有關歷史學者商榷 (1992).

another *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien ts'ung-shu*--a six-volume series that includes two volumes of primary sources.

Most noteworthy is a collection of official sources put out by the Liaoning Provincial Archives. These are not just translations of published sources already available in Japan. Instead, they are Chinese translations of prewar Japanese sources housed in China. These include telegrams that reveal Chinese reactions to events from Chang Tso-lin's 張作霖 assassination to the September 18th Incident, plus SMR telegrams, letters, and other sources dating from the 1910s to the mid-1930s. Not directly related to the September 18th Incident but nevertheless of great interest are SMR documents that include letters by Doihara Kenji 土肥原賢二, telegrams by Matsuoka Yôsuke 松岡洋右, and *Hôten tetsudô jimusho jikyoku nisshi* 奉天鐵道事務所時局日誌 [The Mukden Railway Office's Daily Accounts of the Current Situation].

Older source collections on the September 18th Incident published in Taiwan are: Lo Chia-lun 羅家倫, *Ko-ming wen-hsien* 革命文獻 [Documents on the Revolution] (nos. 33-35, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying-she, 1978); Li Yün-han 李雲漢, *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shih-liao* 九一八事變史料 [Historical Documents on the September 18th Incident] (Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1977).¹³

In 1988 the Chinese Mainland began publishing *Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i ch'in-Hua tang-an tzu-liao hsüan-pien* 日本帝國主義侵華檔案資料選編 [Selected Edited Archival Documents on Japanese Imperialist Aggression Against China]. The Central Archives, China Second Historical Archives, and Kirin Social Science Academy edited this series, whose first volume deals with the September 18th Incident. Other volumes contain some shocking revelations by high Manchoukuo officials such as Kômoto Daisaku 河本大作, Sasaki Tôichi 佐々木至一, Takebe Rokuzô 武部六藏, and their Chinese collaborators.¹⁴ This includes affidavits, recorded testimonies, and confessions produced during trials for Japanese war criminals and "Chinese traitors." Given their nature, we must submit these sources to critical scrutiny. Still, they are highly valuable since they do not exist in Japan. It is too bad that these records were not reproduced in their original form. Instead, the editors translated them into Chinese. That is understandable, since the intended audience is Chinese. But I remain eager to read them

¹³ Taiwan commemorated the sixtieth anniversary by publishing Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang wei-yüan-hui tang-shih wei-yüan-hui, ed., *Kuo-min cheng-fu ch'u-li chiu-i-pa shih-pien chih chung-yao wen-hsien* (*Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih shih-liao ts'ung-pien*) 國民政府處理九一八事變之重要文獻、中國現代史史料叢編 (series 12) (Chin-tai Chung-kuo ch'upan-she, 1992). This work contains records of the political and special diplomatic committees of the KMT Central Steering Committee, primary sources published on the Chinese Mainland, and Taiwan academic articles related to the September 18th Incident.

¹⁴ In addition to this volume on the September 18th Incident, six others have been published to date: volume 3, *Wei-Man k'uei-lei cheng-ch'üan* 偽滿傀儡政權 (1994); volume 4, *Tung-pei "ta-t'ao-fa"* 東北大討伐 (1991); volume 5, *Hsi-chün-chan yü tu-ch'i-chan* 細菌戰與毒氣戰 (1988); volume 7, *Wei-Man hsien-ching t'ung-chih* 偽滿憲警統治 (1993); volume 8, *Tung-pei li-tz'u ta-ts'an-an* 東北歷次大慘案 (1993); and volume 14, *Tung-pei ching-chi lüeh-to* 東北經濟掠奪 (1991). Portions of *Hsi-chün-chan yü tu-ch'i-chan* have been translated by Eda Kenji 江田憲治 as *Seitai kaibô* 生体解剖, *Jintai jikken* 人体実験, and *Saikin sakusen* 細菌作戰 (Dôbunkan, 1991-92).

in the original Japanese, and I look forward to the day when the archives housing them will open to the public.

Unlike the situation pertaining to Marco Polo Bridge, there is no doubt about who perpetuated the September 18th Incident. Hence there are only three real points of controversy: to clarify the causes and background to the incident, to determine if the Japanese state itself was behind it, and to decide if we should deem it the start of World War II in Asia. As the first issue, Chinese historians list the 1929 Depression, Japan's "continental policies," international relations of that day, and fascism.¹⁵ Here, I will introduce Chinese views on the last two issues.¹⁶

In Japan, the scholarly consensus holds that the Kwantung Army officers instigated the incident, perhaps with tacit consent from a few superiors in Tokyo. But Japanese historians do not support the contention that central army headquarters directed the incident.¹⁷ By contrast, Chinese historians argue that army headquarters played the leading role.

Lü Wan-ho 呂万和 says that the incident was not an independent action taken by a small number of field officers. Instead, he claims that the whole imperial army was behind the conspiracy.¹⁸ Shen Yü contends that aggression in Manchuria formed the core of official army policy--not just the Kwantung Army's.¹⁹ However, we should note that Shen Yu 沈予 bases his views on a misreading of one key document, the "Manshū mondai kaiketsu hōsaku no taikō" 滿州問題解決方策の大綱.²⁰ This is the record of a conference that five Army Ministry section chiefs attended in June 1931. They resolved that, "as a measure to win support at home and abroad, we hope to implement this policy carefully for about a year; that is, until next spring." Shen misconstrues the passage to mean that army headquarters was planning military operations that would last one year.

Lang Wei-ch'eng goes even further than Shen. Lang argues that the Kwantung Army was just carrying out a policy conceived by army headquarters and approved by the

¹⁵ See, for example, Lang Wei-ch'eng 郎維成, "Ts'ung i-pu Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i ch'in-Hua shih k'an Jih-pen fa-tung chiu-i-pa shih-pien ti ken-pen yuan-yin" 從一部日本帝國主義侵華史看日本發動九一八事變的根本原因, *Wai-kuo wen-t'i yen-chiu* 外國問題研究 3 (1991).

¹⁶ For example, see Ou Cheng-wen 歐正文, "Ti-erh-tz'u shih-chieh ta-chan ying i 'chiu-i-pa' shih-pien wei ch'i-tien" 第二次世界大戰應以九一八事變為起點, *Ho-nan shih-ta hsieh-pao* 河南師大學報 4 (1992); and Sun Li-kang 孫禮剛, "Lun 'chiu-i-pa' shih-pien neng-fou ch'eng-wei erh-chan ch'i-tien" 論九一八事變能否成為二戰起點, *Tung-chiang hsüeh-k'an: Che-she pan* 東疆學刊: 哲社版 3 (1988).

¹⁷ One Japanese historian, Fujimura Michio 藤村道生, does argue that central army headquarters directed the incident. See Fujimura, *Sekai gendai shi I: Nihon gendai shi* 世界現代史 I: 日本現代史 (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1981). However, Eguchi Keiichi 江口圭一, Tatamiya Eitarō 田々宮英太郎, and others have pointed out Fujimura's shortcomings. See, for example, Tatamiya, *Kensaku! 2.26 jiken* 檢案! 2.26事件 (Yūzankaku, 1993).

¹⁸ See his *Chien-ming Jih-pen chin-tai shih* 簡明日本近代史 (T'ien-chin jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1984).

¹⁹ Shen Yu, "Jih-pen fa-tung 'chiu-i-pa' shih-pien cheng-ts'e hsing-ch'eng ti chen-hsiang" 日本發動九一八事變政策形成的真相, *Tang-an yü li-shih* 檔案與歷史 2 (1990). See also *Jih-pen ch'in-Hua ch'i-shih nien shih*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ In *Gendai shi shiryō 7: Manshū jihen* 現代史資料 7: 滿州事變 (Misuzu shobō, 1964), p. 164.

cabinet. Thus, to Lang, the incident reflected the will of the emperor state.²¹ Opposed to the above views are Liu T'ing-hua and Yü Hsin-ch'un who argue that responsibility for the incident lies with the Kwantung Army.²²

Until recently both Mainland and Taiwan specialists on modern Chinese history and the Chinese Revolution held that China's "Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan" began with the July 7th Incident. But from the mid-1980s, Mainland Chinese historians began to adopt the "Fifteen- (or Fourteen-) Year War of Resistance to Japan" thesis according to which the war started with the September 18th Incident. Since then, the Chinese have intensely debated this issue of periodization.²³

By contrast, Chinese specialists on modern Japan take the "Fifteen-Year War" thesis as a given. They argue that Japanese imperialist aggression inevitably led to the war. This aggression began with continental policies of expansion in the 1920s that necessarily led to the September 18th and July 7th Incidents.²⁴ Indeed, the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences recently devised a framework for a "Seventy-Year Period of Japanese Aggression Against China" beginning with the Taiwan Expedition of 1874.²⁵ It should be noted, though, that Taiwan historians are more wary about stressing continuity because it may have negative implications for the KMT government that concluded the Tangku Ceasefire Accords in 1933.

In Japan, Himeta Mitsuyoshi has submitted a "Fifty-Year War Thesis" that underscores the consistency of Japanese aggression against China from 1894 to 1945. So this issue of how to contextualize the Fifty-Year War within the overall history of modern Sino-Japanese relations will continue to be a major topic of debate. As for nomenclature, Himeta urges us to adopt the terms "Fifty-Year War of Aggression Against China" and "War of Aggression Against China."²⁶

However, Chang Ching-t'ang stresses that the usual Japanese terms "Sino-Japanese War" and "Fifteen-Year War" do not convey an accurate sense of Japan's aggression which was the essence of the war. Chang, too, urges us to adopt more explicit

²¹ Lang Wei-ch'eng, "Jih-pen chün-pu, nei-ko yü chiu-i-pa shih-pien" 日本軍部内閣與九一八事變, *Shih-chieh li-shih* 世界歷史 2 (1985).

²² See the works by Liu and Yü cited above.

²³ See the detailed study by Yasui Sankichi 安井三吉, *Rokôkyô jiken* 盧溝橋事件 (Kenbun shuppan, 1993)

²⁴ Lang Wei-ch'eng, "Chung-Jih i-wu-nien chan-cheng shih yen-chiu chi-ko wen-t'i ti t'an-t'ao" 中日一五年戰爭史研究幾箇問題的探討, *Pei-ching she-hui k'o-hsüeh* 北京社会科学 3 (1987). All survey histories of the war recently published on the Chinese Mainland use the 1931 to 1945 periodization scheme. See, for example, Hu Te-k'un 胡德坤, *Chung-Jih chan-cheng shih* 中日戰爭史 (Wu-han ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1988); Wang Fu 王輔, *Jih-chün ch'in-Hua chan-cheng (1931-1945)* 日軍侵華戰爭 (4 vols., Liao-ning jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1990); Hsü Lan 徐藍, *Ying-kuo yü Chung-Jih chan-cheng (1931-1941)* 英國與中日戰爭 (Pei-ching shih-fan hstieh-yüan ch'u-pan-she, 1991); and Chün-shih k'o-hsüeh-yüan chün-shih li-shih yen-chiu-pu 軍事科学院軍事歷史研究部, *Chung-kuo k'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih* 中國抗日戰爭史, 3 volumes (Chieh-fang-chün ch'u-pan-she, 1991, 1994).

²⁵ See *Jih-pen ch'in-Hua ch'i-shih-nien shih*, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Himeta Mitsuyoshi 姫田光義, "Nihonjin to 'Tai-Ka shinryaku sensô shikan'" 日本人と対華侵略戦争史観, in *Chûô daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyûjo*, ed., *Nit-Chû sensô: Nihon, Chûgoku, Amerika* 日中戦争日本中国アメリカ (Chûô daigaku shuppanbu, 1993).

terms, i.e., “the Japanese War of Aggression Against China” and “the Fifteen-Year War of Japanese Aggression Against China.”²⁷ From the Chinese standpoint, this represents the flip-side of “China’s War of Resistance to Japan.”

On Manchoukuo

Chinese historians did some research on this topic before the Cultural Revolution. However, the first serious publication was Chiang Nien-tung 姜念東, I Wen-ch’eng 伊文成, Hsieh Hsüeh-shih 解學詩, Lü Yüan-ming 呂元明, and Chang Fu-lin 張輔麟, *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih* 偽滿洲國史 [History of the Collaborationist State, Manchoukuo] (Chi-lin jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1980). It covers a wide range of topics, such as the state’s foundation and pacification, activities of the Concordia Society, economic controls and plundering of resources, immigration policies, colonial control over culture and education, and resistance struggles by the local populace. If the two-volume *Manshükoku shi* 滿洲國史 [History of Manchoukuo] (Man-Mô dôhô engokai, 1970) reflects the ruling Japanese standpoint, *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih* presents the story from the occupied Chinese side. It is interesting to note that a revised version of the *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih* appeared from Ta-lien ch’u-pan-she in 1991. And, its “Afterward” states that systematic study of and publication on “this collaborationist state” has been obstructed for so long in China because “leftists” thought repudiated the worth of anything connected with Manchoukuo.²⁸

As mentioned above, the sixtieth anniversary of the September 18th Incident in 1991 led to a flood of publications. In 1986 historians from Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning formed a committee to compile the *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih ts’ung-shu* 東北淪陷十四年史叢書 [Historical Compendium on the Fourteen-Year Occupation of Northeast China]. It first met in 1987 and began publishing in 1990. Furthermore, as shown by Su Ch’ung-min’s 蘇崇民 tome on the SMR or Hu Ch’ang and Ku Ch’üan’s work on the Manchurian Film Industry, recent Chinese research has moved away from purely political, economic, and military studies so as cover other topics in great breadth and depth.²⁹

²⁷ Chang Chin-t’ang 張錦堂, “Kuan-yü Jih-pen ch’in-Hua chan-cheng ti ch’eng-hu wen-t’i” 關於日本侵華戰爭的稱呼問題, *Jih-pen yen-chiu* 日本研究 4 (1986).

²⁸ See the revised edition, p. 664.

²⁹ Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih tsung-pien-shih, ed., *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih yen-chiu* 東北淪陷十四年史研究, vol. 1 (Chi-lin jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1988); vol. 2 (Liao-ning jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1991). Studies include: Wang Ch’eng-li 王承禮, *Chung-kuo Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih kang-yao* 中國東北淪陷十四年史綱要 (Chung-kuo ta pai-k’o-ch’üan-shu ch’u-pan-she, 1991); Wang Ping-chung 王秉忠 and Sun Chi-ying 孫繼英, *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien ta-shih pien-nien* 東北淪陷十四年大事編年 (Liao-ning jen-min-ch’u-pan-she, 1990); Su Ch’ung-min, *Man-t’ieh shih* 滿鐵史 (Chung-hua shu-chü, 1990); Hu Ch’ang 胡昶 and Ku Ch’üan 古泉, *Man-ying: Kuo-ts’e tien-ying mien-mien-kuan* 滿映：國策電影面面觀 (Chung-hua shu-chü, 1990); Li Chien-pai 李劍白, ed., *Tung-pei k’ang-Jih chiu-wang jen-wu chuan* 東北抗日救亡人物傳 (Chung-kuo ta pai-k’o-ch’üan-shu ch’u-pan-she, 1991); Li Chien-pai, *Tung-pei k’ang-Jih chiu-wang yün-tung shih-liao* 東北抗日救亡運

In Taiwan, volume 37 of *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, which contains sources on Manchoukuo, was reprinted in 1978. But publication of new primary materials has been a major achievement in Chinese Mainland Manchoukuo studies. As noted above the Central Archive in 1988 began to publish *Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i ch'in-Hua tang-an tzu-liao hsüan-pien*. This series contains volumes of source materials devoted to the September 18th Incident, biological and poison gas warfare, and Manchoukuo.

These volumes include not only official records, but also affidavits, recorded testimonies, and confessions by former high-ranking Manchoukuo officials such as Furumi Tadayuki 古海忠之 and Takebe Rokuzô, as well as Japanese military personnel. These sources shed light on Manchoukuo administrative organs, Concordia Society activities, economic controls, immigration projects, opium policies, forced labor, purges of subversive activities, and rule through terror by the police and military police. There was not much on opium--my own area of interest. But one affidavit by Furumi Tadayuki is revealing. In it, he says that Manchoukuo started its opium monopoly in order to secure operating funds and that he played a key role in this venture. Most surprising of all, he claims that Manchoukuo sold 20,000 tons of opium to Japan, 70,000 tons to Germany, and 200,000 tons to the Wang Ching-wei regime.³⁰

Some of the primary sources already have been cited by Chiang Nien-tung in *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih*. Still, their publication in separate document volumes is of great value. From now on, no one studying Manchoukuo will be able to ignore the *Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i ch'in-Hua tang-an tzu-liao hsüan-pien*.

There are two other source compilations that, although of less value, still warrant mention. One of these is the reprinting of Sun Pang 孫邦, *Wei-Man shih-liao ts'ung-shu* 偽滿史料叢書 [Compendium of Historical Sources from the Collaborationist State, Manchoukuo] (Kirin jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1993). This is a topically organized ten-volume collection of memoirs and other literary sources.³¹ As well, 120 volumes of official government reports dating from 1932 to 1945 have been reprinted: *Wei Man-chou-kuo cheng-fu kung-pao* 偽滿洲国政府公報 (Liao-ning ch'u-pan-she, 1993).

Recent industrial development in the Northeast has been amazing. But Chinese historians are openly chary of "modernization" theories suggesting that today's development derives from SMR or other Japanese building in Manchuria. Hsieh Ming points out the danger in recent Japanese historians, such as Matsumoto Toshirô, who admit the fact of Japan's colonial control and military aggression, but still discuss Northeastern "development" in terms of modernization theory.³² Hsieh Ming denies any

動史料 (Chung-kuo ta pai-k'o-ch'üan-shu ch'u-pan-she, 1991); Wang Hsi-liang 王希亮, *Jih-pen tui Chung-kuo Tung-pei ti cheng-chih tung-chih* 日本對中國東北的政治統治 (Hei-lung-chiang jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1991).

³⁰ *Tung-pei ching-chi lüeh-to*, *op. cit.*, pp. 811, 824.

³¹ The ten volumes are: "Chiu-i-pa" *shih-pien* 九一八事變, *Chih-min cheng-ch'üan* 殖民政權, *K'ang-Jih chiu-wang* 抗日救亡, *Wei-Man wen-hua* 偽滿文化, *Wei-Man chün-shih* 偽滿軍事, *Wei-Man she-hui* 偽滿社會, *Wei-Man jen-wu* 偽滿人物, *Jih-wei pao-hsing* 日偽暴行, *Ching-chi lüeh-to* 經濟掠奪, and *Wei-Man fu-wang* 偽滿覆亡.

³² Su Ch'ung-min, *Man-t'ieh shih*; and Hsieh Ming 謝明, "'Man-t'ieh' yen-chiu yü 'chin-tai-hua' wen-t'i" 滿鐵研究與近代化問題, *Shih-chieh shih yen-chiu tung-t'ai* 世界史研究動態 6 (1993). Hsieh directs most of his criticism at Matsumoto Toshirô 松本俊郎, *Shinryaku to*

need for the concept of modernization to tell the “history of the SMR” or the “history of Japanese imperialist aggression in China.” Hsieh argues that Japanese “aggression” and “development” necessarily involved “plunder.” This is sure to become a major point of controversy henceforth.

On the “North China Incident” [Undeclared War]

Japanese historians debate whether the Fifteen-Year War was a single continuum, or if there was a decisive break between the Manchurian Incident of 1931-33 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45. This intervening period has become the focus of much historical inquiry on the Mainland recently.³³

In the 1960s, Taiwan historian Liang Ching-ch'un 梁敬鎔 produced basic studies such as “So-wei Ho-Mei hsieh-ting” 所謂何梅協定 [The So-called Ho-Umezu Accords], “Ch'in-T'u hsieh-ting” 秦土協定 [The Ch'in-Doihara Accords], “Kuang-t'ien san yüan-tse” 廣田三原則 [The Hirota Principles], and “Hua-pei tzu-chih yün-tung” 華北自治運動 [The Autonomy Movement in North China].³⁴ In 1982 Li Yün-han edited KMT government sources in *K'ang-chan ch'ien Hua-pei cheng-chü shih-liao* 抗戰前華北政局史料 [Historical Materials on the North China Political Situation Before the War of Resistance] (Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1982). And, on the Mainland, a collection of 1935 newspaper and magazine articles, the *Hua-pei shih-pien tzu-liao hsüan-pien* 華北事變史料選編 [Selected Documents on the North China Undeclared

kaihatsu 侵略と開発 (Ochanomizu shobô, 1988). On the issue of “modernization,” see Nishimura Shigeo 西村成雄, “Shokuminchi teikoku' no hôkai to 'shokuminchi' kara no dakkyaku: 'Manshûkoku no isan' to wa nanika” 植民地帝国の崩壊と植民地からの脱却：満州国の遺産とは何か, in *Rekishî kagaku* 歴史科学 91 (1983).

³³ On the Japanese side, one example is Eguchi Keiichi 江口圭一, “Rokôkyô jiken e no michi: 15-nen sensô no shikaku” 盧溝橋事件への道：十五年戦争の視角, in Inoue Kiyoshi 井上清 and Etô Shinkichi 衛藤藩吉, ed., *Nit-Chû sensô to Nit-Chû kankei* 日中戦争と日中関係 (Hara shobô, 1988). Some Chinese studies of the Tangku Ceasefire Accords, the so-called Ho-Umezu Accords, the policy to sever North China, economic aggression in North China, East Hopei smuggling, Hirota diplomacy, and the Japanese North China Garrison are: Liu Kuo-hsin 劉國新, “‘Tang-ku hsieh-ting’ yü ‘Hua-pei tzu-chih yün-tung’” 塘沽協定與華北自治運動, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 4 (1989); Hsiung Tsung-jen 熊宗仁, “‘Ho-Mei hsieh-ting’ chih pien-hsi” 何梅協定之辨析, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 3 (1992); Feng Han-chang 封漢章, “Shih-lun Jih-pen ‘Hua-pei fen-chih’ ts'e-lüeh ti hsing-ch'eng” 試論日本華北分治策略的形成, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 3 (1993); Ting Tse-ch'in 丁則勤 and Wang Mei-hsiu 王美秀, “Lun Hua-pei shih-pien ch'ien-hou ti Chi-tung tsou-ssu wen-t'i” 論華北事變前後的冀東走私問題, *Pei-ching ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao* (*Che-she pan*) 北京大學學報哲社版 6 (1987); Ch'i Fu-lin 齊福霖, “‘Kuang-t'ien san yüan-tse' yü Kuo-min cheng-fu ti tui-ts'e” 廣田三原則與國民政府的對策, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 3 (1994); Wu Yüeh-hsing 武月星, “Jih-pen Hua-pei chu-t'un-chün chi ch'i ch'in-Hua hsing-ching” 日本華北駐屯軍及其侵華行徑, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 4 (1990).

³⁴ These were later published as *Jih-pen ch'in-lüeh Hua-pei shih-shu* 日本侵略華北史述 (Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1994).

War], have appeared. As well, there are now studies by Li Wen-jung, Shao Yün-jui, and Yü Tzu-tao.³⁵

On the Chinese Mainland, historians use the term “North China Incident” (*shih-pien* or “undeclared war”) to describe the string of machinations perpetrated by the Japanese army in 1935: 1) the East Chahar or First Western Jehol Incident; 2) the Hopei Incident and so-called Ho-Umezu Accords; 3) the Chang-pei Incident; 4) the Ch'in-Doihara Accords; 5) the North China Autonomy Movement; 6) the establishment of the East Hopei Regime for Self-Government and Containment of Communism and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; 7) the Independence for Inner Mongolia Movement; and 8) economic imperialism symbolized by smuggling under the East Hopei Regime.

This cumulative “North China Incident” is quite different in nuance from the September 18th and July 7th “Incidents”—though all three are called *shih-pien*. And, it may not be wholly valid to lump together a series of small-scale “affairs” (*shih-chien* or “incidents”) under the rubric of a *shih-pien* or “undeclared war.” However, this semantic device does permit Chinese historians to stress continuity between the September 18th and July 7th Incidents. As Li Wen-jung and Shao Yün-jui argue, these three “incidents” comprise a three-part strategy of imperialist aggression against China—with each stage leading inevitably to the next. Lang Wei-ch'eng, T'ung Tung, and Hsieh Hsüeh-shih share this view.³⁶

In Japan, there are almost no studies on the East Hopei Regime set up in November 1935. That dearth of scholarship makes the Chinese study *Chi-tung Jih-wei cheng-ch'üan* 冀東日偽政權 [The East Hopei Japanese Collaborationist Regime] (Tang-an ch'u-pan-she, 1992) all the more valuable. This exhaustive work, edited by Nan-k'ai University historians and Tangshan City archivists, has many relevant sources about the East Hopei regime, from its founding through 1946. It has excerpts from periodicals of that day, such as *Manshü hō* 滿州報 [Manchuria Weekly] and *Kitō nippō* 冀東日報 [East Hopei Daily] as well as Tangshan archival materials. Especially valuable are materials on the activities of the East Hopei Renovation Society, on efforts to uphold order, and on education. These sources are just waiting to be exploited by researchers.

³⁵ Nan-k'ai ta-hsüeh Ma-Lieh-chu-i chiao-yen-shih 南開大學馬列主義教研室 and Chung-kung-tang shih chiao-yen-shih 中共黨史教研室, eds., *Hua-pei shih-pien tzu-liao hsüan-pien* 東北事變資料選編 (Ho-nan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1983; Li Wen-jung 李文榮 and Shao Yün-jui 邵雲瑞, *Hua-pei shih-pien* 華北事變 (Nan-k'ai ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1989); Yü Tzu-tao 余子道, *Ch'ang-ch'eng feng-yün lu: Ts'ung yü-kuan shih-pien tao ch'i-ch'i k'ang-chan* 長城風雲錄：從榆關事變到七七抗戰 (Shang-hai shu-tien ch'u-pan-she, 1993).

³⁶ Li Wen-jung and Shao Yün-jui, *op. cit.*; Lang, “Chung-Jih i-wu-nien chan-cheng shih yen-chiu chi-ko wen-t'i ti t'an-t'ao”; T'ung Tung 佟冬 and Hsieh Hsüeh-shih 解學詩, “Hua-pei shih-pien shih chiu-i-pa shih-pien ti chi-hsü: P'ing Jih-pen chün-kuo-chu-i ch'in-lüeh Hua-pei ti yin-mou” 華北事變是九一八事變的繼續：評日本軍國主義侵略華北的陰謀, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 1 (1991).

The July 7th (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident

In 1987, fifty years after the July 7th Incident, a Museum to Commemorate the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan opened near Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Peking. There occurred a nationwide "Resistance Against Japan" boom, and conferences were held all over China to mark the observance. But the resulting publications would not equal the similar boom in 1991 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the September 18th Incident.

One earlier publication of note is Li Yün-han, *Sung Che-yüan yü ch'i-ch'i k'ang-chan* 宋哲元與七七抗戰 [Sung Che-yüan and the July 7th Resistance to Japan] (Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1973). Others followed: Shen Chi-ying 沈繼英 and Liu Ch'eng-ch'ang 柳成昌, *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-pien ch'ien-hou* 盧溝橋事變前後 (Bei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1986); Hu Te-k'un 胡德坤, *Ch'i-ch'i shih-pien* 七七事變 (Chieh-fang-chün ch'u-pan-she, 1987); Ma Chung-lien, ed., *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-chien yü Hua-pei k'ang-chan* 盧溝橋事件與華北抗戰 (Yen-shan ch'u-pan-she, 1987); Wu Yüeh-hsing 武月星, Lin Chi-po 林治波, Lin Hua 林華, and Liu Yu-yü 劉友子, *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-pien feng-yün-p'ien* 盧溝橋事變風雲篇 (Chung-kuo jen-min ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1987); Li Yün-han, *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-pien* 盧溝橋事變 (Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-ssu, 1987).³⁷ Few of the primary sources have been declassified and made available to the public. Published documents are limited to memoirs by former KMT army personnel and the *Ko-ming wen-hsien*.³⁸

The points of controversy center on the causes of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, its place in the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the significance that this incident has for World War II as a whole. But the really outstanding issue is the first one: who and what caused the incident? In other words, did the incident really "break out accidentally?"³⁹ Which side fired the first shot?⁴⁰

³⁷ Two volumes of collected articles are: "*Ch'i-ch'i*" *k'ang-chan wu-shih-chou-nien t'e-chi* 七七抗戰五十周年特輯 (Shih-chia-chuang Huang-p'u chün-hsiao t'ung-hsüeh-hui, 1987); and Chang Ch'un-hsiang 張春祥, ed., *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-chien yü pa-nien k'ang-chan* 盧溝橋事件與八年抗戰 (Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1990).

³⁸ Chung-kung chung-yang-tang-hsiao tang-shih tzu-liao-shih 中共中央黨校黨史資料室, ed., *Lu-kou-ch'iao shih-pien ho p'ing-chin k'ang-chan* 盧溝橋事變和平津抗戰 (Chung-kung chung-yang-tang-hsiao k'o-yen-pan-kung-shih, 1986); Chung-kuo ren-min cheng-shih-hsieh-shang-hui-i ch'üan-kuo i-yüan-hui wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yüan-hui "Ch'i-ch'i shih-pien" pien-shen-tsu 中國人民政治協商會議全國委員會文史資料研究委員會七七事變編審祖, ed., *Ch'i-ch'i shih-pien* 七七事變 (Chung-kuo wen-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1986); *Ko-ming wen-hsien*, vols. 106-107 (1986).

³⁹ **Translator's note.** E. O. Reischauer so describes the incident in *Japan Past and Present*. He maintained that position until his death, and it appears in the revised edition of that work—*Japan: The Story of a Nation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 170. On the Diet floor in 1988, Cabinet Minister Okuno Seisuke quoted Reischauer verbatim to assert that the incident "broke out accidentally," and he went on to argue that therefore Japan bore no responsibility for starting a war of aggression (*shinryaku sensô* 侵略戰爭) with China. This led to a diplomatic crisis with massive PRC protests that ended only with Okuno's resignation.

On these points Mainland and Taiwan historians basically coincide. The only new bones of contention pertain to the “accidental outbreak” thesis, the KMT 29th Army Instigation thesis, and the CCP instigation thesis. For Chinese historians, the issue of “who shot first?” is “irrelevant and meaningless.” For them, the Japanese army occupied vast areas of Northeast and North China, so stationing troops and conducting field maneuvers on Chinese soil was illegal to start with.⁴¹

For Chinese historians, it is crystal clear that Japan’s North China Garrison Army or one of its Special Services Agencies--not the CCP or the KMT 29th Army--fired first. Allegations to the contrary, they retort, are belied by the following considerations. Japan had long planned to invade northern China. Japan increased the size of its North China Garrison Army in 1936. Japan had been frequently conducting maneuvers before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out. Numerous rumors about an imminent clash had been circulating before July 7th.

One widely-accepted thesis is the one tendered by Taiwan historian Ch’en Tsai-chün 陳在俊. Ch’en holds that Shigekawa Hidekazu 茂川英和 perpetrated the incident.⁴² Shigekawa promoted Special Service Agency activities in the Peking-Tientsin area at the time, and paid CCP-affiliated Chinese students to fire the shot. Ch’en bases his thesis on a statement by Tanaka Ryûkichi 田中隆吉 in *Sabakareru rekishi: Haisen hiwa* 裁かれる歴史：敗戦秘話 [History on Trial: Secrets about the Lost War] (Shin-pûsha, 1948). However, Shigekawa later denied this allegation--though he did admit that he “had subordinates use fireworks to help widen the conflict.”⁴³ Tanaka did not mention Shigekawa in this context when testifying to prosecutors at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials in June 1946.⁴⁴ Hence this “Shigekawa thesis” seems to need reexamination.

In any case, Chinese historians assume that modern Japanese continental policies of expansion “inevitably produced” the string of incidents that began in September 1931, continued with the North China undeclared war of 1935, and led to the July 1937 clash at

⁴⁰ See the very detailed analysis by Yasui Sankichi, “Rokôkyô jiken no imeiji: Chûgoku no baai, Nihon no baai” 盧溝橋事件のイメージ：中国の場合、日本の場合 *Nihon shi kenkyû* 日本史研究 (April 1994).

⁴¹ Ma Chung-lien, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Chao Yen-ch’ing 趙延慶, “Lu-kou-ch’iao shih-pien shih ou-fa shih-chien ma” 盧溝橋事變是偶發事件嗎, *Shih-shieh li-shih* 世界歷史 3 (1989); K’ung Ling-wen 孔令聞, Sun Kuo-ying 孫國英, Wu Ch’eng-k’un 吳承昆, eds., *Hai-tsai zheng-lun ti k’ang-chan shih jo-kan wen-t’i yen-chiu* 還在爭論的抗戰史若干問題研究 (Pei-ching hang-k’ung hang-t’ien ta-hsüeh ch’u-pan-she, 1989).

⁴² Yasui Sankichi, “Rokôkyô jiken no imeiji.”

⁴³ See Hata Ikuhiko 泰郁彦, *Nit-Chû sensô shi* 日中戦争史 (Hara shobô, 1979), p. 209, for the denial; see Yasui, *ibid.*, for the quotation about spreading the conflict once it had broken out.

⁴⁴ Tanaka replied that Marco Polo Bridge, unlike the Mukden (September 18th) Incident, owed nothing to Japanese army planning. As well, he said, according to rumors at the time, “Chinese students associated with the CCP” fired the first shot which set off the incident. However, he insisted that this was just a rumor, not a fact. Thus, he contradicted the statement he would make in *Sabakareru rekishi*. In his 1946 testimony during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he claimed: “My specialty was to investigate incidents like that, and I never failed to get to the bottom of them--except for this one.” See Awaya Kentarô 粟屋憲太郎, Adachi Hiroaki 安達宏昭, and Kobayashi Morohiro 小林元裕, eds., *Tôkyô saiban shiryô: Tanaka Ryûkichi jinmon chôsho* 東京裁判資料：田中隆吉尋問調書 (Ôtsuki shoten, 1994), p. 226.

Marco Polo Bridge. Thus, they conclude, the “first shot” fired there had to come from or be instigated by the Japanese side.

As Yasui Sankichi has noted, “diverging Sino-Japanese views of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident apparently stem from a basically dissimilar understanding of modern Sino-Japanese relations that lies at an ethnic or national level.”⁴⁵ Still, I believe such differences can only be overcome by continued efforts to uncover new source materials, and I hope that the sixtieth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident will serve to spur that endeavor.

Many Chinese studies of the post-Marco Polo Bridge period, when the two nations were in a full-scale war, are devoted to Japanese atrocities such as that committed at Nanking. In recent years, there have been studies on poison gas, bacteriological warfare, opium and narcotics operations, and “comfort women” as employed by the Japanese army.⁴⁶ In 1989, Wu T'ien-wei 吳天威, Hu Hua-ling 胡華玲, and Hsü Chieh-lin 許介鱗 in Taipei established the Society to Study Japan's Aggression Against China; and in 1990, they went about pursuing the problem of Japanese war crimes by founding the journal *Jih-pen ch'in-Hua yen-chiu* 日本侵華研究 [Studies in Japanese Aggression Against China].

Public opinion around the world is on the rise in favor of compensating those left scarred by the Japanese army--such as former “comfort women” and victims of other atrocities. And this factor underscores the need for studies of that sort. But in reality, many studies in both China and Japan are marred by governments who place state interests above scholarship. Still we should note the important work by Ch'ih Ching-te and Meng Kuo-hsiang on Chinese losses and damages.⁴⁷ Finally, there are intriguing Chinese studies of Japanese army policies in occupied areas and of the “peace efforts” made by the two nations.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Yasui Sankichi, “Rokôkyô jiken no imeiji.”

⁴⁶ For example, see: Li En-han 李恩涵, *Jih-pen chün chan-cheng pao-hsing chih yen-chiu* 日本軍戰爭暴行之研究 (Tai-wan shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1994); Pi Ch'un-fu 畢春富, “Ch'in-Hua Jih-chün Wu-han hui-chan ch'i-chien k'o-hsüeh-chan shih-shih kai-k'uang” 侵華日軍武漢會戰期間科學戰實施概況, *Min-kuo tang-an* 民國檔案 4 (1994); Han Hsiao 韓曉 and Hsin P'ei-lin 辛培林, *Jih-chün 731 pu-tui tsui-o shih* 日軍七三一部隊罪惡史 (Hei-lung-chiang jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1991); Wang Chin-hsiang 王金香, “Jih-pen ya-p'ien ch'in-Hua cheng-ts'e shu-lun” 日本鴉片侵華政策述論, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 抗日戰爭研究 3 (1993); Su Shih 蘇實, “Jih-pen ch'in-lüeh-che ch'iang-po Chung-kuo fu-chu tso Jih-chün wei-an-fu shih-lu” 日本侵略者強迫中國扶助作日軍慰安婦實錄, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 4 (1992).

⁴⁷ Ch'ih Ching-de 遲景德, *Chung-kuo tui-Jih k'ang-chan sun-shih tiao-ch'a shih-shu* 中國對日抗戰損失調查史述 (Tai-wan shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1987); Meng Kuo-hsiang 孟國祥, “Kuan-yü Kuo-min-tang cheng-ch'üan hsiang Jih-pen so-p'ei wen-t'i” 關於國民黨政權向日本索賠問題, *Chin-tai shih yen-chiu* 2 (1991); Meng Kuo-hsiang, “Tiao-ch'a ho chui-ch'ang Jih-pen chieh-to wo-kuo wen-wu kung-tso shu-yao” 調查和追償日本劫奪我國文物工作述要, *Min-kuo tang-an* 民國檔案 4 (1992).

⁴⁸ On the occupied areas, see Hsing Han-san 邢漢三, *Jih-wei t'ung-chih Ho-nan chien-wen-lu* 日偽統治河南見聞錄 (Ho-nan ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1986); Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-chih-hsieh-shang-hui-i Pei-ching-shih wei-yüan-hui wen-shih tzu-liao yen-chiu wei-yüan-hui 中國人民政治協商會議北京市委員會文史資料研究委員會, eds., *Jih-wei t'ung-chih hsia ti*

Concluding Remarks

From this brief overview of Chinese scholarship since the 1980s, we can see that, although historians in China and Japan have much in common, they base their views of the Fifteen- (or Fourteen-) Year War on sharply different historiographic assumptions. That is, Chinese historians overwhelmingly stress inevitability in history. They see modern Japanese continental expansion leading relentlessly to the September 18th Incident, to the North China Incident, to the July 7th Incident, and to Japan's defeat; and they virtually ignore any other possible choices along the way that might have been, but were not, explored.

Their emphasis on historical inevitability cannot be fully explained by attributing it to political ideology; instead, it must also be understood in relation to nationalism. The reason that Chinese historians to this very day deem the "Tanaka Memorial" to be of vital importance is that it precisely fits the view of history derived from their national consciousness. The passing of half a century has relegated many--though by no means all--memories to the realm of history. But the scars left on those who have suffered imperialist aggression in their recent past do not soon disappear, and historical views premised on national feeling do not soon change.

Supplement

I wish to make a few additional observations about Chinese books, articles, and source materials published in 1995 after my above article appeared in print in Japan.

In 1995, many events were planned on the mainland to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan. These were carried out as semi-official state events in accordance with policies set down by the Communist Party and Government. It is said that over 400 books were published during this year on the War of Resistance; and in fact, most of these were presented to the people for use in "patriotic education." However, many of these books lack footnotes or references and are

Pei-p'ing 日偽統治下的北平 (Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1987), translated into Japanese by Ônuma Masahiro 大沼正博 with an introduction by Kojima Shinji 小島晋治, *Pekin no hi no maru* 北京の日の丸 (Iwanami shoten, 1991); Pei-ching-shih tang-an-kuan 北京市檔案館, ed., *Jih-wei zai Pei-ching ti-ch'ü ti wu-ts'e ch'iang-hua chih-an yün-tung* 日偽在北京地區的五次強化治安運動, vols. 1 and 2 (Pei-ching Yen-shan ch'u-pan-she, 1987); Pei-ching-shih tang-an-kuan, ed., *Jih-wei Pei-ching hsin-min-hui* 日偽北京新民會 (Kuang-ming jih-pao ch'u-pan-she, 1989); Shang-hai-shih tang-an-kuan 上海市檔案館, ed., *Jih-wei Shang-hai-shih cheng-fu* 日偽上海市政府 (Tang-an ch'u-pan-she, 1986). On "peace efforts," see Huang Yulan 黃友嵐, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti "ho-p'ing" yün-tung* 抗日戰爭時期的和平運動 (Chieh-fang-chün ch'u-pan-she, 1988); Shen Yü 沈予, "Lun k'ang-Jih chan-cheng ch'i-chien Jih-Chiang ti 'ho-p'ing chiao-she'" 論抗日戰爭期間日蔣的和平交涉, *Li-shih yen-chiu* 歷史研究 2 (1993); Liu Chieh 劉傑, *Nit-Chü sensôka no gaikô* 日中戦争下の外交 (Yoshikawa kôbunkan, 1995).

little more than historical novels. Unfortunately, there were no scholarly works among these works that present new historical views.⁴⁹

Amid this intellectual atmosphere, it is normal to expect that trends in Chinese studies of contemporary Japanese history should concentrate on: 1) reconfirming that Japanese aggression in China led to Japan's defeat, and 2) clarifying the war crimes that prove that aggression. On war crimes, there is *Jih-chün ch'in-Hua tsui-hsing chi-shih (1931-1945)* 日軍侵華罪行紀實 (Chung-kung-tang shih ch'u-pan-she), edited by the Scientific Research Management Division of the Historical Research Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which introduces representative incidents of massacres, biological and germ warfare, slave labor, economic plunder, and cultural depredations. As well, there are: Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hsüeh-cheng: Ch'in-Hua Jih-chün pao-hsing chi-shih jih-chih* 血証：侵華日軍暴行紀實日誌 (Ch'eng-tu ch'u-pan-she) which lists Japanese army criminal acts in chronological order; the four-volume *Jih-chün ch'in-Hua pao-hsing shih-lu* 日軍侵華暴行實錄, ed. by the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she) which organizes documents by provinces; and the three-volume *Jih-chün pao-hsing lu* 日軍暴行錄, ed. Sun Yü-ling 孫玉玲 et al. (Chung-kuo ta-pai-k'o ch'üan-shu ch'u-pan-she). This last work is part of the *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih ts'ung-shu* 東北淪陷十四年史叢書, mentioned above in my article; its three volumes list sources incident-by-incident for the provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Liaoning. The volume for Heilungkiang in particular goes far beyond simply presenting sources; it provides detailed analyses of the incidents themselves.

Su Ch'ung-min, Li Tso-ch'üan 李作權, and Chiang Pi-huo 姜璧洁, eds., *Lao-kung ti hsüeh yü lei* 勞工的血與泪 (Chung-kuo ta-pai-k'o ch'üan-shu ch'u-pan-she) is extremely important especially because up to now there have been no comprehensive accounts of Japanese procurement of Chinese slave labor or Japanese controls on labor. This volume, too, is part of *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien shih ts'ung-shu*, and it is a detailed quantitative study of the procurement of slave labor and controls in Manchuria. On slave laborers transported from north China to Manchukuo, see the figures in Chü Chih-fen 居之芬, "Jih-pen ch'iang-lüeh Hua-pei lao-kung jen-shu k'ao" 日本強擄華北勞工人數考, *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng yen-chiu* 4 (1995).

Next, I would like to mention the work of Pu P'ing 步平 on Japanese poison gas operations which has not been published in China but in Japan as translated by Yamabe Yûkiko 山辺悠喜子 et al., *Nihon no Chûgoku shinryaku to doku gasu heiki* 日本の中国侵略と毒ガス兵器 (Akashi shoten). There is no single comprehensive treatment of this topic even in Japanese. So, Pu's empirical study using sources from both the victimized Chinese and victimizing Japanese sides is of immense value.

Regardless of whatever position the Chinese government adopts or continues to adopt, research on topics such as these cannot help but play a role in heightening demands made of Japan for postwar compensation.

⁴⁹ On Chinese sentiments regarding the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, see Kobayashi Motohiro 小林元裕, "Futatsu no Chûgoku' to futatsu no sengo: Sakusô suru tai-Nichi imêji" 二つの中国と二つの戦後：錯綜する対日イメージ, *Rikkyô* 立教 155 (November 1995); also Inoue Hisashi 井上久士, "Chûgoku wa sengo 50 nen o dô mukaeta ka" 中国は戦後五〇年をどう迎えたか, *Kikan: Sensô sekinin kenkyû* 季刊戦争責任研究 11 (March 1996).

As well, I should note research on Manchukuo. The three-volume *K'u-nan yü tou-cheng: shih-ssu-nien* 苦難與斗争：十四年 (Chung-kuo ta-pai-k'o ch'üan-shu ch'u-pan-she), edited by Chao Tung-hui 趙冬暉 et al., should be thought of as the general introduction to *Tung-pei lun-hsien shih-ssu-nien*. It makes full use of recently published research and source materials. Hsieh Hsüeh-shih, one of the main authors of *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih*, has now written *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih hsün-pien* 偽滿州國史新編 (Jen-min ch'u-pan-she). He began this new work from the premise that, given the advances in historical research since the reform and liberalization of recent years, the historiographic value of *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih* is at an end. Earlier, Hsieh had also written *Li-shih ti tu-liu: Wei-Man cheng-ch'üan hsing-wang* 歷史的毒瘤：偽滿政權興亡 (Kuang-hsi shih-fan ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she). But in *Wei Man-chou-kuo shih hsün-pien*, he used even more Japanese sources and recent studies to produce this painstaking masterpiece. Hsieh's book and the aforementioned three-volume *K'u-nan yü tou-cheng: shih-ssu-nien* will set the standard for Manchuria studies for some time to come.

As for publication of document sources, four new volumes have been added to the aforementioned *Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i ch'in-Hua tang-an tzu-liao hsün-pien*, edited by the Central Party Archives among others: *Hua-pei li-tz'u ta-ch'an an* 華北歷次大慘案, *Nan-ching ta t'u-sha* 南京大屠殺, *Jih-Wang ti ch'ing-hsiang* 日汪的清鄉, and *Hopen Ta-tso yü Jih-chün Shan-hsi 'ts'an-liu'* 河本大作與日軍山西殘留. We should also note in the series *Chung-kuo k'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih ts'ung-shu* 中國抗日戰爭史叢書, which began in 1995, *Jih-pen tui Hua-pei ching-chi ti lüeh-tuo ho t'ung-chih* 日本對華北經濟的掠奪和統制 (Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she), edited by the Research Group on the History of China's War Against Japan and the Memorial Office of the Chinese People's War Against Japan. It collects materials concerned with economic matters in the areas under Japanese military occupation following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Finally, on Taiwan, the Committee on Party History of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang has published a nine-volume work, *Chung-Jih wai-chiao shih-liao ts'ung-shu* 中日外交史料叢書, edited by the Research Group on Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.⁵⁰ This is not a new publication, but was published between 1964 and 1967 in a limited edition distributed to a small number of institutions and researchers. We now welcome its reissue so that the general public can easily use its many sources.

⁵⁰ The nine volumes bear the following titles: 1. *Kuo-mih cheng-fu pei-fa hou Chung-Jih wai-chiao kuan-hsi* 國民政府北伐後中日外交關係; 2. *Chiu-i-pa shih-pien* 九一八事變; 3. *Jih-chün ch'in-fan Shang-hai yü chin-kung Hua-pei* 日軍侵犯上海與進攻華北; 4. *Lu-kuo-ch'iao shih-pien ch'ien-hou ti Chung-Jih wai-chiao kuan-hsi* 蘆溝橋事變前後的中日外交關係; 5. *Jih-pen chih-tsao wei tsu-chih yü kuo-lien ti chih-ts'ai ch'in-lüeh* 日本製造偽組織與國聯的制裁侵略; 6. *K'ang-chan shih-ch'i feng-so yü chin-yün shih-chien* 抗戰時期封鎖與禁運事件; 7. *Jih-pen t'ou-hsiang yü wo-kuo tui-Jih t'ai-tu chi tui-O chiao-she* 日本投降與我國對日態度及對俄交涉; 8. *Chin-shan ho-yüeh yü Chung-Jih ho-yüeh ti kuan-hsi* 金山和約與中日和約的關係; 9. *Chung-hua min-kuo tui-Jih ho-yüeh* 中華民國對日和約.