Saitō Takao and Parliamentary Politics in 1930s Japan

Lawrence Fouraker
Georgetown University

Interpreting Japanese politics in the decade from the Manchurian Incident of 1931 to Pearl Harbor is complex and problematic. For instance, what is the significance of the emergence of cabinets under nonelected leaders from the military or nobility in the early 1930s? For more than a decade before 1932, it was routine for the “elder statesmen” to choose as prime minister the head of the majority party in the lower house, but from that year until 1945 not a single party member became premier. Did the end of party prime ministers spell the end of democratic tendencies in Japanese politics? Strictly speaking, prewar politics was hardly democratic. Under the constitution of 1890, sovereignty unambiguously lay with the emperor, not the people, and nonelected elites acting in his name wielded great power continuously until the end of World War II. But surely it is more than coincidental that military men began to play an expanded role in domestic politics at the same time that the Kwantung Army initiated hostilities in Manchuria in 1931, and that their involvement in affairs at home deepened in parallel with military escalation on the continent.

On the other hand, there was a great deal that did not change in the years after 1931. Attempted coups d’état by rogue elements in the military punctuated the 1931-1936 period, but none succeeded in overthrowing the government. Voters continued to support the two mainstream parties at the polls until the parties’ “voluntary” dissolution in 1940, and there was a striking continuity of political institutions even after that, notably the Japanese Diet. This essay, a case study in parliamentary politics in the 1930s, argues that fundamental changes in Japanese politics and society outweighed these significant continuities. A comparison of two speeches in the Diet in 1936 and 1940 by Saitō Takao 齊藤隆夫 (1870-1949), a lawyer and party politician, and the response these speeches invoked, will demonstrate the drastic transformation of Japanese politics in the late 1930s. Without eschewing a consideration of the wider changes in politics and society, we will focus on these two speeches to illustrate what actually went on inside the Diet, and reflect on how it changed in the tumultuous late 1930s.

In both speeches Saitō endorsed diplomacy rather than military aggression, and attacked the pernicious influence of vacuous impractical ideas of “reconstruction” or “renovation.” And in both he repeatedly called for the restoration of the freedom of speech and a functional Diet system. The markedly different reactions to Saitō’s fundamentally similar speeches in 1936 and 1940, both by his colleagues in the Diet and by the general public, confirm how drastically Japanese politics was changing. In 1936, fellow MPs enthusiastically cheered Saitō’s ringing denunciation of empty calls for “national renovation,” and shared his regret over the erosion of the freedom of speech. The general public sent him many letters and telegrams of unanimous support. But four years later, a basically similar speech met with a mixed response. Though initially welcomed by many of his colleagues in the Diet, his speech led a handful of politicians to
shout out in anger and organize a movement to “punish” Saitō. Ultimately, an overwhelming majority of Saitō’s fellow MPs voted to expel him from the Diet. The reaction to Saitō’s 1940 speech by the public was also significantly different than four years before. While the majority of the hundreds of people who wrote to Saitō agreed with him and thanked him, these voices of support were joined by those that disagreed with Saitō or tried to teach him about Japan’s “holy war.” The appearance of these critical letters demonstrates how the Japanese people were changing, coming to support an aggressive foreign policy in pursuit of poorly-articulated and unattainable war goals.

First Interpellation, May 7, 1936

Japanese military aggression in the 1930s erupted not only in China but also inside Japan. Young military men and their civilian allies repeatedly and violently attacked the political structure of Japan, murdering politicians and seeking to impose military rule. Two such attempted coups shook Japan in 1932, the Blood Pledge League Incident and the May 15th (or 5.15) Incident. In the months and years that followed, the authorities uncovered and thwarted several other plots before they erupted, such as the October Incident of 1934. All these attempted coups sought to eliminate existing political institutions and impose a military dictatorship under the direct command of the emperor.

Minsei Party member Saitō Takao watched these coup attempts with dismay. He was a strong supporter of ideas and policies endorsed by the most liberal leaders of his party, such as the relatively conciliatory foreign policy of Shidehara Kijirō 夏目高徳, and the relatively democratic domestic policies associated with Wakatsuki Reijirō 若槻礼次郎. Ten weeks after the last in this series of attempted coups, the February 26th (or 2.26) Incident of 1936, Saitō addressed the Diet in order to expose what he saw as the roots of these attempted coups. For an hour and twenty-five minutes he relentlessly questioned the country’s top leaders about the causes of this attempted coup. (Interpellation sessions in the Diet sometimes degenerated into shouting fests, but were generally conducted with decorum. Even so, we will see that Saitō’s invective became quite harsh in both speeches, as he went well beyond questions to make strongly-worded attacks on the country’s leaders.)

Saitō attributed these violent “incidents” to the faddish popularity of ideas of “renovation” or “reconstruction.” While their proponents believed they were the sweeping solution to the nation’s problems, Saitō portrayed these ideas as little more than calls for the destruction of the existing order and imposition of direct rule by the emperor. These vague notions were utterly devoid of rational or concrete plans, as:

> Dropouts from the struggle for survival, dejected losers from the world of politics, or half-baked scholars chant “reconstruct the state,” but do they have any idea how to reconstruct a state? They chant slogans like “Shōwa Restoration” (Shōwa isshin 昭和維新) but do they have any notion of how to carry out the task of implementing a Shōwa Restoration? They chant “reconstruct the state” without any idea what it means.

---

1 Saitō Takao, “Shukugun ni kansuru shitsumon enzetsu” 建軍に関する質問演説 (Interpellation Session on Disciplining the Military), in Kaiko shichijûnen 回顧七十年 (Recollections of Seventy Years) (Tokyo: Chûô kôronsha, 1987), pp. 233-67. Subsequent references to this speech will simply refer to the page numbers from this source.
They chant “Shōwa Restoration” without understanding what it is. After all, examining their proposals for reconstruction, we find only emptiness. [He was interrupted by applause here.] That these irresponsible radical ideas are apt to incite some shallow imprudent fellows to foment alarming plots here and there, even leading to the emergence of insubordinate assassins, is a disgrace to our civilized countrymen and a shameful thing. [Applause] (p. 236)

Unfortunately, Saitō noted, it was a time when only those who shouted “renovation” could be statesmen or patriots. Even the new prime minister, Hirota Kôki 廣田弘毅, had proposed “renovation of the administrative structure” in the previous day’s Diet session. Saitō insisted that Hirota explain what he meant by “renovation.” Exactly what did the prime minister intend to do? Saitō bemoaned the prevalence of vague calls for thoroughgoing renovation of the entire political, legal, and administrative structure of Japan, especially when they emanated not only from naive young military men but from the country’s top leaders.²

Saitō was adamant that Japan’s entire structure of government was by no means inferior to those of other advanced countries, and certainly not in need of a drastic “renovation.” Unlike the ideologues of renovation, Saitō did not indiscriminately excoriate Japan’s institutions—he rather thought the problem was with the people in charge of them. On the other hand, while he rejected destructive ideas in pursuit of the “renovation” of Japan, Saitō recognized the pressing need for certain specific reforms. For instance, lawyer Saitō denounced Japan’s judicial system as “terribly backward,” and scorned the way trials in Japan tended to drag on for years as a clear violation of the people’s rights. This situation demanded urgent solutions, and Saitō had proposed reforms in the previous Diet. If the legal system was too complex, then simplify it. If more courts or funding was needed, then provide the funds. Saitō had to be careful not to openly criticize the military, but in a barely-veiled indictment of recent cabinets’ pro-military priorities, he insisted: “We allocate money hand-over-hand in one area, so when it comes to the courtrooms that preserve the nation’s vital human rights and freedoms, we can hardly refuse funding.” (p. 245)

The problems with Japan’s judicial system were all the more baneful in light of the shocking reality of how routinely the state trampled upon human rights. (As Saitō began to question cabinet leaders about the enforcement of justice, the Minister of Home Affairs apparently tried to leave the Diet chambers, provoking MPs to shout: “What is the

² Calls for renovation or reconstruction had been a part of the Japanese scene for nearly two decades, and in his speech Saitō bunches all such thought together as unfeasible and irrational. But not all renovationist ideas were as empty as the shouted slogans of the young officers. For instance, in 1919, the monthly journal “Reconstruction” (Kaizō) began publication, bringing a variety of new ideas to its mostly urban reading public, notably essays by prominent foreign critics of capitalism including Marx and Lenin. Kano Masanao notes that it was in the same year that the sort of renovationist ideas Saitō deplored emerged in the very different sort of “reconstruction” proposed by radical fascist Kita Ikki in An Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan, which called for a military coup, suspension of the constitution, and martial law while the power of the existing elites was destroyed, replaced by “direct rule” of the emperor. Kano Masanao 麗野政直, Taishō demokurashii-no teryū: “dōzoku”-teki seisshi e no kaiki 大正民主主義の底流：「士族」的精神への回帰 (Undercurrents of Taishō Democracy: Toward a Return to an “Indigenous” Spirit) (Tokyo: Nippon Hōsō Shappan Kyōkai, 1973), p. 19.
Saitō harshly denounced the state's violations of the people's legal and human rights. He charged officials with committing crimes, abusing the law at the expense of people's freedom, forcing false confessions, wounding and torturing suspects, and even killing innocent citizens. In the midst of the applause of fellow members of the Diet, Saitō proclaimed: "What a savage act!" (p. 245)

Next, Saitō brought up Prime Minister Hirota's call upon forming his cabinet to implement an "unyielding national policy" to promote world peace. Saitō fundamentally doubted the goal of world peace. For him, the outbreak of war in Europe at the time had already demonstrated the futility of pursuing world peace. The League of Nations—formed with the goal of maintaining world peace—had proved utterly impotent when confronted with the rivalry of nation states. Once any war began, claims of the justice or morality of one's cause were irrelevant, and it was simply a case of "the survival of the fittest." (pp. 247-48) Instead of the unattainable and unrealistic goal of peace in the entire world, Japan's mission and responsibility were to maintain peace in its part of the world, in East Asia. Japan's urgent task was to construct the "foundations for a hundred year's peace" in Asia. And the only way to ensure such a durable—"hundred year's peace"—in Asia was through a realistic, principled diplomacy. But instead of working toward a sturdy peace in Asia through sincere diplomatic negotiations, Japanese leaders were carrying out a "duplicitous diplomacy," pretending to negotiate for world peace at the same time as furiously expanding the army. Asking the rhetorical question, "what will be the end result?" of the current spiraling arms race, Saitō implied that further military escalation could lead only to war. (pp. 249-50) Saitō did not need to spell it out for his audience of politicians and bureaucrats that Hirota Kōki, foreign minister for the past three years, was largely culpable for Japan's hypocritical diplomacy. So he earnestly called on the new prime minister to implement a "true diplomacy" in which the country acts in accordance with its statements on foreign policy.

Giving Prime Minister Hirota a respite, Saitō turned to the minister of the army, grilling him about the 2.26 Incident. But before he began, Saitō felt the need to strenuously affirm (as he did several times throughout the speech) that it was not his intent to foment anti-military sentiments, nor to attack the ministers of the army and navy. (p. 251) Saitō had struggled when writing this speech because he had to be very cautious both about what he said and how he said it. It was obviously dangerous to speak as he did at a time when rightwing fanatics were murdering politicians and statesmen, none of whom had openly criticized the military. The pragmatic need to avoid any direct criticism of military men, combined with the questioning style of interpellations in Diet sessions makes Saitō sound inconsistent at times, and one must interpret his speeches in this highly specific context.

Saitō found the root cause of the 2.26 Incident in the influence of the ideas of "national renovation" discussed above on naïve young military men, impelling them to intervene in politics. Since around the time of the Manchurian Incident, some of these men had been swayed by ideas of renovation or reconstruction to make statements about politics or join political movements, even though they were active-duty military men.

---

3 Watanabe Yukio, ed., "Saitō Takao shukugun enzetsu kisō Nikki" (Draft Diary on Disciplining the Military Address), Chūō Kōron (September 1991), p. 296.
Saitō noted that this involvement of military men in politics was a blatant violation of the "sacred Imperial Will," prohibited by the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, as well as by various other national laws and regulations. These laws reflected the specialized and limited education and training of military men, taught to provide loyal service to the nation, even giving their lives in battle. Such men, many still in their twenties, lacked the background or training to deal with the complex issues of politics, economics, or diplomacy. Saitō predicted that the intervention of military men in political matters, using force to impose their own views, would bring an end to political debate and destroy constitutional politics, opening the way to national disorder and military dictatorship. (pp. 253-54)

Saitō saw clear proof of the danger of military interference in politics in a previous attempted military coup, the 5.15 Incident of May 1932. Making good use of his legal training, he had attended the trial of the naval cadets charged in the that Incident, and had closely examined the trial records. Saitō learned that the direct impetus to the young officers' acts were tracts by those he refers to as "Gondô something-or-other" or "Kita something-or-other" (i.e. agrarianist Gondô Seikyô 権藤成 郦 and fascist ideologue Kita Ikki 北 一 輝). These irresponsible and reckless ideas had easily convinced the young officers that "the political parties, the zaibatsu, and the ruling class were rotten" and that only a drastic transformation could rescue Japan from its looming destruction. They became fanatics, certain that the only way to end Japan's "weak foreign policy" and the "humiliating London Naval Treaty" was to murder the prime minister and impose military rule.

Saitō demonstrated the shallow "simplicity" of these defendants' ideas by citing their formal statements at the trial. For instance, they claimed that the London Treaty "violated the emperor's prerogative of supreme command," but they had absolutely no idea of how it was a violation in terms of constitutional law. They spoke of a "new Imperial politics," or a "politics loyal to the throne," but had not the least notion of how to implement such politics. (p. 255) These young military men were incapable of recognizing the utter hypocrisy of renovationist ideology. They actually believed that their murderous acts would rescue the country and thus were proof of their selfless patriotism. The 5.15 Incident had clearly revealed not only the irrationality but also the hypocrisy of these soldiers' calls to "renovate" the country, as their assaults led not to any renovation of the nation but only to violent destruction. Unaware of their hypocrisy, these men continued to see themselves as heroic patriots, when in fact they were no more than murderous thugs. Convinced that their violent acts would somehow automatically lead to national renovation, they "sincerely" believed in the urgent need to act upon infeasible and impractical ideas that they only half-understood, carrying self-deception to dangerous new heights. Saitō notes that these men made no attempt to cover up or deny what they had done. As they explained why they had killed the country's leaders, they actually seemed proud of their murder and destruction.

What was the military leadership's response to the young officers' heinous crime? Here Saitō provides a concrete example of the serious problems with the nation's judicial system. As navy officers, the ringleaders of the 5.15 Incident were tried in the Navy Court. Given the seriousness of the charges against them, the prosecutor called for the death sentence in three cases. But a vigorous opposition movement arose among some military men and their civilian cronies, surrounding prosecutor Yamamoto's house and
threatening his family. In the end, the court gave in, reducing the defendants’ sentences to as little as a year, the longest two sentences being thirteen and fifteen years. On the other hand, the civilians who had cooperated with the navy officers were tried in civilian court, and their leader (Tachibana Kōzaburō 橘服三郎) sentenced to life in prison. In short, someone who murdered a prime minister was lightly sentenced because he was a military man, while someone who merely threw a bomb at an electrical generation plant received a life sentence because he was a civilian, even though the bomb did not explode. The discrepancy between these sentences, imposed in courts established in the name of the emperor and dedicated to equal treatment before the law, was plainly a travesty of justice.

Saitō blamed not only the courts but also military leaders for their lenient attitude toward the dangerous intervention of military men in politics, finding in this leniency a secondary cause of the series of violent “incidents” of the 1930s. Preceding the 5.15 Incident of 1932 were the March and October Incidents of the previous year. Military authorities had responded to these failed coup attempts with secret proceedings, ultimately imposing no significant penalties on the small group of military men responsible. If the authorities had adequately punished the conspirators immediately following the 1931 incidents, subsequent incidents could have been averted. (p. 257)

"Then," Saitō recounted, “came the 5.15 Incident of 1932, when military men forced their way in broad daylight into the residence of Prime Minister Inukai [Tsuyoshi]  岸信介, whom the emperor had entrusted with running the country, and shot him dead, next turning the weapons with which they should defend their nation onto the highest officials of the land.”

Saitō argued that the response by military leaders to the 5.15 Incident confirmed their active support for the violent actions of the young defendants. As the case went to trial in 1933, more than a year after the murder of Inukai, an extraordinarily sympathetic joint declaration by the Minister of Justice and the Army and Navy Ministers proclaimed:

---

4 P. 258. Initially, proceedings from the trial of the 515 defendants were confidential. Then, in May 1933, as Japan left the League of Nations in response to that body’s acceptance of the Lytton Commission’s recommendation that it not recognize Manchukuo, some elements within the government decided to make use of the ongoing trial of the young officers to spread the ideal of how to act in a “time of crisis” (hijōji 非常時). The government made the trial records public, and Army Minister Araki called for the Japanese people to learn from the “sincere motives” and “deep concern for the nation” of the young officers who had murdered the prime minister. As the mass media reported verbatim the young officers’ statements that they were sincere and ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation, ultranationalist groups began a petition movement to pardon the defendants, eventually collecting more than a million signatures. Awaya Kentarō 株尾健太郎, Shōwa no rekishi 昭和の歴史 (History of the Shōwa Period), Vol. 6: Shōwa no seittō 昭和の政党 (Political Parties of the Shōwa Period) (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1983), pp. 268-69. As we shall see, the public reaction to Saitō’s speech condemning the shallow sincerity of the young officers shows that many Japanese abhorred their violent acts.

5 In the wake of the incident, some of their superiors praised the young officers, and they were permitted to hold forth at length during their trial, explaining why they had acted “righteously,” in order to “save the nation.” Apparently none recognized that their attempt to save the nation involved eliminating the nation’s chosen representative, inasmuch as the electorate had voted for Inukai.
The motives and the goals behind this offense, as each of the defendants has insisted, stem from recent conditions in our country, in which deadlocks are emerging on all sides, in politics, diplomacy, economy, education, thought, the military, and so forth. As the spirit of our countrymen is becoming decadent, they fear that if they do not destroy the present state of affairs (genjō o daha 現狀を打破), our imperial land may be led to destruction. And the source of these deadlocks is the collusion of the political parties, the zaibatsu, and the privileged classes. They pursue only self-interest and greed, neglecting national defense and the people’s well-being. Only by wiping them out can we carry out a true renovation (kaizō 改造) of the state and construct a pure new Japan.6

In short, the highest-ranking military leaders explicitly concurred with the need for national renovation and a destruction of the status quo. In his own remarks, Army Minister Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫 stressed the “pure hearts” of the defendants, who were “acting for the sake of Japan.”

Though he made no mention of this declaration (which his audience surely knew of) in his speech, Saitō strongly suggested that higher-ranking officers had not only been lax in imposing discipline but were implicated in the attempted coups, or at least tacitly encouraged the violent young officers. Perhaps these high-ranking military men conveyed some ideas to the young officers, or goaded them to act, or let it be known that they anticipated another incident. Carefully but firmly, Saitō stated: “As I see it, there is grounds for doubt that there was not even one of this sort of wirepuller.” (p. 261) Indeed, in the case of the most recent coup attempt in February 1936, the young officers expected not punishment but praise from their leaders in the wake of the incident. Their expectations were only shattered when the emperor spoke out branding the coup leaders rebels three days later, on February 29. By risking his life to implicate high-ranking officers in the 2.26 Incident, Saitō provides us with a rare, uncommonly accurate perspective on this attempted coup. In the midst of an increasingly zealous atmosphere in which spouting calls for national renovation became a fad, Saitō dared to directly criticize these ideas in public.

Saitō’s bravery came from a conviction that he was not alone, and that many other Japanese deplored the faddish ideas of the day. But at the end of his speech, he sadly noted that freedom of speech was vanishing from Japanese society, so that people were unable to voice their extreme regret about the 2.26 Incident:

6 Inoki Masamichi 猪木正道, Gunkoku Nihon no kōbō: Nis-Shin sensō kara Nit-Chū sensō e 軍国日本の興亡: 日清戦争から日中戦争へ(The Rise and Fall of Militarist Japan: From the First Sino-Japanese War to the Second Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1995), pp. 201-02. Itō Takashi remarks that Saitō’s insistence that Japan did not need a thoroughgoing reconstruction placed him in the “maintain the present state” school (“genjō iji”-ha 現状維持派). He speculates that Saitō’s membership in this group, along with his patriotism and loyalty to the emperor, may have stymied postwar researchers, who thus saw him as a conservative. Itō Takashi 伊藤隆, “Kaisetsu” 解説 (Commentary), in Saitō, Kaiko shichijinen, p. 308. For a related recent interpretation, see Earl H. Kinmonth, “The Mouse that Roared: Saitō Takao, Conservative Critic of Japan’s ‘Holy War’ in China,” Journal of Japanese Studies 25.2 (Summer 1999).
No matter what, in the present age of the restriction of free speech the Japanese people cannot publicly speak out. They can merely furtively give vent to their true feelings in private or try to express themselves by signaling with their eyes. In what way is this any different than the dictatorial militarism of the feudal age? (pp. 265-66)

In conclusion, Saitō linked his call for the protection of freedom of speech with a proclamation that the spirit of constitutional monarchy was to express the general will of the people through the fairest possible free elections. He found it intolerable that “the will of a few is now threatening to neutralize the people’s will.” (p. 267)

Despite the considerable popularity of ideas of renovation, the reaction to Saitō’s 1936 speech demonstrates that a great many Japanese, both inside and outside the Diet, agreed with his denunciation of these ideas and his support for representative politics. Assembled MPs applauded more than forty times, shouted out remarks such as “hear hear,” “so so,” and “listen up!” In his diary Saitō recounted that his audience quietly and intently listened to his speech, though they applauded thunderously at key parts.7 After his speech, Saitō was surprised to find MPs from all political parties come forth to thank him and shake his hand.8 (His surprise suggests that he expected many in his audience endorsed the ideas of national renovation he had criticized.)

The strains and fissures of Japanese society in the mid-1930s provide the crucial context for understanding the enthusiastic response to Saitō’s speech. In the five years since the invasion of the Manchuria in 1931, nearly fanatic supporters of the military glorified the war in China. The emotional intensity of 1931 and 1932 was not again attained until Pearl Harbor, but any daily newspaper was full of the photographs of uniformed military men, in sharp contrast to the papers a decade earlier. In every village and town, a highly visible (and vocal) minority supporting the war effort were winning out over the silent majority, increasingly cowed into silence.9 Saitō’s speech was thus a clarion call against the tide of public opinion propagated by these self-appointed “opinion makers.” Yet despite the increasing clampdown on disparate opinions in the broader society, there is clear evidence that many Japanese outside of the Diet shared the ideas in Saitō’s speech. They too wanted to speak against the prevailing tide of ideas calling for destruction of the existing order, and they also feared such attacks imperiled free speech and the parliamentary system. Beginning the day after his speech, and continuing for more than two weeks, Saitō received a steady stream of letters, postcards, and telegrams, not only from Japan but also from Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China. Except for two or three hard-to-decipher messages, every one of these letters and telegrams strongly supported Saitō and his ideas. Several thanked him for saying what they had wanted to


8 Saitō, Kaiko shichijūnen, p. 123.

9 Louise Young describes how women’s organizations played a major role in whipping up war hysteria, even from the time of the Manchurian Incident in the early 1930s. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
say for several years but could not. These writers regretted that they were losing their freedom.¹⁰

The Japanese people's response to Saitō's speech shows their ongoing support for constitutional politics and freedom of speech, and dread over the increasing influence of the military and their civilian allies. The next day, all major newspapers risked censure to join the individual letter-writers in thanking Saitō for his speech.¹¹ The Tokyo Asahi newspaper reported that Saitō deeply moved the audience, calling him the "star" of the Diet for pointing out the illegality of military men's political activities. The Yomiuri newspaper applauded Saitō's bravery, declaring:

Saitō clearly demonstrates how to pursue freedom of speech. Among the many MPs, who can so correctly accuse military men of their violations? Only Saitō. Though he is short and poor in appearance, he fascinated his audience with the vehemence of his argument, even at the risk of his life.

An American named Mason came to see Saitō and told him that his speech would go down in history along with Patrick Henry's. While the ideas of national renovation were already omnipresent in Japanese society, the outpouring of support for Saitō by his colleagues and the public shows they were not yet omnipotent.

**Domestic Politics, 1936-1940**

During the intervening four years before Saitō's 1940 speech, overseas aggression steadily expanded, while nonelected elites implemented drastic changes in domestic politics. The military (as if responding to Saitō's requests) imposed discipline over its ranks—there would be no more coup attempts. Prime Minister Hirota and his cabinet decided to fight fire with fire, seeking to reassert control over the military by granting their leaders more power, ending the long-standing prohibition of active-duty officers from cabinet-level posts. Hirota anticipated the military services would exercise self-restraint, but his decision backfired, feeding the services' arrogant intervention in politics. Henceforth, the services could order their ministers to resign at will, giving them the power to bring down a cabinet at any time.

Along with the escalation of fighting in China in 1937, the pace and scale of change in Japanese domestic politics accelerated. The late 1930s was the heyday of "renovationist bureaucrats" (kakushin kanryō 新斬官僚), who implemented formidable institutional changes in Japan. Ignoring how Saitō had disclosed the infeasible nature of calls for renovation and the broad support for his denunciation of these ideas by

---


¹¹ The gist of many of these articles is found in Saitō, *Kaiko shichijūnen*, p. 123-29. Saitō also remarks that most monthly magazines in June included excerpts from his speech or reprinted it in its entirety.
politicians and the public, these bureaucrats sought to implement their version of the “renovation” of Japan. Many held an odd mix of beliefs, combining fierce anticommunism with agrarianist anticapitalism, all tinged with vague “Japanist” notions such as adoration for imperial regalia or mythical divine emperors. In the late 1930s their numbers and influence further expanded as colleagues returning from the continent sought to apply lessons learned in the founding of the puppet state of Manchukuo to the home front.

Working closely with the military, powerful renovationist bureaucrats crafted a variety of new mechanisms for regulating economic and political affairs as part of the expanding war effort. They formed bodies such as the Asian Development Board, or the Cabinet Planning Agency (which they almost immediately reformulated as the even more powerful Cabinet Planning Board). They ordered the establishment of more than a million “neighborhood associations” in cities, towns, and villages across Japan, in an attempt to regulate and monitor the behavior of Japanese people down to the local level. In emulation of the Nazi Arbeitsfront, they set up the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association, with units in factories and workshops across the country. By 1941, around 85,000 such units were in place, linking 4.8 million workers. The Association incorporated 70% of industrial workers, ten times the membership of labor unions at their peak. All of these new institutions were designed to fully mobilize the energies of Japanese people in all ranks of life for the twentieth-century phenomenon of total war.

On the ideological front, the government’s censorship program found new targets, rationing newsprint to channel it to selected publications. Since the state had already suppressed communists, socialists, and indeed virtually all organized opposition to government policies or the war in China, it began to target any potential source of criticism or disparate opinions. In place of accurate information, the Japanese people were subjected to a propaganda blitz from elements in the military, using the mass media and pamphlets, such as one on national defense that began: “War is both the father of creation and the mother of culture.” In 1937 the Ministry of Education published the cornerstone of the propaganda program: Principles of Our National Essence (Kokutai no hongi 国體の本義), eventually distributing more than 600,000 copies. Principles of

12 Without disputing Saitō's disclosure of the infeasible nature of ideas of national renovation, he clearly simplifies somewhat to get his points across. The kind of renovation sought by the new bureaucrats would be imposed from within the system—not by overthrowing it. And the nihilistic calls for destruction of the existing order that Saitō deplored blended with more rational critiques of Japan's society and economy. One reason the ideas of renovation gained so many adherents is that they built upon a healthy criticism of the Taishō years. Concerned chiefly with the political consequences of renovationist ideas, Saitō downplays or is perhaps unaware of the considerable appeal of these ideas for many Japanese in all walks of life.


Our National Essence drilled it into its young readers that it was their “divine mission” to spread the uniquely Japanese combination of filial piety and loyalty to the emperor around the globe to replace faltering Western ideas of democracy, communism, socialism, and individualism. A series of national spiritual mobilization campaigns inculcated the ideals of sacrifice for the nation, frugality, and so on. Mobilization campaigns affected even grammar- and middle-school students, forcing them to participate in military training.

Then, on April 1, 1938 the first Konoe Cabinet enacted the Army-sponsored National General Mobilization Law, bringing unprecedented new government intervention into the lives of the Japanese. When the draft law was introduced in the lower house in late February, Saitō spoke for many of his colleagues when he raised his objections to the new law. Some politicians dreaded the greatly reduced power of the Diet under this law. Others feared the drastic erosion of the people’s freedom and rights that could result from a law giving dictatorial powers to nonelected bureaucrats. The mobilization law gave government officials the authority to intervene in many aspects of the people’s lives explicitly protected by the constitution—bypassing the accepted procedure which required them first to obtain imperial sanction for such actions on a case-by-case basis in the form of rescripts. Saitō’s fifty-minute interpellation focused on the unconstitutionality of the new law.

While Saitō of the Minseitō and Makino Ryōzō of the Seiyūkai criticized the proposed mobilization law, leading members of their parties, Nagai Ryūtarō and Nakajima Chikuhei, respectively, publicly supported the new law. And ultimately, MPs meekly voted the bill into law without modification. Why did politicians not do more to resist the passage of a law that emasculated the Diet? Their inaction stemmed from a climate combining fear and apathy that pervaded the Diet. The fear stemmed from pressures and threats from the military and rightwing groups that stymied most outspoken opposition to the law. For example, a few days before the law was introduced in the Diet, a mob of 300 fanatics calling themselves the “League to Protect the Country from Communism” occupied the headquarters of both mainstream parties. Symbolic proof that the growing confidence of the military had reached the point of arrogance was apparent in an incident within the Diet building. When an army official, uniformed soldiers surrounding him, was explaining the details of new law, he was interrupted by a heckler. He responded by shouting “shut up!” (damare! 談れ!) Saitō’s explanation of why there was no resistance to the new law stressed how, since the expansion of the war in China, most MPs had become cowardly in the face of pressure from the right-wing or the military. Saitō sadly recalled in his memoirs, “Once again, the parties revealed their utter timidity.” His criticism of the General Mobilization Law (it was reprinted in its entirety in most newspapers) met with the approval of the general public, who sent him letters,

---


16 Saitō, Katko shichijūnen, pp. 140-41. I will return to Saitō’s stress on the pressure from the military in my conclusion.
postcards, and telegrams urging him on. Saitō may have been fighting a losing battle, but he obviously still had supporters, except within the Diet where politicians no longer dared to represent the views of their constituents.

The fifty articles of the General Mobilization Law authorized nearly unlimited central control over labor, materiel, prices, and publication for the sake of “national defense” in a time of war. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro responded to criticisms that the new law was no more than a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Authorization Law by promising that the mobilization law would not take effect under the current China Incident (meaning Japan’s undeclared war of aggression on the continent), and that MPs would constitute a majority of the General Mobilization Council overseeing its application. But Konoe’s promises soon proved empty. Within months of its passage, the state began to employ the General Mobilization Law to intrude into peoples’ lives in innumerable new ways, although its full impact was not felt until after 1940. The state could call on the people as needed (article 4), order the cooperation of workers (article 5), impose conditions on the hiring and wages of workers (article 6), determine how materiel was produced, consumed, and distributed (article 8), limit and regulate trade and lower or raise taxes (article 9), order the formation of cartels (article 17), set prices, wages, and fares (article 19), regulate and censor the press (article 20), and so forth. The General Mobilization Law—enacted more than three-and-a-half years before Pearl Harbor—illustrates to what lengths the government would go to mobilize the total energies of all Japanese people for the war effort.

Akin to the myth that Hitler seized power by legal means, at first glance the National General Mobilization Law of 1938 seems to have been “legally” enacted, voted into law in the Diet. But as Saitō pointed out in his speech, the mobilization law violated the rights of the Japanese people that were explicitly guaranteed by the Meiji Constitution. Also, Saitō insisted that the Diet lacked the legal authority to override any provisions of the constitution—only the emperor could do that. Apparently the result of due constitutional process, the General Mobilization Law actually was blatantly unconstitutional. These MPs’ suicidal vote for the mobilization law was the beginning of the end of the Diet as a functional body capable of any meaningful opposition to the decisions of nonelected elites.

Second Interpellation, February 2, 1940

The “China Incident” had steadily expanded, taking a heavy toll on the people. Saitō estimated that about 100,000 soldiers had already died, with the number of wounded exceeding half a million. The fruitless sacrifices made by the Japanese people helped impel Saitō to demand that cabinet leaders find a way to end the war. Even in his sparsely-populated home district, the war had already brought great hardship. In a 1937

---

17 Awaya, Shōwa no se!tō, p. 13.

18 Itō Takashi, Nihon no rekishi 日本の歴史 (History of Japan), Volume 30: Jōgōnen sensū 十五年戦争 (The Fifteen-Year War) (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1976), pp. 204-05.
letter to one of his local supporters, Saitô sympathized with how the families of the 500 soldiers conscripted from his home town of Izushi were worried and sad.\(^{19}\)

Ignoring the people's hardships and sacrifices, party politicians had timidly approved all of the policies expanding war of the cabinets of Konoe, Hiranuma Kiichirô 平沼騨一, and Abe Noriyuki 阿部信行, leading Saitô to admit in his diary: "How miserable I have been as a member of one of the dominant parties!"\(^{20}\) Unable to stand his passive acquiescence any longer, Saitô decided to raise the issue of the China Incident at the Diet. On the second day of the new Diet, he began his most famous interpellation by directly addressing the new prime minister, Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa 米内光政:

What on earth is the China Incident? When will it be over? How long will it continue?
The cabinet declares that it will resolve the China Incident, but how does it plan to do so? The people want to ask these questions but cannot. Surely everyone expects they can obtain answers to these questions through the Diet.\(^{21}\)

Stressing the political role of elected representatives to question government leaders, Saitô was fighting against the scissor-like combined function of censorship and propaganda, which denied accurate information to the people, substituting in its place half-truths and lies.

Even as he questioned Admiral Yonai about the "China Incident," Saitô frankly recognized that the basic hypocrisy of state policies extended even to the term used to describe current events, remarking: "Actually, what we now call an incident is in fact a war. And it is the biggest war we have experienced since the founding of the country." (p. 273) And what, Saitô asked, were the aims of this immense war? The Yonai Cabinet had stated that it would resolve the "Incident" in accordance with the so-called "Konoe Declaration," issued by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on December 24, 1938. First and foremost, this declaration had stated that Japan would "exterminate" the anti-Japanese Guomindang 國民黨 regime. Then, working with those in Asia who shared Imperial Japan's goals, the plan was to establish a "New Order in East Asia." This New Order would involve friendly neighborly relations between China, Japan, and Manchukuo, united by their mutual defense (against communism), and economic cooperation. Japan would maintain the right to station troops in limited areas for the defense against communism and to create a buffer zone in Inner Mongolia. The Konoe Declaration clearly affirmed that Japan had no territorial or financial designs on China, but sought only cooperation and friendship.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) Awaya, Shôwa no seitô, p. 17. Saitô's nephew was among those who had died.

\(^{20}\) Saitô, Kaiko shichijûnen, p. 142.

\(^{21}\) Saitô Takao, "Shina jihen shori ni kan suru shitsumon enzetsu" 支那事変処理に関する質問演説 (Interpellation Session on Resolving the China Incident), in Kaiko shichijûnen, pp. 268-303. Subsequent references to this speech will simply refer to the page numbers from this source. This citation, p. 269.

\(^{22}\) Oka Yoshitake, Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography, transl. Shumpei Okamoto and Patricia Murray (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983), pp. 81-82. Saitô's summary of
Saitō was perplexed by various contradictions between the Konoe Declaration’s stated war goals. For instance, how was the goal of “exterminating” the Chinese government to be reconciled with the intent of establishing “friendly neighborly relations” there? And the Konoe Declaration certainly did not jibe with many of the government’s recent foreign policy statements, such as claims that the Incident would drive Western powers out of China, liberating Asia from Western imperialism. After all, the declaration stated that Japan would not monopolize China’s economy, and that third countries would be free to trade with China. Saitō disclosed that his country was waging a great and costly war for the sake of policy goals that made no sense. He was especially dubious about the claim that Japan had been fighting to establish a “New Order in East Asia,” since this war goal first emerged a year-and-a-half after the China Incident in the Konoe Declaration of November 3, 1938.23 And in light of the nature of Hitler’s pursuit of a “New Order” in contemporary Europe, the phrase had a disturbing ring for Saitō:

As I believe the foreign minister said yesterday, these days the construction of a New Order is not only taking place in East Asia, but has been discussed for several years in Europe as well. But while the construction of a New Order in Europe supposedly meant that the “have-not countries” would demand territory from the “have countries,” in a sort of international communism, if we look at what really ensued, we find the exact opposite. In other words, powerful large countries have oppressed, persecuted, and annexed small weak countries in a case of the survival of the fittest. So the building of a New Order in Europe has been absolutely incongruous, actually meaning violent destruction. (p. 279)

Did the Japanese government intend to copy Hitler and bring about the destruction of Asia? Saitō demanded to know exactly what the construction of a New Order in East Asia meant.

For at least five years, Konoe had been an ardent supporter of the renovationist approach, as is apparent from the title of an article he wrote in 1933, “Let’s Reconstruct the Present World!”24 And he had already referred to “have” and “have-not” countries even before making his declaration in late 1938. Earlier that year, during the Diet session in which the lower house ratified the General Mobilization Law, Social Masses Party member Nishio Suehiro 西尾末廣 had welcomed the new law enthusiastically, the declaration also includes an affirmation of the independence of China and a promise to quickly withdraw all Japanese troops except those in Inner Mongolia. As a first-person witness to Konoe’s “declaration” in the Diet chambers, Saitō’s version is probably as reliable as any other. Konoe later confessed that a central part of the declaration, Japan’s pledge to withdraw all its troops from China, was cut from the official text due to Army pressure. Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 122 footnote.

23 P. 279. This was the second of three “Konoe Declarations.” The first, in January 1938, stated Japan’s refusal to negotiate with Jiang Jieshi, the second, in November 1938, as we see, proclaims Japan’s war goal to be the establishment of a “New Order in East Asia.” The third Konoe Declaration, as discussed above, came the following month, in December 1938.

concurring with Prime Minister Konoe that a worldwide struggle between “have” and “have-not” countries was taking place. But when Nishio urged Konoe to implement policies of renovation “like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin,” pandemonium broke out in the Diet. Approval of fascist leaders was one thing, but suggesting that Konoe emulate a Communist was going too far. Party leaders organized a committee to punish Nishio, and MPs voted to expel him.²⁵

For Saitô, the problems with the war goals expressed in the Konoe Declaration were myriad. These goals were not only hypocritical and infeasible but inherently irrational. For example, he was frankly baffled by an official publication of December 1938, the “Draft Outline of a New Order in East Asia,” which dealt with ideas such as the “basic principle of our Imperial Way,” or the “philosophy of the Chinese Kingly Way,” or “The Whole World Under One Roof.” For someone like Saitô, whose head was preoccupied with practical political matters, these ideas were just plain incomprehensible. (Part of the audience agreed, applauding here.) Yet the cabinet had set up committees to ponder these airy notions, researching the “fundamental principles” or “spiritual foundations” of the coming New Order in East Asia. Was it not preposterous that the New Order, the goal of a massive war and the reason for such great sacrifices, was not formulated for a year-and-a-half after the war had started, and that even a year later, high-level politicians were still meeting to investigate the meaning and the “spiritual basis” of the New Order? (p. 281) Much to Saitô’s regret, the infeasible proposals for national renovation espoused by fascist terrorists in the early 1930s had actually reemerged on a far grander scale in the government’s official war goals calling for a “New Order in East Asia.”

Although Saitô was permitted to finish his speech, afterwards the chairman of the lower house ordered the speech from this point to be cut from the public record. Thus, few Japanese, at the time or subsequently, had access to the entire speech. A few local newspapers published the entire speech, but the excised latter two-thirds of Saitô’s speech became widely available only in 1972, 32 years after it was censored, in a new edition of his memoirs.

At the start of the part of his speech cut from the official record, Saitô continued his examination of the goals of the war in China. He noted that the past few cabinets had repeatedly proclaimed that the present conflict was “utterly different in character from previous wars.” Japanese leaders insisted that the country was not seeking profits but rather, in accordance with international justice and the spirit of “The Whole World Under One Roof,” fighting to bring everlasting peace not only to Asia but to the whole world. This worldwide mission for peace was what made it a “holy war.” (pp. 281-82) Saitô’s outspoken scorn for the so-called holy war surely explains why the speech was cut just before this passage.

We have already seen that Saitô felt that the everlasting world peace proposed by the Konoe Declaration was an unrealistic goal for any war. He felt that true politicians

²⁵ Nishio’s linking renovation ideas with the leader of international communism illustrates the complexities of categorizing political ideology in 1930s Japan. His was the only case of expulsion from the Diet since Hoshi Tôru’s 星淳 expulsion in 1893 for implication in a financial scandal. Itô Takashi, Jûgenen sensô, pp. 214-16. After Nishio, the next expulsion of a Diet member would be Saitô Takaô in 1940. Itô thinks that MPs were also frustrated by how they had caved in to the mobilization law and took it out on Nishio.
should not get caught up in such daydreams or unrealistic ideals, but rather take account of the reality of conflict between nation states and devise appropriate policies to ensure their own nation's future. And despite the many calls for world peace and peace movements in the past, barely more than 200 years of the last 3500 had seen peace around the entire globe. Saitō prized peace so much that he stated: "All in all, in this world there is nothing as stupid as war." But given human nature, he was realistic about the slim chances of peace persisting forever. (pp. 284-85)

Saitō also took issue with the cabinet's claim that the "holy war" was being fought for international justice. The reality was that in any war both parties claim that "justice" is on their side. But justice does not bring about victory—power does. As he had in 1936, Saitō argued that war was always a contest of national power. Bringing up the example of "Christian countries in the West," he was interrupted by a ruckus and shouts of "Never mind that!" and "Get to the point!" Continuing, he pointed out the hypocrisy of these nations: "They bow their heads in front of the cross inside, but when international conflicts occur, it is always the survival of the fittest." At this point, Saitō's talk reached an emotional crescendo:

If we ignore this reality, or camouflage it with the beautiful words "holy war," pointlessly neglecting the people's sacrifices for an array of elusive pretexts such as "international justice," or "a moral foreign policy," or "coexistence and co-prosperity," or "world peace," and thereby lose a rare opportunity and end up ruining the great state plan of the century...[Saitō was again interrupted by shouts and jeers...] today's politicians will commit a crime that we cannot compensate for with our deaths. (p. 287)

Obviously, Saitō was not only demanding that cabinet leaders stop the war, but he was also calling on his colleagues in the Diet to join him in making this demand. (There was no applause in response, but more shouting.)

Ever the pragmatic politician, Saitō then expanded upon his disclosure of the hypocritical and infeasible war goals of the Konoe Declaration to take up the specific politics of the China war. The Japanese government, having flatly rejected any possibility of peace negotiations with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 蔣介石, now planned to aid and work with the "new government" that was to be established under Wang Jingwei 汪精衛. (Wang was the ex-Guomindang politician whose "puppet" government at Nanjing Japan would recognize a month after Saitō's speech, in March 1940. Prime Minister Konoe had timed his declaration to coincide with Wang's break with the Guomindang and departure from China in December 1938.)

Wang Jingwei had publicly expressed his support for the Konoe Declaration, stating that he was convinced that the declaration marked a new direction in Japan's China policy, definitively renouncing any "invasion-ism" (shinryakushugi 侵略主義). (p. 275) Cooperating with Japan in pursuit of the New Order, Wang had begun struggling against other Chinese, especially Jiang Jieshi. Therefore, Japan's China policy depended on the success of the new Wang government. But, Saitō asked, how much power would Wang's new government actually have? Could the new government really maintain order in China? And what would be the relationship between the new government and Jiang's? One could hardly expect Jiang's regime, which was cooperating with the Communists to oppose Japan, to get along well with Wang's pro-Japanese, anti-communist government. Military leaders had stated that Japan and the new Wang government would cooperate and fight against Jiang until his defeat. So in
essence, the military proposed for Japan to wage a long war against Jiang at the same

time as supporting the new government under Wang. What a heavy burden this dual

policy would impose on the Japanese people! Once again explicitly taking the role of

the people’s spokesman, Saitō stated: “I believe that all of the Japanese people want to know

whether we have sufficient manpower, materiel, and financial resources” to carry out

such a dual policy. (p. 294) Obviously, he felt that Japan lacked the means to continue

the war.

Even assuming Japan and the new government eventually defeated Jiang, Saitō

doubted that Wang’s new government would then have the power to maintain order in a

territory fifteen times the size of Japan and with a population approaching half a billion.

And if the new government lacked the ability to unify China and control its vast territory,

the future would bring only chaos or a civil war. Saitō locates the root cause of this

potential chaos in the Konoe Cabinet’s declaration of January 16, 1938 that Japan would

never negotiate with Jiang’s regime. How could a war ever be concluded without the

possibility of negotiations with the enemy?

Near the end of his speech, Saitō emphasized how confused the people were about

why Japan was at war. Despite the large sums the cabinet spent on spiritual mobilization

campaigns, few could understood why Japan was fighting. To illustrate his point, Saitō

related an episode:

Recently, a certain famous senior politician turned to his audience in a large hall and

stated that he did not understand the goals of the current war. He did not understand

why we were waging the war, and wondered if anyone in the audience understood, and

if so, to let him know. But out of the large crowd assembled in front of him, not a

single person could answer him. (p. 298)

The Japanese government was forcing its people to sacrifice themselves for the sake of a

war that nobody could explain the purpose of

Saitō also complained that recent cabinets had forgotten the enormous sacrifices

the Japanese people were making for the war effort. Convinced that Japan’s serious

problems basically stemmed from poor leadership, Saitō launched a startlingly fierce

attack on the nation’s leaders:

The government’s job is not only to demand sacrifices from the people.... [“Hear hear,”

and applause] But what have recent governments done? What have the cabinets done

since the Incident? [Shouts of “What have the parties done?” and “Be quiet! Listen!”]

In two-and-a-half years, three cabinets have resigned. They cannot maintain political

stability—how can they manage a national crisis? After all, the cabinet’s leaders lack

responsible ideas. [Applause] They lack sufficient enthusiasm to serve the nation

wholeheartedly. Given the Imperial Order to form a cabinet, they forget the point of

constitutional government and ignore the trends of public opinion. Without a popular

support base, or any experience in national politics, they form effete cabinets by

gathering together other incompetents. Because they are not under civilian control,

these leaders lack the confidence to resolutely carry out any policy. Their politics

consists of stalling for time with makeshift stopgap measures. Their failure is a

foregone conclusion. [Applause] (p. 299)

Saitō unequivocally charged the current leaders of Japan with ignoring the principle at

the heart of constitutional politics: that elected representatives carry out the tasks
necessary to respond to the demands of their constituents. Not only were Japan’s elected representatives shirking their duty, the nonelected leaders dominating recent cabinets were by definition irresponsible because they were not chosen by the people. And while the country’s nonelected and undemocratic leaders wasted precious time with ineffective politics and ignored the people’s demands, the country sank deeper and deeper into the morass of the war in China. Saitō contrasted these irresponsible leaders unfavorably with their predecessors fifty years earlier such as Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 and Katsura Tarō 桂太郎. The Itō Cabinet began and finished the Sino-Japanese War, and then the Katsura Cabinet began and finished the Russo-Japanese War (p. 301) Ending the current war was an urgent task that took precedence over any other governmental work. One last time Saitō demanded to know exactly how Prime Minister Yonai and other cabinet leaders planned to end the war.

The Aftermath

What then was the cabinet leaders’ response to Saitō’s criticisms of government policy and many specific questions? Admiral Yonai stood and briefly responded, proclaiming simply: “Imperial Japan’s policies for resolving the China Incident are firm and unyielding.” The closest thing to a specific answer he would provide concerned the new government about to be established in China under Wang Jingwei:

Since the new central government under Mr. Wang has the same idea about the establishment of a New Order in East Asia as the Imperial Government, we expect that it will have real power and the ability to adjust relations among nations, and we will actively assist its formation and development. [Applause]

As for the relationship between Wang and Jiang Jieshi after the establishment of the new government, Yonai said it was unavoidable that the new government would conflict with Jiang, but again “expected” that Jiang would change his mind, dismantle his regime, and surrender to Wang. Concerning domestic affairs, Yonai asked for the people’s understanding and cooperation in strengthening the wartime order, exerting themselves to the utmost to help construct a New Order in East Asia. (pp. 302-03) Yonai entirely ignored how Saitō had exposed the irrationality and hypocrisy of the Konoe Declaration.

In his memoirs, Saitō recalled that: “The Prime Minister’s simple response was fundamentally insufficient. The Army Minister remained silent, unable to reply. After barely ten minutes the speaker of the lower house hastily adjourned.” He also recalled that two or three times small groups had shouted out and made catcalls, but for the most part the MPs had listened quietly, occasionally applauding. Yet Saitō remarked that “one felt an atmosphere of uneasiness wafting through the Diet.”26 In contrast to the support from all sides after Saitō’s 1936 speech, the reaction from colleagues in the Diet to his speech on the China War basically broke down along party lines. Most members of the Minsei party and the “legitimate” Seiyūkai (the factions of Kuhara Fusanosuke 九原房之助 and Hatoyama Ichirō 原山一郎) supported Saitō and applauded his speech regularly. The hoots and jeers came from the “renovationist” Seiyūkai (the Nakajima faction) and from what Saitō referred to as “small groups,” chiefly a portion of the Social

26 Saitō, Kaiko shichijūnen, p. 152.
Masses Party, and the Jikyoku Dōshikai (newly formed from pro-military organizations including the Kokumin Dōmei, Tōhōkai, and the Nihon Kakushintō). 27

The first signs of the depth of the opposition to Saitō’s speech were apparent immediately after the day’s session came to a close, as the army observer in the Diet expressed his great dissatisfaction and called for Saitō’s punishment. Minsei Party president Machida Chūji had disapproved of Saitō’s speech from the beginning, and now worked to appease the military and other proponents of national renovation. 28 Within minutes of the end of Saitō’s speech, the process leading to his expulsion from the Diet began.

Immediately after his speech, Saitō went to the stenographer’s office to check on the accuracy of the official record of his speech. Then he was called to the office of the chairman of lower house, Koyama Matsuhisa (a Minsei Party colleague). Several senior members of the party were concerned that other MPs would complain about Saitō’s speech as a blasphemous attack on Japan’s “holy war.” They were also afraid that newspapers would publish the whole of his speech, so they asked the minister of home affairs to intervene in newspapers. Officials worked late into the night, cutting the latter two-thirds of Saitō’s speech from the Diet record. Saitō had checked the transcript of his speech and told the assembled politicians that he had found nothing needing correction, but if they wanted to excise some part for the good of the party, he had no objection. After returning home, Saitō refused the telephoned request of party officials to immediately visit him. 29 Early the next morning, these party officials visited Saitō at home and asked him to resign from the party. Saitō replied that he had no desire to harm the party, so he readily agreed to party leaders’ request that he leave the Minseitō.

Meanwhile, inside the Diet, most rank-and-file Minseitō members initially supported Saitō and saw no reason to punish him. But the same small number of politicians who had jeered during Saitō’s speech now threatened to bring down the cabinet by introducing a no confidence resolution for Chairman Koyama unless Saitō was punished. By the time the regular Diet session finally convened at 9 p.m., mainstream party members had caved in to the strident opinions of hardcore critics of Saitō and agreed to form a committee to investigate and punish Saitō. 30 The will of a small minority of Diet men, probably backed up by an unstated but implied threat of violence.

27 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, p. 301. For an analysis of Saitō’s case stressing the composition of this political opposition, see the article by Earl Kinmonth cited in note 6.

28 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, p. 302.

29 Saitō, Kaiko shichijūnen, p. 153. Probably Saitō expected party leaders would exclude his two skeptical references to the term “holy war.” He had no idea that two-thirds of his speech would be cut, later blaming this censorship as one factor in his ouster from the Diet (see below).

30 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, p. 303. There were four levels of official discipline possible, and only a vocal minority of MPs (the same groups who had interrupted his speech) initially supported imposing the harshest punishment, expelling Saitō from the Diet.
from elements within the military and rightwing civilian groups, had succeeded in swaying the views of the majority.

Saitō believed that the politicians who opposed him were basically responding to pressure from the military, and he speculated that perhaps some military men were still angry over his criticism of their vacuous calls for renovation and lack of military discipline four years earlier. 31 Certainly many military leaders were infuriated by Saitō’s speech. The army minister had not responded to Saitō’s speech inside the Diet, but publicly insisted that the New Order was “an ideal possible to realize,” while a spokesman from the navy claimed that the speech “defiles the meaning of this sacred war and the special racial character of the Japanese people.” 32 A steady stream of Saitō’s colleagues repeatedly visited him and urged him to resign from the Diet, to which Saitō responded that he did not regret anything he had said. None of those who called for him to resign could provide any reason for him to do so. Saitō had voluntarily left the Minsei Party, but he was adamant that he would not resign from the Diet.

After three weeks of deliberations, the committee charged with investigating Saitō called him before them on February 24. This committee meeting gave Saitō a chance to reiterate the main points of his speech and to refute each of the seven reasons for his punishment issued by the Nakajima faction of the Seiyūkai. According to the next day’s newspapers, Saitō’s point-by-point rebuttal had convinced a majority of committee members. One article reported that “defendant Saitō turned into the prosecutor and left the meeting a triumphant general.” The favorable treatment of Saitō in the press did not last long, as cabinet officials urged newspaper editors to change their line and publish editorials falsely criticizing Saitō. 33 Meanwhile, inside the Diet, the will of Saitō’s supporters was also faltering, and some began to negotiate with Saitō, seeking a way to have him voluntarily retire. Saitō remained firm; if the politicians of the lower house wanted him out of the Diet, they would have to expel him. 34 To escape the constant visits of those urging him to resign, Saitō left home to stay at the family’s favorite inn in Atami. 35

Despite Saitō’s effective performance before the committee charged with punishing him, and the ongoing opposition to his ouster in many quarters, fellow politicians soon voted to eject him from the Diet. By a devious maneuver in which it appointed a special committee to break the deadlock over Saitō’s punishment, the Minseitō leadership pushed through a motion to expel Saitō on March 5. This motion went before the entire lower house for a vote two days later. Of the 303 MPs who voted,

31 Saitō, Kaiko shichijūnen, pp. 154, 159.


33 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, pp. 303-04.

34 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, p. 304.

296 supported Saitō’s expulsion, with only seven dissenting votes. The mainstream of the Diet who had initially supported Saitō had somehow come to oppose him. The vote for Saitō’s expulsion delineates the end of freedom of speech in the lower house, already largely emasculated by the National General Mobilization Law. Henceforth no one in the Diet would oppose or even question the fantastic war goals proffered by the nation’s nonelected leaders. Indeed, the members of the Diet immediately and explicitly confirmed the degree to which they would toe the line, passing a resolution on March 9 in support of the holy war.

New insight into what happened to Saitō in the wake of his speech in 1940 emerged fifty years later in 1990, when his family released the entire contents of his diary for the first time. Saitō dispassionately recounts in his diary which politicians visited him and recommended that he retire. Someone sent him a knife to urge him to commit suicide. Probably the reason why his family waited so long before publicly releasing his diary is that it includes a list of those who visited Saitō and urged him to quit the Diet, including famous figures such as Nagai Ryūtarō.

At first, Saitō reported in his diary, he rejected the suggestions that he voluntary leave the Diet or commit suicide. (It is not clear if Saitō means suicide or resignation, since the term he uses, “jiketsu” 自決, can mean either Perhaps giving up the political life and leaving the Diet was akin to suicide for Saitō.) On February 10, he visited Wakatsuki Reijirō, who strongly supported his resolve not to resign. But the atmosphere was tense. An ultranationalist group in Osaka sent a death threat by telegraph, and a detective visited Saitō to inform him of a rumor he had been shot. Gradually, Saitō’s will faltered, and on February 29 he stated he might resign. However, he changed his mind the next day, and continued to resist the repeated suggestions of visitors that he resign. On March 7 he was formally expelled from the Diet.

After Saitō’s 1940 speech, he again received a great many letters and messages from the Japanese public, responding to the first third of his speech that had appeared in the newspapers. Exactly how many letters he received is unclear. Much primary source material concerning Saitō’s career was lost in air raids during the war, but more than 700 responses to his 1940 speech survive. A very few of these messages were threats or
attacks on Saitō by ultranationalists. The majority of correspondences and telegrams called for the protection of freedom of speech and parliamentary politics. Many writers confessed that they had no idea why Japan was fighting in China. Some letters were from angry and confused parents who did not understand why their sons had died in the war. Others complained about how much suffering the war caused. But only one letter out of more than 700 messages agreed with Saitō about the need to end the war immediately. And some of these letters disagreed with Saitō about the course and significance of the “holy war.” Some endorsed the holy war and the goal of establishing a New Order in East Asia, but were not sure what specific policies to pursue. One writer informed Saitō that the goal of the war was to eliminate all traces of the power of the English in China. A few letters even sought to instruct Saitō on how to carry out a holy war, as one proposing that: “We Japanese should have the Chinese people pray to Japan as the God of Asia.”

Conclusion: Continuities and Discontinuities

At first glance, Saitō’s speeches in 1936 and 1940 seem to concern different topics. In the first speech, he attributed the illegal intervention of military men in politics to the fad in ideas of national renovation, while in 1940 he demanded an end to the war in China. Yet the two speeches actually have more in common than separating them. The most striking similarity between the two speeches is Saitō’s criticism of the idea of national renovation or reconstruction. In 1936 he exposed the dangerous emptiness of the ideas of radical young officers who sought to simply eradicate many of the country’s leaders and institutions without any notion of what to do next. Much to Saitō’s regret, by late in the decade, Japan had begun to wage a major war in China for goals that were essentially the same as the infeasible and irrational ideas he had heard espoused by murderous young officers at their court trials. National policy now displayed the same defects as the empty ideas radical fascists had espoused in their court trials earlier in the decade. The young officers had claimed that their goal was to “renovate” Japan but their actions revealed them to be no more than destructive murderers. In the same way, in his speech in 1940 Saitō revealed that, while the stated goal of the war in China was a New Order and everlasting world peace, in fact Japan was imposing death and destruction on its own people and on the people of Asia. Just as the young officers’ apparently high-minded calls for “national renovation” or a “Shōwa Restoration,” in fact yielded nothing but death and destruction, the Konoe Declaration’s call for “everlasting world peace” resulted only in an endless and destructive war. The dangerous ideas of national renovation that Saitō blamed for the disasters of domestic politics had expanded their pernicious influence to the stage of international politics, where they were enshrined in

---

39 Despite the loss due to the air raids, Saitō’s third son Yoshimichi has in his possession a “mountain” of 942 pieces of mail and telegraphs, including 710 responses to Saitō’s 1940 speech. Awaya, Shōwa no settō, p. 13.

40 Yoshimi, Kusa no ne no fashizumu, pp. 27-31. This is the source for the following analysis of the letters and telegrams Saitō received in 1940.
official government policy statements. Saitō’s speeches both target the dangerous emptiness and infeasibility of faddish ideas calling for sweeping changes in Japan or the world, which fostered military aggression at home and abroad.

In both 1936 and 1940 Saitō castigated the country’s leaders for their lack of direction and incompetence, and in both he clearly rejected military aggression in favor of competent diplomacy. In both speeches he expressed his disbelief that war is ever really waged for the sake of grand principles such as peace or justice, since war is always ultimately a contest of national power in a Social-Darwinist “survival of the fittest.” Though peace was never the reason to wage a war, it was the weighty responsibility of politicians to negotiate the end of a war through diplomacy. Also evident in both speeches was Saitō’s abundant trust in and respect for the parliamentary system. Saitō believed that the system of Japanese MPs such as himself asking questions of top cabinet leaders in interpellation sessions on behalf of the Japanese people was valid and useful. And the proper functioning of this system depended on the freedom of speech. MPs had to be free to demand what they wanted of their government’s leaders. In both speeches Saitō sees this representative function of parliamentary politics threatened by the drastic erosion of the freedom of speech in the 1930s. Saitō’s steadfast—some might say foolhardy—confidence as a politician stemmed from his conviction that elected representatives of the people had not only the right but also the duty to speak out on behalf of their constituents. Saitō was endorsing the principle of representative democracy, although he could hardly use the term in 1940 when words like democracy, liberalism, and individualism had become tainted by their affiliation with Great Britain and the United States.

Given this substantial common ground in the content of the two speeches, how are we to explain the different reaction to the 1940 speech by politicians, military men, and civilians than to the speech four years earlier? In 1936 fellow MPs from all parties praised and thanked Saitō for daring to stand up to the dangerous proponents of radical renovation both inside and outside of the military, and how these ideas and those who acted upon them threatened the viability of the parliamentary system. Four years later, while the majority of his colleagues still supported Saitō, almost none were willing to publicly support him. Only seven dared to vote against his expulsion from the Diet to “punish” him for making basically the same points as in his 1936 speech. And while Saitō’s support from the general public remained strong in 1940, we also find new voices critical of Saitō and his understanding of the war. The voluminous propaganda of the day and the control of alternative sources of information were beginning to transform the Japanese people.

Saitō did not himself stress the similarities between the ideas of the young officers and the impractical notions found in the “Konoe Declaration.” To do so would be to call into question not the ideas of a few rogue officers or convicted criminals but the stated goals of the country’s top leaders—the goals that young Japanese men were being asked to die for. Yet his stated values and outlook remained entirely consistent between the two speeches. For instance, shortly after being expelled from the Diet, describing the many letters of support he had received he wrote:

They say that I asked what they wanted to ask, and found out what they wanted to know, demanding: “What on earth does it mean to punish Saitō for raising questions on our behalf? What are the more than 400 MPs doing? Why is interference or pressure from [two characters, probably gunbu 軍部 (military) were censored] fearful? This sort
of pressure must be eradicated to protect the independence of the Diet.” They say that since the entire nation supports Saitō, if the Diet expels Saitō, then the people will expel the Diet. Unable to adequately express their feelings about the trends of the day on paper, they write letters in characters that seem to spew out blood. 41

Saitō was confident that the hundreds of letters of support in response to his speech and his banishment from the Diet would preserve the truth about contemporary politics for posterity. Against the people’s wishes, advocates of renovation were dismantling the mechanisms of parliamentary rule and expanding systems to control people’s ideas. However we may evaluate prewar Japanese politics today, for his part, at the time Saitō believed he served as a spokesman of the people the Diet. Events would underscore that ultimate power did not rest in the lower house of the Diet, but we should not be too hasty to belittle its function as a representative institution.

The Japanese public’s ongoing support for Saitō confirms their endorsement of parliamentary politics and the freedom of speech. Yet this strong popular support for representative politics obviously raises the question of how and why representative politics broke down. Saitō’s expulsion from the Diet in 1940 and the response from colleagues in the Diet and the general public to his speeches are contrasting signs that reveal the erosion of democratic tendencies in Japan. Even in 1940 the awareness of many of those who wrote letters to Saitō that their freedom was imperiled suggests that the democratic impulse was not utterly absent. But after 1941 this sort of awareness was increasingly eclipsed by an active support for the war goals propagated by the state and eagerly consumed by thousands of volunteer “social mediators” in cities, towns, and villages across Japan, working hard to propel the prevailing war fever to ever higher levels. The key to successful mass mobilization for modern war is to convince people that they are acting of their own volition, not coerced. By the end of 1940 the Japanese who waved the banners of war could no longer recognize that the goals of the war in China were hypocritical and contradictory, and could lead only to destruction. Many actually believed that they were engaged in a “holy mission” to bring everlasting peace to Asia. Like the radical young officers of the early 1930s, millions of Japanese were led to celebrate their “selfless” heroism, unaware that their actions were in fact simply destructive.

Saitō Takao was unusually perspicacious in recognizing the dangerous internal contradictions of renovationist ideology. And he was certainly courageous for the fervor with which he tried to reveal the hypocrisy and irrationality of these ideas to the general public. But he was a politician, not the heroic leader of a nascent anti-war movement. As Saitō readily admits, he supported the war effort for years, voting for endless appropriations bills. And Saitō never really recognized how Japanese people were changing, not simply losing their freedom, but coming to actively support the war goals he found so irrational. When the trial of the young officers who carried out the 5.15 Incident was made public, a million Japanese wrote letters, some signed in blood, calling for leniency. Many Japanese were swayed by the claims of the young officers that they were “selfless” and “heroic,” overlooking their murderous acts to focus on their professed concern with the impoverished farmers of the northeast. Saitō repeatedly (and rather simplistically) attributed the control of freedom of speech and the lack of resistance to

41 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, p. 18.
government policies to pressure from the military. For instance, following the debate on the General Mobilization Law, he blamed such pressure for the cowardice of fellow MPs. But many MPs had resigned themselves to the inevitable curtailment of their power, and some actively welcomed these political trends. And world trends in politics seemed to be moving away from parliamentary rule, as demonstrated by the rise of powerful one-party states in Europe.

By simply attributing the lack of support from colleagues in the Diet to pressure from elements in the military, Saitō downplays the voluntaristic element of these Diet members’ decisions and actions. Most fellow Diet members were probably less cowed by threats from the military than unsure about their own beliefs. In part they agreed with Saitō and his defense of the freedom of speech, but in part they were also convinced by the propaganda that glorified Japan’s mission to instigate a New Order in East Asia. When fifty MPs followed Nagai Ryūtarō out of the Diet in order to support Konoe’s proposal of a single body to replace the political parties, they did not do so because they felt threatened by the military.

What Saitō could not comprehend was that all kinds of people were coming to endorse ideas that had much in common with the infeasible ideas of national renovation that he was denouncing. For instance, only a few months after Konoe’s declaration, philosopher Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 declared that the struggle between the ideologies of liberalism, communism, and fascism since World War I had failed to resolve the world’s basic problems. Searching for new ideas for a new time, Miki argued that “the principle of the construction of China is at the same time the principle of domestic reform (kaikaku 改革), and that the principle of domestic reform must lead to the creation of a principle for the construction of the world.” Thus Miki claimed it was “Japan’s worldly mission to unite East Asia and thereby resolve the China Incident.” Miki’s language certainly echoes Konoe’s declaration and the stress on national mission in Kokutai no hongi. Yet Miki never suggested that the principles of national and international reform would bring everlasting world peace, nor did he call for the annihilation of or refusal to negotiate with Jiang. Miki’s notions of reform may have been idealistic or naive, but they were not hypocritical or contradictory the way the Konoe Declaration was. His ideas certainly resonated with those of renovationists like Konoe, in that he urged national reform, turned against Western ideas such as Marxism and liberalism, and called for the unification of Asia. But unlike the ideas of the young officers or Konoe’s declaration, his notions did not lead inevitably to death and destruction. Miki’s case shows that the political function of ideas of renovation or reform was more complex than Saitō thought. People were swayed by these ideas for a variety of reasons, not all irrational.

The hysteric war fever following the attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941 fed the tendency toward self-censorship and self-sacrifice. Saitō himself discovered the degree to which parliamentary institutions had become superfluous. He launched another successful run for office during the infamous “Tōjō Assistance Election” in April 1942, in which most candidates “recommended” by the state were elected. As an unauthorized

42 Awaya argues that in addition to pressure from the military, many MPs gave in because they expected Konoe to announce a one-party system any day. Shōwa no seitō, p. 258.

43 Cited by Itō Takashi, Jūgonen sensō, p. 201. In the early 1930s Miki had flirted with fascism as a potential solution to the social and political problems of the twentieth century.
candidate, Saitō faced many obstacles and fierce opposition from agents of the state and their sympathizers, who branded him “anti-military” or “anti-war,” or accused him of siding with the British and American enemies. While only a single local figure dared to publicly support Saitō, he was elected with the highest number of voters in his ward in Hyōgo Prefecture, as many constituents stealthily voted for him.44 Though his reelection shows that some still hoped politicians could represent them, it was in fact an empty victory. Saitō recollects that when he came back to the Diet in 1942 he was unable to speak freely: “The Diet had completely lost its function and become a slave organ of the cabinet.”45

Continuing squabbles over the budget pie between rival ministries or branches of the services or resistance to central planning by business organizations notwithstanding, after 1940 there simply was no viable opposition to wartime cabinet policies remaining on the scene. The content of political speeches—in a word, ideology—matters as much as the presence or absence of political disputes, and the extremely limited range of debate in the wartime Diet (evidenced by the slender volumes of Diet records for these years) proves the absence of any true political discourse.

Saitō’s case highlights how by 1940 Japanese politics had become an empty ritual. The representative (“democratic”) function of parliamentary politics—the principle that had empowered Saitō Takao to so boldly confront army ministers and prime ministers—had vanished from the Japanese scene, not to reappear until after the war. Even if another brave and outspoken Japanese politician had wanted to publicly question their government, it was not possible after late 1940, when Konoe’s “Imperial Rule Assistance Association” eliminated interpellation sessions in the Diet. In the meantime, politicians joined with other citizens in self-censorship for the sake of the war effort. It mattered little if politicians continued to assemble in the Diet if their role was merely to applaud the government’s empty slogans.

44 Awaya, Shōwa no seitō, pp. 15-16.
45 Saitō, Kaiko shichigunen, p.