
Abe discusses Yamaga Sokō's (1622-85) emphasis on practical learning in historiography. Abe states that Sokō esteemed Sima Qian's 司馬遷 (ca. 145-ca. 90 B.C.E.) remark, in his "Preface" to the Shiji 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), assigning greater value to accounts of reality and practical matters than to those filled with empty words. In historiography, Sokō too preferred practicality rather than vacuous theorizing. Abe thus sees Sokō as an "epoch-making figure" and "a pioneer" of realistic historical literature in Japan. Most of Sokō's ideas on history are found in ch. 35, "Extending Learning" (J., chichi 敦知; Ch., zhizhi), of the Yamaga gorui 山鹿語類 (Classified Conversations of Yamaga Sokō). Abe reveals that Sokō's ideas launch from the Ming Neo-Confucian work the Xingli dachuan 性理大全 (Anthology of the School of Human Nature and Principle), ch. 55, "Studying History" (Shixue 史學), which includes most of the passages Sokō discusses.

Abe provides bibliographical biographies of Yamazaki Ansai (1611-1699) and his major Neo-Confucian disciples. The latter include Satō Naokata 佐藤直方 (1650-1719), Asami Keisai 浅見顕齋 (1652-1711), Miyake Shōsai 三宅尚齋 (1662-1741), and Wakabayashi Kyōsai 若林強齋 (1679-1732).
This is one of Abe Yoshio's earliest works. He shows how Ansai's understanding of Zhu Xi's thought was largely defined by works that Ansai read and studied by the great Korean Neo-Confucian Yi T'oegye (1501-70). Abe shows for example how Ansai's "Preface" to Zhu's Bailudong shuyuan jieshi reflected T'oegye's earlier writings on that document. Abe notes the importance of T'oegye's Chasŏngnok (Record of Self-Examination) which influenced Ansai's emphasis on the praxis of "holding onto seriousness." Apart from repeated references to imperial Japan and its kokutai, or national essence, the conclusions here, along with substantially more evidence, appear in the second section (pp. 229-420) of Abe's Nihon Shushigaku to Chosen (Korea and the Japanese Schools of Zhu Xi Learning) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppansha, 1965).

Abe analyzes Ansai's grasp of Zhu Xi's notion of humaneness. Minus the nationalistic rhetoric found in Abe's earlier paper, here he pursues the same thread as before: the relationship between Ansai's purist devotion to Zhu Xi and the extent of Ansai's indebtedness to his Korean predecessor, Yi T'oegye. Following Zhu's idea of humaneness as "the principle of love," Ansai saw humaneness as "unmanifested love." Later his disciple Asami Keisai interpreted Ansai's notion of humaneness as "the love one possesses even before one begins to love." Abe claims that rather than simply repeat Zhu Xi's ideas, Ansai's school generally sought to resolve disputes among Zhu Xi schoolmen over the proper interpretation of Zhu Xi's ideas on the notion of humaneness. In doing so, they most often followed T'oegye's purist writings. Ansai's belief was that philosophical semantics was preliminary to realizing the meanings of those words in practice. Therefore, Ansai disparaged Chen Beixi's Xingli ziyi (The Meanings of Human Nature and Principle), a late-Song work which seeming-
ly makes understanding the meanings of words an end in itself.

Abe here gives another rendering of Yamazaki Ansai and Asami Keizai's understandings of Zhu Xi's notion of humaneness. He argues that Yi T'oebye exerted the most decisive influence on Ansai. Abe admits that while Ansai's school did not really transcend the bounds of Zhu Xi's thought in calling humaneness "the love which exists before one loves," the Ansai school's views do not necessarily best characterize Zhu's mature views on humaneness. This article quotes original source material extensively and is much more sophisticated than the article in Shibun no. 9 (1954) mentioned above.

Abe treats the influence of Korean texts, brought to Japan in the wake of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea in the 1590's, on the thought of Hayashi Razan. Few Japanese read as many Korean editions of both Chinese and Korean texts, Abe shows, as Razan did. While he studied the ideas of both Yi T'oebye and the Ming Neo-Confucian, Luo Qinshun, as the latter came to him through Korean editions, Razan preferred Luo's vitalistic and materialistic philosophy of *ki* (material force; Ch.,...
gil over T’oegye’s more quietistic and idealistic emphasis on ri 理 (principle; C., li). For Abe, Razan exemplifies the second major strain of Neo-Confucian thought in early-Tokugawa Japan. For example, Abe notes that Razan’s acquaintance with Chen Beixi’s Xingli ziyi, for which Razan wrote a vernacular explication, was based on the Korean edition of 1553. Abe presents much detailed textual scholarship proving the crucial role Korean editions of Neo-Confucian literature played in the emergence of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism. This piece was republished as the second part of section one of Nihon Shushigaku to Chōsen.


Abe opens his enthusiastic appraisal of Hayashi Razan’s role as a pioneer of the ethical, rationalistic, and more highly secular culture of Edo Japan by acknowledging that much previous scholarship on Razan has tended to look askance at him, often dismissing him as a bakufu ideologue. Abe’s positive view of Razan stresses the latter’s contributions to various areas of Japanese culture. Abe advances his research on the Korean origins of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism by pointing to numerous Korean editions in Razan’s library. This article is a popularized version of the last one summarized.


Abe relates how a young Korean government official, Kang Hang 姜沆 (1567-1618), was captured during Hideyoshi’s 1597 invasion of Korea, later taken to Japan as a prisoner of war, and finally ended up instructing Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) in the subtleties of Cheng-Zhu 程朱 (J., Tei-Shu) thought. Kang Hang was an indirect disciple of T’oegye’s philosophy; Seika’s acceptance of T’oegye’s Neo-Confucian ideas, and his Kanbun 漢文 writings, translations of the Confucian classics in light of Cheng-Zhu interpretations, stemmed from Seika’s intimate, three-year association with Kang Hang. This essay reappears as part one of section one in Abe’s Nihon Shushigaku to Chōsen.

___ "Edo jidai Jusha no shusshin to shakai teki chii ni tsuite"
Abe describes the social and political status of Neo-Confucian scholars in the early-Edo (1603-1868) period, beginning with Fujiwara Seika and concluding with Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728). He notes the relatively low standing of these early Neo-Confucians, explaining that the Tokugawa bakufu, while it encouraged various philosophies, did not support Neo-Confucians in a privileged way, but instead as learned men or intellectuals. He admits that Neo-Confucianism as a broad movement experienced many vicissitudes. Though there was no uniformly progressive improvement, on the whole, due to the initially humble status of the Tokugawa Neo-Confucians, their standing improved by the end of the 17th century.

In this brief, general account, Abe simplistically describes the beginnings of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism. Considered in the context of his previous work, this article is a popularization of his ideas. Major thinkers from Fujiwara Seika through Itō Jinsai (1627-1705) are discussed.

Abe advances a theme from Nihon Shushigaku to Chosen by tracing the pervasive impact of Yi T'oegye's Chasŏngnok. Abe shows that this brief Korean work was a crucial mediator of Zhu Xi's learning in Tokugawa Japan. Apart from his helpful introduction, the remainder of the article consists of extensive quotations and textual references.

This paper, written in 1969 and reiterating Abe’s positive
evaluation of Seika’s philosophical significance, commemorates
the 350th anniversary of Fujiwara Seika’s demise.

Abe offers a brief biography of a latter-day disciple of
Yamazaki Ansai, Okada Kansen (1740-1816). Kansen was one of
the leading administrator-scholars whom Matsudaira Sadanobu
appointed to administer the Kansei reforms which partly transformed the Hayashi family academy into a bakufu-directed center of higher education. However, Abe’s focus is on how Kansen, following the death of his teacher, took up his unfinished task of editing and publishing a volume of T’oegye’s letters selected from his Complete Works. Finishing this project, done out of reverence for his teacher, required considerable expenditures of Kansen’s time and money.

Again Abe analyzes the importance of Neo-Confucianism to
Japanese culture in unabashedly enthusiastic terms. He unveils
his outlook in the opening paragraph by quoting Ogyū Sorai’s
remark that "later generations will praise heaven and say [Fujiwara Seika] was a sage." Abe generally praises those who facilitated the acceptance of Neo-Confucianism in Japan as "epoch-making cultural giants." He traces the various roles of Neo-Confucianism in Japanese cultural history, briefly suggesting its importance in the Meiji Restoration.

Abe again discusses Yi T’oegye’s studies of self-cultivation, especially as expounded in the Chasön’ngok, and their impact on Yamazaki Ansai’s Kimon school of Neo-Confucianism.
These volumes assemble many of the primary sources that were crucial to the conclusions that Abe’s scholarship had earlier established. They are arranged to make the connections between Korean Neo-Confucianism and that of Tokugawa Japan obvious. The first volume, after presenting samples of Yi T’oegey, Sŏ Hwadam 徐花潭 (1489-1546), and Yi Yulgok’s 李栗谷 (1536-1584) writings, introduces selections from Yamazaki Ansai’s works which best reveal their continuity with earlier Korean works. Then writings from four later Kimon scholars, Asami Keisai, Satō Naokata, Miyake Shōsai, and Tani Shinzan (1663-1718), whose thoughts reflected T’oegey’s brand of Korean Neo-Confucianism, are presented. In both volumes, annotated classical Japanese translations of the original classical Chinese texts are given first. The genbun 原文, or the original Chinese, also appears.

Volume Two opens with writings on or by Fujiwara Seika, followed by selections from Hayashi Razan’s Complete Works. Selections from works by later Neo-Confucians, including Kinoshita Jun’an木下順庵 (1621?-1699?), Amenomori Hōshū 阿部範洲 (1668-1755), Andō Seian 安藤省菴 (1622-1701), Muro Kyūsō 室鶴巢 (1658-1734), Bitō Nishū 尾藤二洲 (1745-1813), Nishiyama Sessai 西山拙斎 (1717-98), Fujita Tōko 藤田東湖 (1806-1855), Aizawa Seishisai 佐沢正志斎 (1782-1863), and Motoda Tōya 元田東野 (1818-91). These two volumes provide a variety of resource material not easily obtained outside of Japan.


Song-Yuan-Ming intellectual history, Araki relates, witnessed three peaks: Chan 禅 (J., Zen) Buddhism, Zhu Xi’s learning, and
Wang Yangming’s learning. Chan Buddhism provoked a reaction against itself in the form of Zhu Xi’s teachings. The latter, however, did not obliterate Chan teachings for later Wang Yangming’s teachings emerged, partially out of Chan Buddhism and partially out of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism. Having thus described the logic of Song-Yuan-Ming intellectual development, Araki examines whether a similar pattern is detectable in Tokugawa Japan. He shows that the kogakuha 古学派, or the Ancient Learning School, made Tokugawa philosophical history decisively different. Kogaku scholars attacked the Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming schools for their Buddhistic theories, calling for a return to the teachings of ancient Confucianism. Ironically, in criticizing Zhu and Wang, Japanese kogaku thinkers exhibited a kind of philosophical activism which Araki sees as characteristically Zen in nature.

Araki argues that, although Kaibara Ekken did harbor grave doubts about Zhu Xi’s ideas, Ekken remained a disciple of Zhu Xi throughout his life. To strengthen his point, Araki contrasts Ekken’s ideas with those of one of Ekken’s contemporaries, Itō Jinsai, whose doubts and disagreements with Zhu Xi’s notions put him into decisive opposition to Zhu’s school.

Araki presents a brief intellectual biography of Muro Kyūsō, noting his contacts and associations with the major thinkers and schools of his day, such as the Ansai school of purist Zhu Xi studies in Kyoto, Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657-1725) and Ogyū Sorai. Araki also discusses Kyūsō’s role in political, ritual, and legal issues as a Confucian scholar serving the Tokugawa bakufu.

Bitō Masahide 星藤正英. “Yamazaki Ansai no shisō to Shushigaku” 山崎顕斎の思想と朱子学 (The Thought of Yamazaki Ansai and Neo-Confucianism). Shigaku zasshi 史学雑誌, 65.9 (September 1956), 1-45.
This article became, with modifications, part one of Bitō’s Nihon hōken shisō shi kenkyū (Research on the History of Japanese Feudalistic Thought) (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1961), pp. 40-99. Bitō first gives a detailed and well documented comparison of Ansai and Zhu Xi. He notes that many scholars have characterized Yamazaki Ansai as a Zhu Xi purist; however, he shows that Ansai’s interpretation of the Daxue (The Great Learning) skips sections related to giongiri 筆理 (J., kyūri, exhaustively investigating principle), but zeroes in on Zhu Xi’s notion of jing (J., kei, seriousness). Bitō contends that Ansai’s understanding of jing differed decisively from that of Zhu Xi. He concludes that the thought of Zhu Xi and Ansai appear similar, but are not the same. Ansai’s ideas are more religious in nature, while Zhu’s are more rationalistic and scholastic. In emphasizing the strong religious tendencies in Ansai’s so-called quasi-Neo-Confucianism, Bitō shows that Ansai’s intellectual development does not divide so neatly into (1) a Buddhist stage, (2) a Neo-Confucian stage, and (3) a Shinto stage, as some earlier scholars have suggested.

Bitō concludes that the socio-historical significance of Ansai’s thought lies in its conservative support of the Tokugawa bakufu. Bitō notes that Ansai’s contention that the emperor should be revered entailed subversive tendencies vis-à-vis the Tokugawa bakufu, but he observes that Ansai never explicitly encouraged such tendencies. Bitō sees Ansai as a conservative supporter, in practice, of what he calls "the feudal regime" of the Tokugawa bakufu.

Bitō’s research contrasts with that of Abe. He never broaches, for example, the impact of Korean texts on Japanese Neo-Confucianism, which is the crucial element of Abe’s research. Abe explains the differences between Ansai and Zhu Xi by reference to the impact of Yi T’oegye’s Korean redaction of Zhu’s thought. It seems that Bitō, from Abe’s perspective, has chosen the wrong standard, Zhu Xi’s thought rather than T’oegye’s, against which to appraise Ansai’s ideas.

Bitō contrasts Ansai’s philosophy with that of Zhu Xi, arguing that in both tendencies towards practicality are evident. But
rather than reduce Jinsai’s ideas to Zhu Xi’s, Bitō sees the fundamental spirit of Jinsai’s moral thought, especially its emphasis on a "pure, bright, straight, and sincere mind," as overlapping with traditional Japanese ethics. Bitō accounts for Jinsai’s failure to universalize his moral thought by noting the peculiar structure of Edo society in Jinsai’s day. Neo-Confucianism was respected, Bitō claims, as a kind of academic learning, but it was not necessarily acted upon in politics or in ethical life. Even as a form of learning, Confucian ideas had a limited audience in Jinsai’s day due to the absence of (1) civil service examinations requiring knowledge of them, and (2) an extensive, diversified school system.


Taking the accounts of Sokō’s intellectual vicissitudes in the Haisho zanpitsu 配所残筆 (Autobiography in Exile) as a starting point, Bitō traces the development of Sokō’s thought, contrasting it with that of Zhu Xi, who was generally speaking the major philosophical influence on Sokō. Bitō argues that Sokō rejected Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism as he became conscious of the extent to which it was at odds with the social realities surrounding him in samurai-dominated Tokugawa Japan. Though he referred to his own thinking as seigaku 聖學, or "the sages’ learning," as Zhu Xi sometimes referred to his own philosophy, Bitō observes that both fulfilled social functions in their respective arenas. Bitō belittles the classical grounds for Sokō’s return to the Confucianism of Confucius and the Duke of Zhou. Rather than portray him as a philologist-philosopher, Bitō sees Sokō as a thinker whose goal was to make Neo-Confucianism more compatible with the socio-political world of Tokugawa Japan. Also, Bitō does not define the origins of Yamaga Sokō’s understanding of Zhu Xi’s thought in terms of the latter’s peculiar origins and development in early-Tokugawa Japan.


Bitō explores the curious relationship, philosophical and per-
sonal, between Ogyū Sorai and Dazai Shundai (1680-1747). Shundai, the best known of Sorai's disciples, carried on almost singlehandedly Sorai's concern for practical social, economic, and political theory. Although he had little regard for Sorai's kobunji gaku, or "the study of ancient Chinese prose and poetry," Shundai believed that he was Sorai's successor in the fields of statecraft and economics. Shundai even wrote Sorai's burial eulogy. Yet despite that, Sorai and Shundai did not fully admire one another: each went on record criticizing the other. Bitō's essay seeks to clarify Shundai's ideas by contrasting them with those of Sorai. In the process, he reveals the distinctive features of Shundai's life, his scholarly achievements, and aspects of his thought. Also, Bitō reveals how Sorai's practical philosophy was transmitted, in this case, by Shundai. Bitō characterizes Sorai's writings as vast and magnanimous, while Shundai's were discriminating, but somehow cramped.


Bitō briefly discusses affinities between Sorai's thought and that of the Laozi. Reasoning that (1) ties between the Laozi and the ideas of kokugaku, or nativist learning, have been established, and that (2) kokugaku methods and themes in part derived from Sorai's philosophy, Bitō sees points of commensurability between Sorai and the Laozi. Bitō cites the Bendō (Discerning the Way), the Benmei (Discerning the Ancient Meanings of Philosophical Terms), the Gakusoku (Rules of Study), and the Ken'en zuihitsu (Ken'en Miscellany), in which Sorai quotes or comments on the thought contained in the Laozi. Bitō claims that significant points of comparison are evident. He suggests that seeing the relationship between Sorai and the Laozi is important for comprehending connections between Sorai's notion of the Way and his ideas about rites and music. Bitō acknowledges Sorai's remarks charging thinkers like Zhu Xi with falling into the philosophy of the Laozi, but he contends that those statements were merely polemical ones. Bitō sees Sorai's view of the Laozi as a unique one among Confucians.

____. "Mitogaku no tokushitsu" 水戸学の特質 (Distinctive Characteristics of the Mito School). Mitogaku 水戸学. Imai Usaburō 多井宇三郎, Seya Yoshihiko 濱谷義彦, Bitō
Bitō first notes how Mito slogans like (1) sonnō jōi, or "revere the emperor but repel the barbarians," (2) kokutai, or "the national essence," and (3) taigi meibun, or "the great duties associated with one's social status," do not appear in the ancient Chinese classics. He concludes that the Mito school writings, where these bakumatsu notions do appear, should be considered their literary source. Bitō argues against attempts to reduce these allegedly Mito notions to the Confucian tradition of China. He argues that while the activities of the Mito school may have been based on Zhu Xi's thought, that was not so with the Mito school of the early-19th century. Thus, rather than being called Shushigaku, these later developments, which had no real basis in Zhu Xi's writings, were given different names such as Mitogaku or Tenpōgaku. Bitō then examines Mito thought, beginning with the Dai Nihon shi (History of Great Japan), continuing with Fujita Yūkoku's Seimei ron (Rectifying Terms) and its relationship to meibun, or "status," and ending with the structure of Aizawa Seishisai's discussion of kokutai. Bitō relates these developments to the historical processes leading to the formation of the early modern Japanese state.
This group review of Yoshikawa’s "Sorai gakuan" records a dialogue of three eminent literary and philosophical scholars as they heap superlatives on Yoshikawa’s study of Sorai’s thought. For example, Katō’s opening remarks bemoan how, in Yoshikawa’s day, there was still no Ogyū Sorai zenshū (Complete Works of Ogyū Sorai), though one was being planned. Without such resources, Katō reasoned, a comprehensive appraisal of Sorai’s thought was impossible. Despite that disadvantage, he admitted, Yoshikawa’s study provides the best overview of Sorai’s ideas from beginning to end. The three scholars thus discuss the “Sorai gakuan” in the context of scholarship on Sorai. Their dialogue also offers a few tangential but significant insights regarding similarities between Sorai’s philosophy and the kaozheng (J. kōshō), or evidential research, movement of Qing-dynasty China.


Here Bitō’s essay relies mainly on Sorai’s Seidan and Tōnonsho as well as on Yoshikawa Kōjirō’s "Sorai gakuan" and "Nihon teki shisōka to shite no Sorai" (Sorai as a Japanese Thinker). Bitō argues that Sorai’s ancient learning was more akin to the Laozi than to mainstream Confucianism. Thus, he claims that Sorai’s thought was characteristically Japanese. Also Bitō suggests that Sorai’s interpretation of the sennō no michi (J., hōken) or Way of the early kings, is more consistent with the ancient Chinese fengjian (J., gunken) or feudal system, than with the more centralized imperial polity based on junxian (J., gunken), or counties and prefectures. Bitō insists that Sorai conceived of laws, institutions, and political systems for the sake of the individual person. People are not, Bitō argues, wholly subordinate to the institutions and systems which Sorai repeatedly extols. Thus Bitō defends Sorai against critics who see his views as less than liberal and humanistic.

Bitō’s brief account of the vicissitudes of Nakae Tōju’s (1608-1648) life and thought illuminates the major shifts in Tōju’s Neo-Confucianism. Bitō emphasizes the indigenous Japanese factors over those traceable to China.


Bitō contends that despite Sorai’s adulation of the ancient Chinese language and its literature, Sorai anticipated Japanese nationalist thinkers by allowing, in his political thought, for a government by religious rites. Bitō links Sorai’s esteem for ancient Chinese religious practices with 20th-century nationalistic ideology calling for imperial rule by the supposedly divine Japanese emperor. Bitō’s essay also discusses Sorai’s life, thought, and historical significance. One continuing theme of Bitō’s essay is his comparison of Sorai with his contemporary rival, Arai Hakuseki.


This bibliography, first published in 1915, catalogues books in libraries within the colony of Korea which, following its annexation in 1910, had become a part of Imperial Japan. The bibliography gives a brief and simple account of each text. It does not list every book in Korea; those texts which it does not record were to be catalogued in successive supplements. In cataloguing Korean books, the bibliography uses the four libraries system which includes the following categories: (1) the Chinese classics, (2) historical works, (3) philosophers, and (4) collected works. The books are indexed following the order of the Japanese syllabary alphabet, according to the Japanese readings for their titles. Brief biographies of the authors or editors are frequently provided. The call number is given next to the title; the number of volumes and chapters in each book is recorded below the titles; whether the book is a manuscript or a published edition is also indicated.

Fujimoto explains Jinsai’s notion of humaneness (J. nin 仁; Ch. ren) by first examining his comments on the Lunyu 論語 (The Confucian Analects, 7.30) where Confucius wonders, "Is humaneness remote? When I seek it, it appears." Other passages from the Lunyu and the Mengzi 孟子 (The Mencius) are also explained. Fujimoto addresses Sorai’s charge that Jinsai, despite his criticisms of Zhu Xi and other Neo-Confucians, did not differ greatly from them in his views. Fujimoto compares and contrasts Jinsai’s ideas with those of Zhu Xi. While admitting the similarities between Zhu and Jinsai, Fujimoto focuses more on the variations. For example, despite the fact that Jinsai's accounts of humaneness took off from Zhu’s remarks on that topic, Jinsai explicitly rejected Zhu’s use of the notion of principle--Jinsai deemed it a "dead word"--in explaining humaneness.


Fukuma surveys the critiques of Buddhism offered by the early Tokugawa Neo-Confucians, Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan. He explains differences in their haibutsu ron 排仏論 by pointing to disparities in their intellectual orientations and professional situations. Fukuma notes the widespread influence that their attacks had on other Tokugawa thinkers who bashed the Buddhists for forsaking society and undermining morality.


Fumoto’s thumbnail history of Confucianism in Japan begins with the Yamato state (300-710) at the dawn of the historical age when the Han (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) and Tang (618-907) commentators first began to hold sway. Fumoto uses the Western term neo-confyūshianizumu, or Neo-Confucianism, to describe the
Haga shows that during the Muromachi period, Song Neo-Confucianism came to permeate the intellectual world of the aristocrats in the imperial capital. Juso 儒僧, or Zen-Neo-Confucians belonging to the Gozan 五山 or Five Mountain temple system of Rinzai Zen, were largely responsible for this. They taught Neo-Confucianism as a form of worldly hōben 方便, or expedient means. Haga laments that while scholars usually mention Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan in discussing the rise of Neo-Confucianism in early modern Japan, they neglect the Muromachi foundations. Neo-Confucianism was first expounded in Zen temples during Muromachi, but even in those temples Rinzai students were often less concerned with Buddhism than with Neo-Confucianism. Haga also notes that some Zen-Neo-Confucians worked closely with the Ashikaga bakufu.


Haga contends that all Confucians through Jinsai saw Confucian learning as a matter pertaining to the mind and human nature. Sorai too stressed the practical aspect of learning, but he also set the stage for ideas which reduced learning to little more than elegance and refinement in poetry and prose. Haga believes that Sorai’s school split following Sorai’s death. Hattori Nankaku’s 服部南郭 (1683-1759) branch, but not Dazai Shundai’s 大塞春台 (1680-1747), lost sight of the real moral purpose which Sorai saw as the aim of learning. Nankaku’s fac-
tion quickly degenerated into a clique of dilettantes. Late-Tokugawa reactions against Nankaku’s relatively amoral approach to scholarship reaffirmed learning as a practical, ethical, and political endeavor.


Hino suggests that Hattori Nankaku, one of Sorai’s favorite disciples, advanced the shiteki na sokumen 私的左側面, or the private sphere, of Sorai’s learning. This sphere, Hino explains, refers to Sorai’s teachings which revealed: (1) rejection of Zhu Xi’s dao xue 道学 (learning of the Way), (2) his tolerant affirmation of the naturalness of human emotions and passions, and (3) his liberation of literature from morality. The latter contrasts with the political half of Sorai’s learning which emphasized seido 制度, or governing institutions, as the solutions to socio-political ills. Hino explains that the later tilt of the Sorai school towards the private sphere resulted from Sorai’s disciples not having had the political opportunities which their master had had. Also, Hino notes that intellectuals who were politically thwarted by the restrictive, hereditary Tokugawa social system found in Sorai’s learning an alternative path, one which permitted them to excel in the arts of poetry and prose.

Hirata Atsushi 平田厚志. "Soraigaku no kadai to sono shisō shiteki yakuwari" 禊模板の課題との思想史的役割 (The Subject Matter of Sorai’s Learning and the Historical Role of His Thought). Ryūkoku shidan 63 (September 1970): 76-98.

Hirata sees similarities between Sorai’s learning and that of the Qing-dynasty kaozheng movement, but he insists that Sorai’s kogaku, or ancient learning philosophy, differs essentially from that of the Qing thinkers.


Honjō examines the political and economic reforms that Sorai proposed to shogun Yoshimune 吉宗 (1684-1751), regarding how
the economic distress of the samurai, caused by the increasing
wealth of merchants, proprietors, and moneylenders within the
urbanized Tokugawa polity, might be alleviated. Honjō shows
how Sorai’s antiquarian if not reactionary calls for (1) summary
regulations, (2) returning samurai to the countryside, and (3) the largely exclusive use of rice as currency, sup-
ported the privileged position samurai had, given their socio-
political status as the leaders of the nation.


Iijima argues that Sorai thought the ancient Chinese Way corresponded with the distinctive Way of Japan. Thus Sorai believed it was the duty of Japanese to preserve that Way. Iijima states that this belief in the cultural duty of Japan to preserve the Chinese Way was shared by many Tokugawa thinkers, including Hayashi Razan, Yamaga Sokō, Yamazaki Ansai, Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), Rai San’yō (1780-1832), and others. The latter thinkers have been adequately praised for their contributions to Japanese culture, Iijima states, but Sorai has yet to achieve his due fame. Clearly Iijima’s views preceeded the surge in Sorai scholarship following Maruyama’s essays on Sorai, found in his Nihon seiji shisō kenkyū, first published during the 1940’s.

Imai Usaburō "Mitogaku ni okeru Jukyō no juyō" (The Mito School’s Acceptance of Confu-

Imai discusses the understanding, acceptance, and uses of Con-
fucian thought by the Mito school, especially Fujita Yūkoku and
Aizawa Seishisai. The Shangshu (Book of Documents), the
Zhouchuan (The Offices of the Zhou), and the Zhouyi (The Zhou Book of Changes) were the three classics that formed the center of Aizawa’s learning. Aizawa’s school was deeply rooted in: (1) the notion of ten (Ch. tian), or heaven, de-
veloped in the Shangshu, (2) the Zhouchuan belief that military and civilian administration were a unity, and (3) the Zhouyi idea that in the yang trigrams, there is one ruler and two subjects, but in the yin trigrams, there are two rulers and one subject. These notions were in turn indigenized in accordance
with the maxims of Tokugawa Nariaki: "Serve the way of the kami, but advance the Confucian teachings: faithful loyalty and filial piety are not two different virtues. Civilization and martial skills are not disconnected. Neither knowledge nor action should be privileged. If we revere kami and venerate Confucius, there will be no biased scholars."


Imanaka examines two lifestyles of early-modern Japanese professional intellectuals. Razan represents the pragmatic, urban scholar who affirms the legitimacy of the status quo and those ruling it; Seika stands for the reclusive scholar who, while living in the midst of a "feudalistic" capital city, Kyoto, created within it a small intellectual haven, a salon of sorts, where cultured people gathered. Imanaka scrutinizes the widely held view that Seika "rejected Buddhism and converted to Confucianism." This latter view is largely based on the Seika sensei gyōō 恒窓先生行状 (Biography of Master Seika), compiled and edited by Razan. Imanaka sees it as far too simplistic. Nonetheless he admits that the modernity of Seika and Razan as professional people partly derives from their rejection of an intensely religious Weltanschauung. Still, Imanaka insists that the claim that Razan and Seika "rejected Buddhism and converted to Confucianism" ignores how their Confucianism grew out of and in tandem with their continued participation in Buddhist activities.

This article, with revisions, became part two, "The Formation of the Ken’en zuhitshu,” of section one, "The Formative Processes Leading to Sorai’s Learning," in Imanaka’s Soraigaku no kiso teki kenkyū 仏儒学の基礎的硏究 [Basic Research on Sorai’s Learning] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1966), pp. 95-
169. Imanaka’s analyses of the Chinese sources of Sorai’s thought, as found in his Ken’en zuihitsu, seem to rival both Maruyama’s studies of Sorai’s thought and Yoshikawa’s "Sorai gakuan." Critics of Imanaka, however, note how he rehashes Iwahashi Shigenari’s Sorai kenkyū 徂徕研究 (Tokyo: Sekishoin, 1934). As the revisionist, Imanaka questions the view that Sorai’s ideas were unprecedented. He contends that Sorai’s philosophy was an adaptive modification of several strands of Chinese thought. He shows that Sorai’s fukkogaku 復古學, or "return to the ancient meanings of terms," traces to the Xunzi 東子, the writings of Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 B.C.E.-18 C.E.), and the utilitarian Neo-Confucian schools of Ye Shi 葉適 (1150-1223), and Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143-94). Imanaka contends that Sorai’s kobunjigaku concepts about the superiority of ancient Chinese prose and poetic styles were grounded in the various literary theories of Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824), Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (773-819), Ouyang Xiu 欧陽修 (1007-72), and those of the Ming scholars, Li Panlong 李攀龍 (1514-1570) and Wang Shizhen 王世貞 (1526-90). Imanaka’s evidence for his claims takes the form of allusions to those Chinese literary theorists appearing in Sorai’s Ken’en zuihitsu and Bunshū 文集 (Collected Literary Works). Despite its partially derivative nature, while Iwahashi’s work remains out of print, this article or Imanaka’s monograph, Soraigaku no kiso teki kenkyū, is basic reading for scholars interested in the Chinese origins of Sorai’s thought.

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Many topics treated in Imanaka’s Soraigaku no kiso teki kenkyū are presented here in terse form. Imanaka traces Sorai’s methodology, distinguishing between his fukkogaku and his kobunjigaku. Imanaka admits that the two are not easily separable, but he believes that in distinguishing them, two aspects of Sorai, the poetic and the political, are revealed. Imanaka’s focus is on Sorai’s rekishishugi, or historicist, view of the past. He claims that Sorai was ready to view all human standards as the products of history, but was unwilling to admit the same about supposedly universal notions like Zhu Xi’s conception of principle. Imanaka sees Sorai’s view of history as rooted in his view of human nature, which Sorai considered to be fundamentally unchangable. Further, Imanaka judges that
in asserting such a view of human nature, Sorai commits "Confucian suicide," i.e., he severs a vital link to the Confucian tradition which assumes that human nature is improvable if not perfectable.


Imanaka discusses each of the 30 chapters of the Soraishū. His study facilitates use of the Soraishū, especially Sorai's correspondence. Imanaka provides a chapter by chapter account of those to whom Sorai wrote, their alternative names, their dates of birth and death, in some cases the years during which they knew Sorai, and an account of their relationship with Sorai. This information is not supplied within the Soraishū. Without it, manifold and tedious research chores would face scholars seeking to penetrate Sorai's correspondence. Imanaka admits that nevertheless the main problem of the Soraishū, that much material is undated, remains.

**___ "Razangaku to Seikagaku no idō" 羅山學と惺齋學の異同 (Seika's and Razan's Learning: Similarities and Differences in Their Teachings). Rekishi kyōiku 18.5 (1970): 46-52.**

This study foreshadows Imanaka's Kinsei Nihon seiji shisō no seiritsu: Seikagaku to Razangaku 近世日本政治思想の成立:惺齋學と羅山學 (Early Modern Japanese Political Thought: Seika's and Razan's Learning), (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1972). Imanaka contrasts Seika's ethical, theoretical, and quasi-Buddhist approach to Neo-Confucianism with Razan's more materialistic, pragmatic, and utilitarian version of Neo-Confucianism. Imanaka acknowledges Abe Yoshio's claim that the ideas of the Korean scholar Yi T'oegye influenced Seika's Neo-Confucianism, while those of the Ming thinker Luo Qinshun affected Razan's. Imanaka differentiates Seika from Razan in a way that Abe's paradigm does not: Razan, not Seika, tried to formulate a Neo-Confucian/Shintō synthesis absolutizing bakufu rule. Discussing the political significance of Razan's Shintō denju 神道伝授 (The Transmitted Teachings of Shintō), Imanaka suggests that Razan, combining Neo-Confucianism and Shintō in an amalgam similar to ones taught at the Kennin Temple where he studied as a youth, meant to sanctify Tokugawa absolutism. Imanaka claims that the Shingaku gorinshō 心學五倫書 (Treat-
ise on the Five Relationships in the Learning of the Mind), traditionally attributed to Seika, more resembles Razan’s thought than that of Seika. Imanaka disparages Razan and his scholarship, calling him "an ideologue of bakufu absolutism" and "the first pharisee of modern Japan." Imanaka claims that Razan’s Seika sensei gyōjō, a biography of Seika, fabricated the myth that Seika rejected Buddhism. Imanaka insists that rejecting Buddhism and embracing Confucianism was more the concern of Razan than Seika. Imanaka’s portrait of Seika as a reclusive scholar is primarily based on descriptions left by Kang Hang, Seika’s Korean tutor between 1598 and 1600. Imanaka sees Kang Hang’s records about Seika as being more impartial and less ideologically oriented than those that Razan offered.

Imanaka traces the history of Zhu Xi’s thought in Japan, beginning with its introduction in the Kamakura period. He distinguishes two branches of Zhu Xi studies: one deriving from the Gozan, or the Five Mountains—Rinzai Zen temples officially patronized by the Ashikaga bakufu—which influenced the Kiyowara family teachings, and a second branch deriving from Yi T’oegye whose interpretations were introduced after Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea in the 1590’s. Imanaka suggests that Razan’s learning grew out of that of Kiyowara Nobukata (1475-1550). Nobukata early on perceived that Neo-Confucianism could play an ideological role in the national domain. Razan, who had studied at the Kennin Temple where Kiyowara Nobukata’s writings were stored, was influenced by Nobukata’s understandings of Zhu Xi. Imanaka alleges that Razan plagiarized sections of Nobukata’s shōmonō 抄書, or Sino-Japanese versions of Zhu’s Sishu jizhu 四書集注 (Commentaries on the Four Books) in his, Razan’s, Shisho shūchū shō 四書集注抄 (Sino-Japanese Explication of Zhu’s Commentaries on the Four Books). Imanaka also claims that Razan’s Shintō denju mimics Nobukata’s Nihongi jindai shō 日本紀神代抄 (Explanations of the Chapters on the Divine Age in the Chronicles of Ancient Japan). Imanaka charges that Razan took the ideology in Nobukata’s writings and peddled it to the bakufu as the Hayashi family teaching. Thus Imanaka concludes that more than Seika, Kiyowara Nobukata was Razan’s real teacher, albeit indirectly. Imanaka sees Seika’s learning as sincere and non-ideological;
but he disparages Razan as a Machiavellian who bastardized Zhu Xi’s learning for the sake of the bakufu’s political ends.

Imanaka presents textual evidence for his claim that Razan’s Shintō-Neo-Confucian teachings drew heavily from the writings of Kiyowara Nobutaka. Nobutaka’s writings are in the Kyoto Rinzai Zen temple, the Kenninji, where Razan first studied Neo-Confucianism. Nobutaka’s Shintō theories were tailored for the political purposes of feudal rulers during the Warring States’ period (1477-1568) in Japan. Razan found in Nobutaka’s writings certain doctrines which could be easily appropriated by the Tokugawa bakufu. Thus, Imanaka shows, Razan borrowed from the writings of Kiyowara Nobutaka for the ideological needs of the Tokugawa. Razan may have studied with Fujiwara Seika, but he did not learn his Shintō-Neo-Confucian ideas from him. Razan’s rehashings of Nobutaka’s ideas were popularized in works such as the Shingaku gorinshō, and the Honsa roku (Record of the Lord of Satō).

Imanaka explains his understanding of the relationship between the methodology of Sorai’s kobunjigaku and the methodology of kokugaku, or the Japanese school of Nativist Learning. This topic had been previously discussed by 20th-century historians such as Yoshikawa Kōjirō, Maruyama Masao, and before them, Muraoka Tsunetsugu in his work, Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1911). Imanaka offers many interesting insights, but his treatment of the topic is obfuscated by his attempt to argue that both Sorai and Norinaga contributed to a Japanese rifūmeeshon, or "reformation," insofar as they both rejected Zhu Xi’s thought. Problematic for this view, however, is that Zhu’s philosophy was itself a kind of Song-dynasty Confucian reformation of the Chinese mind directed against Buddhism. Still, Imanaka argues that in Sorai’s view, Zhu Xi’s ideas were a continuation of the Zen school of medieval China. Both Sorai’s kobunjigaku and the
methodology of the kokugaku thinkers aimed at investigating, Imanaka claims, empirical realities, or things (mono 物) in a way that anticipated the development of modern natural science. Ironically, however, the mono that Sorai and the kokugaku scholars sought to investigate were those of antiquarian utopias. Yet their "reformations" did not lead to the development of modern science because, within both Sorai's school and that of kokugaku, a return from antiquity to the present never occurred. Thus, the quantitative analyses of modern phenomena never unfolded from these reformations. Imanaka's discussions in this article elaborate those found in his monograph, Soraigaku no kiso teki kenkyū, pp. 504-51.


Inoue's trilogy on Tokugawa Confucianism has been extremely influential, both in Japan and in the West, in 20th-century discussions of Japanese Neo-Confucianism. Contemporary specialists may dismiss Inoue's tripartite interpretive schema as too simplistic, but most survey accounts of Tokugawa thought do adopt at least a modified version of Inoue's taxonomy of Confucian scholars. Essentially, he claims that there were three major Edo schools which, in the world of ideas, progressed in somewhat Hegelian fashion. The Zhu Xi school, the originating thesis, generated its antithesis in the Wang Yangming school. From them emerged a synthesis, the Ancient Learning school of Sokō, Jinsai, and Sorai.

Inoue's schema, like most, weakens considerably under scrutiny, but it remains a useful pedagogical framework. Most seriously, Inoue neglected Korean influences on early Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism. Inoue wrongly assumed that the Japanese Zhu Xi school could be adequately described by simply outlining the views of Zhu Xi as they developed in late-Song China, transferring those
views to Japan, and attributing them to Zhu Xi’s "spiritual slave," Hayashi Razan.

Japanese scholars increasingly refer to Neo-Confucianism as "ideology" or as "thought," rather than as "philosophy." This is unfortunate for it means an opportunity postponed, if not lost, for comparisons with the most commensurable field of Western learning, philosophy. In any event, the abiding value of Inoue’s study results partly from its having been written and published just at the turn of the century, decades before the heydey of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies which permeated scholarship on Confucianism.


Ishida tries to clarify the relationship between Tokugawa feudal society and Neo-Confucianism. He concludes that "an inner relationship of correspondence" existed between Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism and Tokugawa feudal life. Ishida’s arguments are weak because he (1) assumes, rather than proves, that Tokugawa Japan was "feudal," and (2) discusses Neo-Confucianism as a monolithic whole, referring to a variety of disparate representatives and/or doctrines as they suit his purposes. He is not concerned to distinguish, e.g., Razan’s interpretations of key doctrines from those of Yamazaki Ansai. Despite these deficiencies, Ishida’s views are innovative, especially regarding their characterization of the religious motifs of Neo-Confucianism. Phillip Thompson’s translation of this article, entitled "Tokugawa Feudal Society and Neo-Confucian Thought," can be found in Philosophical Studies of Japan 5 (1964): 1-37.

Ishida argues that Hayashi Razan was the first real ideologue of the bakuhan system. Ishida claims that Razan, in stressing
the supervisory power of notions like "the principle of heaven" or "the great ultimate," played an ideologically supportive role for the bakuhan system. In this article, Ishida replaces "the Tokugawa feudal system" with "bakuhan system," but as before he characterizes Neo-Confucianism as an ideorogii without really explaining what that means. Ishida tries to relate developments in the Zhu Xi school to the early Tokugawa political realm, but his analyses are not very convincing. Nevertheless he offers many tangential insights which make the essay noteworthy.


More than Razan's ideorogii, this essay focuses on the extent to which Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan rejected Buddhism. Ishida argues that Seika's Neo-Confucianism never transcended the medieval framework of Zen-Neo-Confucian syncretism from which Seika's thinking emerged. Razan's Neo-Confucianism, Ishida claims, was much purer since it was uncompromised by long association with the Zen world. Ishida also examines some interesting conflicts in Razan's life: his adoptive mother's faith in Jōdo, or Pure Land, Buddhism, which supposedly informed Razan's "spiritual world," and Neo-Confucianism. Ishida concludes by comparing Seika to Hideyoshi and Razan to Ieyasu. Ishida notes that Hideyoshi vanished after one generation, while Ieyasu established an age of peace lasting over two centuries. Ishida then lauds Razan as "the Ieyasu of the intellectual world."


Ishige enthusiastically reviews Imanaka's monograph, noting how it is the culmination of thirty years of research on early modern Japanese thought. Ishige believes Imanaka's study is a prolegomenon for future studies, intellectual or historical, of Sorai. Ishige also notes that Imanaka defines Sorai's thought as utilitarian, even while tracing Sorai's ideas to various Chinese sources. Ishige criticizes Imanaka's emphasis on
studying ideas in terms of their historical role regardless of their structure. Ishige's criticism of Imanaka thus recognizes Maruyama's methodological contribution. Apart from this, the review praises Imanaka.


Kaji argues against the view that Nakae Tōju's interpretation of filial piety as compassion was unique to Japanese "feudal" thought. Kaji shows that precedents for Tōju's view appeared in Chinese and Japanese intellectual history. Kaji asserts that filial piety was the essential virtue of Tokugawa morality, serving both as the basis of ancestor worship as well as the principle ethic of family behavior.


Kanbara discusses Neo-Confucianism in pre-Tokugawa Japan. He notes that by the time of Go-Daigo's Kenmu Restoration in 1333, Neo-Confucian teachings were quite evident. He claims that Rinzai monks who studied Neo-Confucianism were often inferior students of Zen. Kanbara also notes that daimyo valued Neo-Confucian teachings for their worldly practicality and strategic good sense. These daimyo sometimes employed "Zen-Neo-Confucianists" as their advisors. Kanbara sees Neo-Confucian influences in the kahō 家法 , or family codes, and kabegaki 壁書 , or wall-edicts, of daimyo from the post-Ōnin 平藪 War (1467-77) era, namely the Warring States period. In these developments, Kanbara sees the beginnings of the new ideorogii 儒学思想 which would become more prominent in Tokugawa Japan.


In marked contrast to Ishida's characterization of Seika as a "Zen-Neo-Confucian" who never transcended "the framework of the
medieval Zen-Neo-Confucian syncretism," Kanaya, while acknowledg­
ing a residual Zen influence on Seika, argues that Seika’s primary concern was with "daily moral issues" and "practical, concrete, ethical concerns." Kanaya denies that Seika’s thought was primarily directed towards or centered around Zhu Xi’s notion of principle, as opposed to material force. Citing Seika’s Daigaku yoroku (Essential Notes on the Great Learning), Kanaya points to crucial similarities between Seika’s thought and that of Lin Zhao’en (1517-98), a late-Ming syncretist, in regard to the Great Learning. Kanaya also sees important parallels between Seika’s ideas and Wang Yangming’s thought. Basically Kanaya sees Seika’s philosophy as syncretic. Kanaya thus also differs from Abe Yoshio’s view of Seika’s thought as being Zhu Xi-like in emphasizing principle. Kanaya recognizes the influence of the Yanping dawen (Dialogues with [Li] Yanping) on Seika, but he seems too ready to link that work’s concept of "untrammeled spontane­ity" to Wang Yangming rather than Zhu Xi, and his teacher, Li Yanping (1093-1163). Kanaya’s views com­pliment Abe Yoshio’s research on the Korean origins of early Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism by focusing instead on the Chinese roots of Seika’s thought.


Kato shows more reverence for Jinsai than is usually evident in objective scholarship. Yet J. J. Spae, in his 1948 study Itō Jinsai, judged Katō’s book to be a "scientific contribution" on the Kogidō movement. Katō’s "Preface" describes the historical setting of his book as the Shōwa ishin, or Shōwa Restoration, i.e., the age when the Japanese Imperial Way would be realized in East Asia. Jinsai’s learning is significant, Katō argues, not just within Japan but also for those forging a spirit of leadership for reviving China. Japanese Confucian­ism, Katō thinks, has preserved the virtuous conception of the trinity of heaven, earth, and man, found throughout traditional Chinese culture. In writing this book Katō states that he worked strenuously to establish the Imperial Way in East Asia via education. Katō sees Jinsai’s ideas as having inspired
Ogyū Sorai's, and then those of the kokugaku, or nativist movement, too. He claims that Jinsai's ideas played a role in the Meiji Restoration. Katō traces the history of Jinsai's school through 1940, the year his study was published, suggesting that Jinsai's pedagogical techniques could be useful in reviving China. By putting aside the "Preface" and spots where Katō waxes ultra-nationalistic, there is much to be gleaned from this detailed study. Yet its ultra-nationalistic observations are the threads binding it.


This reference work catalogues Chinese works according to thirteen different divisions, beginning with the Chinese siku categories and continuing with governing; geography, metals and rocks; bibliographies; philology and lexicography; rhetoric; encyclopedias; miscellanies; and collectanias. A brief biography of the author, the textual history of the work in question, and the structure and contents of the work is provided. As is true of any bibliography of this scale, in a few cases the information may be unreliable or incomplete.


Kawaguchi explores the socio-economic thought of Kumazawa Banzan, showing how it developed from notions which Banzan more or less accepted from the Song philosopher Zhu Xi and the Ming philosopher Wang Yangming. Thus Kawaguchi differs from most accounts which simply label Banzan as a follower of Wang Yangming. Going even further, however, Kawaguchi suggests that Banzan appropriated ideas from Zhu and Wang in ways which differed from their uses of them. Despite Banzan’s optimistic view of humanity, his socio-economic reinterpretations of Song and Ming Neo-Confucian notions derived largely from his own experiences as a han, or domain, reformer. Kawaguchi suggests that Banzan was a pioneer among Japanese in setting forth a coherent set of socio-economic ideas—such as returning samurai to agricultural life in order to reduce their reliance on merchants and money lenders—regardless of the somewhat reactionary nature of those ideas.
Kawaguchi distinguishes between two major patterns of Tokugawa economic thinking: (1) the (positivistic) Soko pattern, and (2) the (moralistic) Banzan pattern. He associates Jinsai's economic ideas with those of Banzan, and Sorai's with those of Soko. Kawaguchi suggests that Ishida Baigan's economic views represent the culmination of the Banzan-Jinsai pattern of theorizing. The latter emphasizes moral notions, while the Soko-Sorai pattern is more "value-free."

Kimura first distinguishes between two types of intellectual transmission: (1) the loyal and faithful kind, as exemplified by Jinsai and his son and philosophical successor, Itô Togai 伊藤東涯 (1670-1736); and (2) critical but reconstructive transmission, as occurs when one thinker rejects a system of thought yet formulates a new system on the basis of elements borrowed or refashioned out of the old system. The former most typifies Asian intellectual history, while the latter more represents the history of Western thought. Tōju formed his ideas, Kimura argues, by dissecting, supplementing, reducing, and then reformulating notions integral first to Zhu Xi’s and then to Wang Yangming’s Neo-Confucianism. Kimura rejects stock descriptions of Tōju as the founding father of the Japanese Wang Yangming school. Instead, Kimura says that Tōju’s mature thought, best characterized as Tōjugaku, or "the Learning of Tōju," was a three-in-one eclectic blend of Neo-Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.
Kitajima discusses Ogyū Sorai's life, his intellectual world, and his thought in relation to the economic theories that Sorai's Seidan (Political Discourses) develops. Kitajima focuses on Sorai's critique of the sankin kōtai (alternate attendance) policy and the lack of sumptuary regulations. He also examines Sorai's plan to return samurai to the countryside. Kitajima argues that Sorai's perspective, while seeming to exalt peasants, was based on the best interests of the samurai. Kitajima notes that Sorai's opinions about the Tokugawa economy jibed with those of the samurai, not the merchants. Thus Sorai's economic ideas did not transcend the feudal world from which they arose.


Koyasu provides a detailed, monograph-length account of the major concepts and themes of Jinsai's mature thought and its relationship to Zhu Xi's ideas on the same or similar notions. The chapter titles indicate the diverse contents of Koyasu's study: Introduction: Perceptions of Jinsai and his Philosophy; (Ch. 1) The World of Human Ethics: Jinsai's Notion of Reality; (Ch. 2) The Structure of His Philosophy: The Analects and The Mencius in Jinsai's Thought; (Ch. 3) The Relationship between Human Nature and Morality; (Ch. 4) "Apart from Humanity, There Is No Moral Way," part one; (Ch. 5) "Apart from Humanity, There Is No Moral Way," part two; (Ch. 6) The Way of Heaven and the Way of Humanity. Following the last chapter there is a brief nenpu, or chronological account, of Jinsai's life. Also, there are two appendices: "Human Nature and Human Knowledge in Early Modern Neo-Confucianism" and "Asserting and Denying the Reality of Ghosts."

Kurata Nobuyasu 倉田信靖. "Jinsaigaku hihan ni okeru Soraigaku no kōzō: Ken'en zuihitsu o chūshin to shite" 仁義学批判における仁義学の構造: 謳国随筆を中心として (The Structure of Sorai's Thought as Apparent in his Critique of Jinsai's Philosophy: An Examination of Sorai's Ken'en Miscellany). Daitō bunka daigaku kangakkai shi 大東文化大学漢学会史 23 (March 1984): 54-64.
Kuroda traces Sorai's attack, in his Ken'en zuihitsu, on Itō Jinsai's thought. Representing himself as a loyal believer in Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, Sorai first criticized Jinsai's ancient learning ideas. In 1717, three years after publishing the Ken'en zuihitsu, Sorai developed his own ancient learning philosophy, one which was similar, at least in its general approach to Confucianism, to that of Jinsai. Kuroda's article raises many interesting questions but it provides answers, even tentative ones, for few.


Kurita relates that Hakuseki willingly acknowledged the Tokugawa bakufu as the legitimate governing agency of Japan, while he saw the Japanese emperor as a transcendental figure who should distance himself from the political realm. Despite this support of the bakufu, Hakuseki's political thinking was based on bunishugi 文治主義, or the Confucian principle of humanistic rule.


Kuroita examines Sorai's views of history as revealed in: (1) his kobunjigaku, (2) his evaluation of Confucius, (3) his preference for Sima Guang's 司馬光 (1019-86) Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government) over Zhu Xi's Tongjian gangmu 通鑑綱目 (Outline and Commentary on [Sima Guang’s] Comprehensive Mirror), (4) his evaluation of Sima Qian's Shiji, and (5) the miscellaneous yet insightful remarks on historical methodology and historical knowledge in Sorai's Narubeshi 南部別志 (Etymological Miscellany). Kuroita contends that Sorai's ideas on history derived from his kobunjigaku approach to philosophical and literary matters. Kuroita's ideas, while interesting and provocative, are also often sketchy and speculative.

Kokan’s (1278-1346) personality, his research interests, and his views of Confucianism and Daoism are the key topics of this article. Kusumoto notes how Kokan distinguished between ancient Confucianism and the Neo-Confucian ideas of the Cheng-Zhu school. Kusumoto shows that while Kokan admired ancient Confucianism, he criticized Neo-Confucians for their critiques of Buddhism. Kusumoto also discusses Kokan’s critical analyses of major Daoist works like the Laozi, the Liezi, and the Zhuangzi. Kusumoto’s article reveals the degree to which some Japanese Zen monks understood the Zen-Neo-Confucian syntheses of Song China. The same holds for their understandings of Daoism. Yet, Kusumoto admits that Kokan’s thoughts on these topics were few and unsystematic.


Maeno recounts how Sorai was among the first Tokugawa scholars to master Chinese, both the spoken and the written language, in the classical style and the modern vernacular. Earlier Japanese scholars had mastered Chinese enough so that they could punctuate Chinese texts according to the various, rather unsystematic rules of kanbun, or Sino-Japanese. Sorai insisted that his students read Chinese in the original, unpunctuated form. Sorai distinguished semantic issues carefully, noting how the meanings of Chinese words changed over time. Embodying this linguistic ethic, Sorai wrote his Bendō and Benmei in Chinese, without kanbun punctuation. Later generations of Sorai’s school, however, did not live up to his ideals. In order to popularize Sorai’s ideas, his disciples authored kanbun punctuations of Sorai’s works, the very same works which Sorai had insisted be read in the original Chinese.


McEwan believes that Jinsai’s criticism of the Song school was historically significant because it cleared the way for Ogyū Sorai’s later critiques. Due to Jinsai and Sorai’s evaluations of Neo-Confucianism and the new age in Japanese thought that
their arguments ushered in, Aizawa Seishisai, in the early-nineteenth century, could write Shinron without feeling the need to rebut the Song school's study of principle, or their notion of transforming the nation via virtuous government.


Maruya traces the formative processes of Jinsai's pluralistic understanding of human nature by analyzing the variations in Jinsai's thought as apparent in several Genroku manuscripts and/or woodblock editions of the Dōjimon 童子問 (Elementary Philosophical Questions). Maruya notes that section 21 of the Dōjimon criticizes Zhu Xi's claims about the universality of human nature. But, Jinsai never recognized how Zhu's ideas provided a model for his own, especially when the latter acknowledged under the rubric of "the physical nature" the existence of many varieties of human nature. Maruya suggests that Jinsai remained silent about this because he wanted to distance himself from the Neo-Confucian school rather than acknowledge how his own emphasis on the individuality of human nature had developed out of Zhu's ideas. Maruya concludes that Jinsai used half of Zhu's thought to criticize the other half.


Maruyama states that the Taiheisaku is a problematic text, one possessing "a mysterious, disharmonious" quality. An early 20th-century scholar, Takimoto Seiichi 濱本誠一, has even questioned its authenticity, thus reviving issues that first surfaced in 18th-century Edo Japan. In the Nihon keizai sōsho 日本経済叢書 (Collected Writings on Japanese Economics, 1913), Takimoto's "Kaidai" 解題 (Explanatory Analysis) of the Seidan observes how Sorai's disciple, Hattori Nankaku, listed neither the Taiheisaku nor the Seidan in his Butsu fūshi chojutsu shomoku ki 物夫子著述書目記 (Bibliography of Sorai's Writings, 1753). Nankaku claimed that any writings attributed to Sorai that were not in his bibliography were forgeries. Takimoto himself reasoned that since the Seidan and
the Taiheisaku are so similar in content, their authenticity is dubious. Maruyama notes, however, that Iwahashi's Sorai kenkyū rejects Takimoto's view, affirming that Sorai wrote the Seidan and the Taiheisaku. Iwahashi adds that the similarities in those works convince him that Sorai wrote them both. Imanaka's Soraigaku no kiso teki kenkyū agrees that the Seidan and the Taiheisaku were Sorai's, explaining their similarities by suggesting that Sorai wrote the Taiheisaku to summarize the Seidan. Maruyama's study, agreeing with Iwahashi and Imanaka, attempts to speculate about when the Taiheisaku was written, given its contents and records in the Sorai sensei shinrui yuisho gaki (Ogyū Sorai's Genealogy), by Ogyū Hōmei (1755-1807). Regarding the year 1722, the Sorai sensei shinrui yuisho gaki mentions "a special unofficial assignment" which Sorai undertook. This, Maruyama claims, refers to shogun Yoshimune's request that Sorai record his thoughts and proposals for future socio-political reforms. Thus Sorai, in total secrecy, authored the Taiheisaku and the Seidan. Isolated from his disciples and friends, Sorai wrote, at the bakufu's request, three times a month within the residence of a bakufu retainer. These factors might explain the Taiheisaku's "mysterious, disharmonious quality." Maruyama speculates that the Taiheisaku was written between 1719 (Kyōhō 4) and 1722 (Kyōhō 7). Maruyama claims, in conclusion, that his investigations record, but do not resolve, several textual puzzles which the Taiheisaku presents. Though his stated intention is not to resolve the problem of authorship, clearly Maruyama, via literary intuition developed through careful examination of Sorai's myriad works, does not strongly doubt that Sorai wrote the Taiheisaku.

Maruyama first observes that the title to volume 31 of the NST is Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, and not simply Yamazaki Ansai, i.e., the volume collects works from Yamazaki Ansai’s school, and not just from Yamazaki Ansai himself. Maruyama asks why an intellectual giant like Yamazaki Ansai did not leave a greater corpus of philosophical literature? He notes that Ansai’s Complete Works mostly contains passages copied verbatim from Chinese or Korean works. Maruyama suggests that Ansai’s liter-
alism regarding Cheng-Zhu philosophy made it unnecessary for him to record novel ideas. Most of Ansai’s ideas were set down only later by his trusted disciples, Asami Keisai and Satō Naokata. In a similar way, the thoughts of Keisai and Naokata were recorded by their highest disciples. Maruyama generalizes that within the Kimon school of Japanese Neo-Confucianism, disciples recorded the ideas of their teachers which had previously been conveyed only in oral form. He states that this method of transmission was a distinguishing feature of the Kimon school. The Ansai school, Maruyama adds, meticulously recorded the dōtō 道統, or the transmission of the Neo-Confucian way, from teacher to disciple, generation after generation, from Tokugawa times through the modern era. After discussing Kimon views of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, Maruyama concludes that despite the complex origins of Cheng-Zhu learning in Japan, Ansai’s Kimon school was the first to realize personally, in theory and practice, the worldview of Cheng-Zhu learning. Noting his own earlier studies of links between the Kimon school and 20th-century Japanese ultra-nationalism, Maruyama states that the intellectual supremacy of the Kimon school in Japan has been the source of both their honor and their disgrace.