Orthodoxy and Legitimacy in the Kimon School

Part I

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Translator's Preface

In the striking photograph of Professor Maruyama that appears on the first page of the publication announcement of Iwanami shoten's sixteen-volume edition of his Complete Works (Maruyama Masao shi 丸山真男集, 1995), Maruyama's penetrating gaze on the left side of the picture is offset on the right by a plaque on which are written the four characters for “Establish the Nation on the Basis of Truth” (shinri rikkoku 真理立國). If this is an epitomization of Maruyama's scholarly mission, it could serve equally well as a statement of the mission of the Kimon school, as of all schools of thought which claim to be inheriting and propagating an intellectual orthodoxy that is also conceived to be the ideological basis of the state. In the case of Maruyama and those who share his sense of mission in the postwar period, the translation is probably best left without a “the” before the word “Truth.” Certainly the conception of truth that motivates his scholarship has much more room for the critical pluralism than the conception propagated as orthodoxy in the militaristic period. Nevertheless, as Hermann Ooms has shown for the early Tokugawa period, Carol Gluck for the Meiji period, Stefan Tanaka for the Taishō and

* Sino-Japanese Studies is grateful to Iwanami shoten and to Professor Maruyama for their kind permission to publish this English translation of Maruyama's article. We also express our deep gratitude to Professor Maruyama for providing explanations for several especially thorny passages in his quotations from Edo-period writings. Earlier this year Professor Maruyama was hospitalized, making it difficult for him to check over the entire manuscript. Sino-Japanese Studies and the translator express their heartfelt wishes for Professor Maruyama's rapid recovery.


2 Hermann Ooms's Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructions, 1570-1680 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) is the first major study in English to examine in detail the ideological significance of Yamazaki Ansai and attempt to delineate the discourse to which he was party. Observing the combination of Shinto mythological ideas and Neo-Confucian ethical ideas of Razan and Ansai and the political uses of these ideas, Ooms challenges the established picture of the
imperialist period, and Maruyama in the present study for the Edo period, a national ideology is never something static and monolithic, but a living process in which various, often contradictory versions of the “single truth” are always being reformulated out of a complex dialectic between inherited structures of ideas and people’s perceptions of the momentum (ikioi 势) of objective events. Thus, on the far left side of the same picture, opposite the plaque, we see a book entitled Hiroshima, written in the katakana script normally used to write words of Western origin, as if to balance the Sinitic echoes of the calligraphic plaque on the right. Truly, Maruyama’s career has been framed by the tension between the Confucian intellectual tradition epitomized on the right and the implications of the cataclysmic imposition of foreign power we are reminded of at the left, an event that fundamentally changed the project of relating Japan to its past.

So, it is inevitable that Maruyama’s efforts to reexamine from new perspectives the sources of Japan’s national ideology to further the rise of a new world outlook in Japan have elements both of continuity and discontinuity with earlier scholarly traditions. That is, his endeavor to objectify the archetypes in the thought of the past in order to inhibit their power of irrational fascination also helps to keep those archetypes alive. To deconstruct the national ideology is also to reconstruct it for newer generations, at least for the portion of the academic community that continues to take an interest in such matters. Even his task of promoting the creation of “an autonomous mind that can function as an intermediary between reality and ideas,” something the Japanese intellectual traditions is said to have lacked, sounds like a restatement of the perennial mission of Neo-Confucianism—a mission that was also taken up energetically in different ways by the three eminent teachers of the Kimon school. What is distinctively new in Maruyama’s studies from the point of view of this tradition, of course, is his masterful incorporation of philosophically informed European methodologies into the task of analyzing the thought of the past, with the result that without losing sight of “the internal structural interrelations between the basic categories of thought,” he is also able to see these ideas from the outside with an acute consciousness of their ideological and social functions and their development of Tokugawa thought, concluding that “the dichotomy between rationality and arationality is inappropriate for understanding early Tokugawa Japan” (p. 151).

6 Ibid., “Author’s Introduction,” p. xvi.
7 Consider, for example, Satō Naokata’s statement: “Even if one possesses the true traces [recorded teachings] of the sages of all times, if one does not establish one’s own will, one will not achieve [true] learning... There are few even among scholars who can see their way through all of this; how much more so for the uneducated.” Gakudan zatsuroku 学談雑録 (A Miscellaneous Record of Discussion on Learning), in Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, p. 437.
8 A phrase used by Maruyama in praising the methodology of the German Marxist social scientist, Franz Borkenau. See “Author’s Introduction,” Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, p. xxiv.
historical development. The main significance of the present study, I believe, lies in its clarification of the basic categories of Neo-Confucian thought and the dynamics of their historical unfolding in relation to the struggle to define orthodoxy and legitimacy principally in Japan, but in China as well. Whether or not this means that Maruyama has found in Neo-Confucianism the closest thing in the Japanese tradition to "an axial intellectual system comparable to Christianity in the West," I do not venture to say, but there is no doubt that it constitutes such a system in China.

Due to the fact that Maruyama's essays of the 1940s published in Nihon seiji shi kenkyū have continued to be referred to as a "point of departure" for the study of Tokugawa Confucianism, he is still at times associated with the oversimplified views of the history and structure of Neo-Confucian thought presented in those essays. One reason I have thought it important to present the present study in translation is that it reflects the much more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of Neo-Confucian thought that he has developed since the 1950s, partly in response to the waves of criticism his early work drew, and partly as a result of wide and perceptive readings in both Chinese and Japanese Confucian sources. Like his earlier works, the present study strives to situate Japanese intellectual history within a "universal" framework that searches for the basic laws of development of thought systems and world views in general. For this reason, it reveals new levels of meaning in Confucian ideas that reach well beyond their traditional boundaries. Just as Maruyama's work has brought this "universal," or at least European, perspective to the study of East Asian thought, endeavoring to counter the parochialism of the Japanese toward their tradition that has survived even the onslaught of Western thought since the Meiji Restoration, we in the West can also use Maruyama's perspectives to help bring the rich world of East Asian thought into our own often too Western-centered understanding of the world. Even the new trends in methodology in English-language scholarship on East Asia are still dominated by Western names and Western theories, lacking some of the dynamics of the interplay between European and Asian modes of thought that characterizes the intellectual world in Japan. One of the reasons for this is the higher prestige given to translation in Japan as a legitimate mode of scholarly endeavor—something which also reflects a very long tradition in the evolution of Japanese thought.

The present study is an extremely difficult piece to read in Japanese, and it is hoped that presenting it in translation will help keep Maruyama's insights fully involved in the increasingly sophisticated discourse on the history of East Asian thought in Western-language scholarship. Moreover, it is hoped that its availability in translation will further the incorporation of Neo-Confucian discourse into other fields of intellectual inquiry beyond the still somewhat exotic fields of premodern Chinese and Japanese intellectual history. Of course, by the very fact that Maruyama's studies are informed by postwar trends in Western methodological theory, as that theory itself evolves, the present work will also be subjected to criticism. Perhaps from the point of view of current

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9 See ibid., "Translator's Preface," p. ix. Hane notes here that the thesis of one of Maruyama's essays of the late 1950s is that Japan lacked such a system.

methodological trends it is already somewhat dated. But if the seminal nature of a work
is directly proportional to the amount of comment and criticism it draws, as suggested by
the fate of Maruyama’s early essays, then this is all the more reason for presenting it in
English translation. It also seems to me that there is much of value in the present study
that will survive critiques from post-Foucault methodological perspectives. For one thing,
Maruyama does not claim that his textual material necessarily gives us access to some
reality either “out there” in the objective world or “in there” in some exclusive realm of
subjectivity— he is merely concerned with the structure of thought in both a spatial and a
temporal scheme of relationships. For another, the basic categories or archetypes of
Confucian thought, as inscribed in the Confucian classics themselves, constitute one of the
major traditions of world thought, and study by one of modern Japan’s greatest scholars
that delves into those basic categories, their relationships, and their historical working out
is bound to have lasting relevance.

One reason that this study opens new ground is that, as widely as the importance
of the Kimon school in Japanese intellectual history is recognized, very little material
exists on it in English, and even the limited number of non-Japanese scholars who have the
linguistic competence to read the voluminous texts involved may well have better things to
do with their time. Researchers in other areas of Edo thought and history often meet with
caricatures of the Kimon school from the mouths of its critics, and the lack of an inside
perspective can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the intertextual dynamics among
the various schools. Scholars working to clarify the Song-dynasty origins and develop-
ment of the dao_xue 道學 tradition, whose work also helps illuminate the controversies
within the Kimon school, can conversely gain a broader perspective to text their
generalizations from more documentation on the unfolding of this tradition in Tokugawa
Japan. The present study, based on a wider knowledge of the textual records of Edo
Confucian thought than any Western scholar is likely to have for a long time, provides a
sort of map of the various sub-schools and controversies within the school that can form a

11 Naoki Sakai 酒井直樹 has recently published several critiques of Maruyama’s historiography
from a “postmodern” point of view. See Iwanami kōza, “Shakai kagaku no hōhō 社会科学の
方法, “Nihon no shakai kagaku 日本の社会科学, and “Shakai kagaku hōhō jōsetsu 社会科
学方法序説. Also see Sakai’s “Maruyama Masao to sengo Nihon 丸山真男と戦後日本, Sekai 世界 615 (November 1995), pp. 57-68; see also Gendai shisô 現代思想 (January 1995).
As this essay goes to press, I was unable to obtain more precise bibliographic citations—my
apologies.
12 See, for instance, Tetsuo Najita, Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese
school provided one of the two definitions of bureaucracy that converged to form the ideology of
the Tokugawa system of rule, though he does not take up the difficult question of just how this
ideology managed to emerge from the teachings of Ansai or his disciples. “Yamazaki argued that
the ethical nature of politics is conceivable only in the light of fixed, nonarbitrary norms outside of
historical processes that make it possible for men to establish rules, rituals, and structures.”
Further, “What Yamazaki stressed, then, was not so much internal devotion to enable one to
perceive norms, since norms are explicit and given, but rather the indefinable potential in human
personality to act out one’s convictions in a public context and thereby make history approximate
norms of goodness.”
foundation or reference point for further studies that will have to be more limited and localized in their scope. This map can help researchers to keep the larger picture in view while they look into the thought of individual thinkers, even as they seek to redefine the picture of the school as a whole that has been provided by Maruyama.

No matter what else this study is, we must certainly recognize it as a depiction, based on certain philosophical projects and intentionalities and rooted in the particular time in which it was written. Maruyama would be the first to tell us that we should not mistake his depiction for the school itself, that is, for a definitive picture of the way the school "really was." Certainly, though, it is an attempt to depict the school with a more detached, more "objective," less ideologically infatuated perspective than that from which the school was portrayed in the militaristic period--what he refers to as the "exceptional period" (hiyōji 非常時). Therefore, in closing, it may be instructive to look at an example of the way the school was portrayed during the height of Japan's ideological mission to establish a new world order in East Asia. The reader will notice both continuities and discontinuities with this portrayal as he or she reads on in Maruyama's study. No doubt the author of the piece quoted below (Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄) was as committed as Maruyama to the ideal of shinri rikkoku, and even to the ideal of promoting the development among the Japanese of what he understood as an autonomous (jikakuteki 自覚的) "self." In view of the various convolutions of logic he felt compelled to engage in, Abe must have recognized that his portrayal of the Ansai school was very much a construction put together for ideological purposes. Yet he was also no doubt convinced that this construction represented the true historical significance of the school, at a time when this "historical significance" was impacting on the unfolding (nariyuki 成り行き) of East Asian history in ways that went far beyond the bookish boundaries of the world of historical scholarship.

Like other great thinkers, Ansai also, after long intellectual torment and searching, finally returned to the spirit of his ancestral land... In the first year of Manji [1658], at 40 years of age, he first came to Edo, becoming the guest teacher of men like Lord Inoue Masatoshi 井上正利 and Lord Satō Yasuyoshi 加藤泰義. From that point on he would spend half the year in Edo, serving as the guest teacher of various daimyōs, and half the year in Kyoto, devoting himself to the education of his disciples. In this period he became the teacher of Hoshina Masayuki 保科 正之, daimyō of Aizu, an illustrious relative of the bakufu whose fame filled the four seas. Not only did this further enlarge Ansai's influence; it also gave him the opportunity to realize his aspirations regarding social education in the Aizu region and to have a hand in government through his lord. Moreover, his researches regarding Shinto were able to progress more and more due to the support of Lord Hoshina. After Masayuki's death in the second year of Kanbun [1662], he never set foot again in the Kantō region, engaging exclusively in writing and teaching until his death at 65 in the second year of Tenna [1682].

Satō Naokata 佐藤直方, Asami Keisai 浅見網齋, and Miyake Shōsai 三宅尚齋, who are called the three eminent teachers of the Kimon school, were all disciples of his later years. It is said that it was especially Keisai who inherited his orthodox line (seito 正統). Those who came and went within the Ansai school numbered 6000, and his school is compared with that of Kinoshita Jun'an 木下順庵 in the number of talented individuals it produced... Ansai's school spread throughout all regions of the country and flourished more and more as time went on. In particular, the fact that it became a great source for our
country’s imperial loyalist movement will shine brilliantly in Japanese history for all time. That is, it exerted great influence on the Mito school, and loyalists such as Yamagata Daini, Takeuchi Shikibu, Rai San’ei, Hirata Atsutane, Umeda Unpin, Arima Shinsichi, Fujimori Kōan, and Hashimoto Keigaku appeared one after another. Ansai himself said, he did not have a regular teacher, but he received the tradition of “Southern Learning” in Tosa. He directly referred to Zhu Xi as his teacher, revering only a few Confucians from the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Among them, those who can be thought to have influenced his style of learning were Xue Jingxuan, Hu Jingzhai, and Yi T’oegye. The great purpose of his learning was in fostering the Way of the three bonds and five constants in our country and in teaching the meaning of great righteousness and allotted duty, in order to promote the dignity of our national essence. That is, his aspiration was to clarify the Way of our country, and for this he used Zhu Xi learning as an end. In the fact that he established this great purpose lies his great insight as a scholar and his important historical significance.

Men who left their names in the history of Confucianism contributed in no small way to the improvement of our country’s culture in the areas of morality, government, the arts, and so on, and they should all be respected. But it goes without saying that scholars who endeavored to arouse the national consciousness and make manifest the kokutai--the very foundation upon which our country is established--possess an especially great historical significance. Ansai and those of his school not only proclaimed this like a lion’s roar in their studios, but when the time arrived they expressed it in practice. When one died the next would take over, not fearing any difficulty, giving themselves totally to the cause of the nation with the same single mind, becoming one great stream leading to the realization of the great enterprise of the Restoration. There was absolutely no other school of learning in the history of our country’s early modern period that presented such a magnificent sight, and the extent of its influence exceeds our ability to imagine.

Then why did it exert such a great influence? We must not forget that the great root of this came out of their penetrating study of Zhu Xi’s learning, as well as their profound study of Shinto and the national history... Ansai’s academic research combined with his noble character to become a burning conviction that gave birth to an intense spiritual energy. It was just because of this spiritual energy that his learning possessed such power. Moreover, one must consider the fact that this learning and energy were transmitted in one unbroken line within his school because of his strict and intense method of study.

Ansai’s Shushigaku was based on pure belief in Zhu Xi without any admixture of other teachings such as Buddhism or the Lu-Wang school. His Shinto doctrine, as well, rejected mixture with Buddhist theories. He took it as a cardinal article of faith that “the Ways of foreign countries should not be mixed in through the making of forced analogies.”... In the preface to The Compendium on the Hongfan, he argued that: “Since the universe is only one principle, even though there is a difference in the teachings of the gods and sages who are in the place where the sun rises and the place where the sun sets, there is something that mysteriously corresponds in their Ways.”... While this was based on Zhu Xi’s theory of li and qi, in his time it was truly a penetrating view, as different as clouds and mud when compared to the view of some later Shintoists who vainly rejected Confucianism. That is,

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13 There follows here a list of the Shinto teachers whose doctrines he synthesized, beginning with Kikkawa Koretari 吉川惟足.
for Ansai, one believes something not because it is Shushigaku or because it is Shinto, but because it is the one principle of the universe...

At the time, with the rise of education in the literary arts, the worship of China (Shina 志那) was extremely widespread, and the idea that China was the middle civilization and Japan was barbarian ruled the minds of Confucians... Ansai took a great iron hammer to these worshippers of foreign countries, elucidating the true righteousness of the kokutai on the basis of the theory of taigi meibun, making this the great root of his teaching. He said: “... As for the name ‘middle country’ (chūgoku 中國), if we speak from the point of view of each country, one’s own country is the middle and the foreign countries in the four directions are the barbarians. Therefore, the fact that we call our country ‘the middle country of the luxuriant reed plains’ (toyo oshihara no nakatsu kuni 豐袤原中國) is not something that we can keep to ourselves alone.” Moreover, he aspired to compile a Japanese Mirror in order to demonstrate taigi meibun in our national history. Only the table of contents of this Japanese Mirror has come down to us, but not only is it in perfect accord with the four great characteristics of the Dai Nihon shi 大日本史 (History of Great Japan) of Mito, but even the year the compilation was begun is the same. The spirit behind Ansai’s compilation of a national history was learned from the Tōngjian gengnu (Outline of the Comprehensive Mirror [for Aid in Government]) of Zhu Xi. What it comes down to is elucidating the spirit of the founding of the country, honoring the uniqueness of the kokutai, distinguishing between our country and foreign countries, revering lord and father, extolling the great righteousness of loyalty and filial piety, revering the legitimate lineage (seittō), and praising honor and integrity... He once wrote in a poem that “learning is nothing other than loyalty and filial piety.” Moreover, his loyalty and filial piety were the loyalty and filial piety of a Japanese. He held that if there is learning that departs from loyalty and filial piety, that learning is in the final analysis useless, and the person [who engages in this learning] is also useless.

Whatever else we may say about Ansai, it is certainly amazing how long his teachings have been able to keep providing fuel for whatever ideology or theory of ideology is currently clamoring for hegemony in the larger world that determines meaning in the field of Japanese intellectual history. It will be interesting to see what the emerging generation of scholars does with him.

14 Bunkai hitsurolat 文會筆錄. This quotation from Ansai continues with a quotation from Cheng Yi 程頤 to the effect that wherever one goes in the world, there is no place that is not the “center.”

1. The Continuity and Distinctiveness of the Kimon School

This volume [Nihon shisō taikei, vol. 31] is entitled “The Yamazaki Ansai School,” and not “Yamazaki Ansai.” One might wonder why a giant like Ansai does not get an independent volume. Commentators are not privy to considerations on the level of editorial technology, but in the case of Ansai it would seem there are sufficient reasons in substance as well to lump him and his followers together as a single “school.” To begin with a “negative” reason, as all students of Ansai are aware, in spite of the extensiveness of the writings Ansai left behind, those which can be called “works” in the usual sense of the word constitute a remarkably small proportion. As a case in point, we can consider what is quantitatively speaking his greatest work—the *Bunkai hitsuroku* 文會筆錄, in twenty volumes. The great majority of this work consists of quotations from a wide range of books, including Cheng-Zhu writings such as *Zhu Zi yulei* 朱子語類 (Classified Sayings of Zhu Xi) the *Zhu Zi wenji* 朱子文集 (Collected Writings of Zhu Xi), *Daxue huowen* 大學問 and *Zhongyong huowen* 中庸問 (Questions on the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean), and the *Zhongyong jilue* 中庸輯略 (Compendium on the Doctrine of the Mean), as well as the writings of Yi T’oegye 李退溪 of Korea, the 24 histories, and even the miscellaneous philosophers. One only occasionally finds direct statements of opinion by Ansai in paragraphs marked “Ansai says” or “Ansai notes.” Confucius’s dictum “to transmit and not to create” truly represented Ansai’s basic attitude toward classical studies. Moreover, though the Japanese reading marks (kunten 訓點) that Ansai provided for the Four Books and Zhu Xi’s *朱熹* commentaries had an important impact on the history of the Japanese reading of Confucian texts, on the level of *philosophical* meaning they totally followed Zhu Xi, rejecting in principle the later glosses (matsuso 末疏) and sharply criticizing authoritative commentaries such as the *Daquan* 大全 (The Great Compendia) and the *Mengyin 蒙引* as “muddled and obstructed in the highest degree.”16 When it comes to important questions—such as the concrete basis of his rejection of the later glosses in particular cases, the reasons for his distinction between not-yet established theory and established theory in Zhu Xi’s own writings, the criteria he used to select certain compilations from the vast body of “original texts,” or the reasons why he concentrated on specific chapters of the classics or the explication of specific concepts—in the last analysis these are almost completely left to the records of Ansai’s talks made by such eminent disciples as Asami Keisai 淺見泉齋, Satō Naokata 佐藤直方, and Yusa Mokusai 遊佐木賢, as preserved in *Kōgi hikki* 講義筆記 (Lecture Notes), *Shisetsu 師說* (The Teacher’s Sayings), and *Mondō hikki* 問答筆記 (Records of Teacher-Disciple Dialogues). This applies not only to the Four Books and *Reflections on Things at Hand*, but equally to works like *Kōyūsō* 拘幽操 (Fidelity in Imprisonment) and *Keisai shin* 敬齋箴 (Maxims of the Reverence Studio), which, though short, became basic texts

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16 *Bunkai hitsuroku* 3, Yamazaki Ansai zenshū 山崎閑齋全集, vol. 1. Note: Italicized phrases and quotation marks throughout this study represent emphasis added by Maruyama. Explanatory comments in parentheses, except for single words added to explain the meaning of terms used in the original, are Maruyama’s comments. Footnotes added by the translator are indicated by the principal source consulted or by “(tr.).”
of the Kimon school. That is to say, basically Ansai’s learning and thought can only be revealed through the medium of his disciples. And the same pattern is repeated successively, for instance, between Keisai and his disciple Wakabayashi Kyōsai 若林強齋, between Naokata and his disciples Inaba Usai 稲葉迂齋 and Noda Gōsai 野田剛齋, or between Miyake Shōsai 三宅尚齋 and Kume Taisai 久米貞齋, and then again between Wakabayashi Kyōsai and Yamaguchi Shunsui 山口春水, between Usai and his son Mokusai 黙齋, and between Sachida Shizen 幸田子薗 and Satō Naoshi 佐藤尚志. In all cases the oral materials—lecture notes, miscellaneous conversations, and study talks—constitute an important clue to understanding the learning and thought of the teacher or the founder of the school. Bit by bit, it becomes clear just what sort of philosophical nuances there were. For now it is sufficient just to note the fact that the records made by Ansai’s eminent disciples, or by disciples of the second and third generations, have a decisive importance for understanding Ansai’s teachings.

The fact that it is difficult to approach Ansai’s teachings except through the whole school to which they gave rise means, in other words, that there were few other schools of Edo Confucianism that had so much the character of a “school.” Though it may be a superficial illustration, it is enough just to look at the classificatory charts of schools of learning given in reference works on Edo Confucianism or in books like Jurin gennryū 儒林源流 (The Origins of the Confucian Academy). Here, in almost all cases, the Ansai school or the “Keigi 敬義 School” is separated from the other schools of Zhu Xi learning (Shushigaku 朱子學) even from the Nan 南 (Southern) school and treated as an independent entry. This sort of lineage scheme—teachers and disciples, reminiscent of a clan lineage, is more appropriate for doctrinal Shinto, which has a tradition of secret oral transmission. Such a statement will call to mind the branch of Ansai’s teaching known as Suika 亜極 Shinto, which if not anti-Confucian was at least non-Confucian. Of course, the existence of the field of Suika Shinto within Ansai’s school is certainly an important characteristic of the school. But that is not the only reason that the Kimon school is distinguished from the other schools of Cheng-Zhu learning. Within the Kimon school the Shinto side was hardly recognized as academic doctrine. Even as a pure Confucian lineage that strove for a thorough devotion to Cheng-Zhu learning, the school distinguished itself from ordinary Cheng-Zhu learning using the name “the Learning of the Way” (daoxue; dōgaku 道學). Inaba Mokusai, for example, said: “If we speak of ‘Shushigaku,’ Muro Kyūsō 室鷹巢 and Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒 also fall into this category. If one

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17 Kōyūsō was based on Han Yu’s 韓愈 essay of the same name, Juyoucao, which extols King Wen’s loyalty to King Zhou 紂, the evil last ruler of the Shang dynasty, even when Zhou had Wen imprisoned. Keisai shin was based on Zhu Xi’s work of the same name, Jingzhai zhen, with the addition of interlinear notes taken from several commentators and references to Jingzhai zhen writings by later Confucians (see Nihon shisō taikei, vol. 31, pp. 531ff and 539).

18 Keigi was Ansai’s style (azana). Meaning literally “reverence and righteousness,” it is a reference to the classical phrase that Ansai took to embody the essence of Neo-Confucian praxis—“Reverence to straighten the internal, righteousness to square the external”—which also became the focal point of his distinctive interpretations of Confucian doctrine.

19 The Nan or “Southern” School was founded by Minamimura Baiken 南村梅軒 in Tosa domain in the late Sengoku period. See note 25 below.
says ‘Dōgaku,’ however, these two are not included.” 20 The term “dōgaku” itself was, of course, not something monopolized by the Ansai school, and from its very origins as a term, it circulated widely among other Confucians, particularly Shushigaku scholars. But for the Kimon school, this was a self-appellation that carried a very rigorous and out-of-the-ordinary meaning. Moreover, this view of themselves as a special school was not limited to those within the Kimon school itself. Among Shushigaku scholars who were contemporaries of Ansai, as well as those of later generations, the image of the Kimon school as something special was very common. Even for the Wang Yangming school or the Ancient Learning school, which observed the Shushigaku camp from a more clearly distinguished philosophical point of view, the Keigi school appeared as a group with a very distinct coloring.

Reported even in the latter half of the seventeenth century to have some six thousand disciples, the Kimon school had no rival in the early modern period in the matter of historical continuity. Its lineage was continued virtually without break into the period after the Meiji Restoration. No matter how we understand the great transformation of the Restoration, it need hardly be said that the dissolution of the bakuhansan system and the tumultuous inflow of Western civilization was a fatal shock not only to institutionalized Confucian learning, but also to the ideological importance of Confucianism and the degree of circulation of Confucian concepts in everyday discourse. In being subjected to this shock, the Kimon school after the Restoration was of course no exception. Nevertheless, among the many schools of Edo Confucianism, it was the Kimon school that, as a school of learning, was the first to recover its footing in modern Japan. To mention this at the beginning of this essay is to reverse the historical order. But just in its being an easily overlooked existence within the overall picture after the radical transformation of the trend of the realm, it demonstrates the continuity of the school that has been referred to above.

In the sixteenth year of Meiji period (1883), a group of scholars centering on Ishii Shūan 石井周庵, of the school of Mikami Zean 三上是庵 (Keiyū 景雄, a Confucian scholar of Matsuyama 松山 domain), founded the Dōgaku Association, and from November of the same year they began publishing a monthly called the Dōgaku kyōkai zasshi 道學協会雑誌 (Dōgaku Association Magazine). Since Mikami Zean had studied under Okudaira Seichian 奥平政胤, and Seichian was of the school of Inaba 淵尾 Naokata 那長 branch of the Kimon school. The “Intent of Publication” that appeared in the first issue of the magazine read:

It all began when Yamazaki Ansai appeared in our country, possessing unusual talent. Revering and examining the classics handed down, he at length mastered the deepest meaning of the learning of the sages and was able to obtain the true transmission of their learning... Ever since his outstanding disciples, Masters Satō, Asami, and Miyake, each one has remained in his lineage (monryū 門流).
Not to Confucianism in general, but to this school in particular, is assigned the duty of saving society from moral degeneracy: “Ultimately we aspire only to be able to remedy the moral condition of society (fi'ka no man'i chi o hiho shi 風化ノ萬一ヲ補補シ), and to attain to the realm of the endless transmission of the learning of the Way.” At the same time, the association took up the task of publishing the works of the Kimon school. Using the funds left over from donations for the restoration of Naokata’s grave, they appealed for the publication of a movable-type edition of Unzōroku 輪藏録 [the records of Naokata’s teachings put together by his second-generation disciple, Inaba Mokusai]. They also used the magazine to republish Kimon works, printing for instance Miyake Shōsai’s Rōchiroku 狼窟録 in installments starting from issue number 45 (September 25, 1887). The Dōgaku Association split up four years later over the policy of publishing “Posthumous Writings of Dōgaku” (Dōgaku isho 道學遺書) and over the table of gravesites of Kimon teachers that was included in this collection, but subsequent issues of the magazine, renamed Dōgaku zasshi 道學雑誌 (now with Ikeda Kenzō 池田謙蔵 as publisher), continued to carry basic Kimon texts such as Inaba Mokusai’s Lectures on the Rules of the White-Deer Grotto Academy, as well as biographies of important Kimon personalities. The spirit of “dispelling heresy,” which had always been a strong tradition in the Ansai school, also showed great vigor, as in the following diatribe that appeared in issue 11 against an editorial by Tokutomi Sōhō 德富蘇峰 carried in the magazine Kokumin no tomo 國民ノ友:

If one opens the volume it is entitled “Familistic Autocracy”... On reading it one is scandalized. Truly it is something that cannot stand up to a smile of pity and regret....

How flagrant! He is intoxicated with the dregs of Western civilization and has lost the ability to distinguish between right and wrong! Does he not know the limit of error, confusion, and self-indulgence? If he fully implements this individualistic system that he preaches, society will decline to the level of the birds and the beasts, becoming nothing more than the lair of rebellious vassals and bandit sons who deny their fathers and lords... How can we fail to imitate the example of the Spring and Autumn Annals in executing by the pen, and borrow the horse-beheading sword of Naokata to cut off heretical ideas and awaken others to the danger?22

The Nihon dōgaku engenroku 日本道學淵源録 (Record of the Origins of the Japanese School of the Way), which could well be called the “Biographical Encyclopedia of the Ansai School,” was completed in seven volumes (including a supplementary volume, Zokuroku 稀録) in the thirteenth year of Tempō (1842). It passed through the hands of Tsukida Mōsai 月田豪齋 and Kusumoto Tanzan 業本端山, and in 1900 (Meiji 33), Tanzan’s younger brother Sekisui 碩水 and his son and heir Kunshō 君翔 wrote a revised and enlarged edition of the Zokuroku in two volumes. Oka Chokuyō 岡直養 later re-

22 Here “Naokata” 尚方 appears to be a pun on Shang Fang 尚方 (which can be read Naokata in Japanese) who appears in the “Biography of Zhu Yun” 朱雲 in the Han shu 漢書 (History of the Former Han Dynasty). The “horse-beheading sword,” one of the famous swords of the Han dynasty, is taken from this passage. The passage in question reads, “I wish to grant the horse-beheading sword to Shang Fang, so that he may execute the one flattering minister, to encourage the others.”
edited the entire work, and published it in a movable-type edition in eleven volumes; it is symbolic that the year of its actual publication was 1934 (Shōwa 9). One can glimpse the original intention of the Engenroku from the phrase “modelled after the Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu” (The Origins of the Cheng Brothers’ Learning, by Zhu Xi) that appears in the preface to the Tempō edition. Here, as well, the compilers continued the editorial policy of “even for those who were pure followers of Zhu Xi learning, if they were not in our school, they are not recorded.” Thus the “orthodox transmission of the Way” (daotong; 道統) of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi was constituted for a second time into an orthodox transmission by the dōgaku of the Ansai school, and this transmission was carried on in one uninterrupted line into the Shōwa period.

This “self-completing” nature of the Ansai school, along with its historical continuity, led to the formation of a certain fixed image of the school. As is common anywhere, this image became generalized more on the level of a style of learning or a mode of action than on the complicated level of academic theory. The “Kyoto style of learning” came to be represented by Ansai. Early on, Kaibara Ekken had criticized the school for its narrow-mindedness, and Ogyū Sorai, in Yakubun sentei (A Manual of Translation), had ridiculed the teacher’s authoritative manner of lecturing and the imitative attitude of the disciples to the point of mimicking the teacher’s every clearing of his throat and every inflection of voice. From the middle of the Edo period such things came to be pointed out again and again in the intellectual world as the characteristics of the Kimon school. And the attaching of such labels was not necessarily limited to the anti-Shushigaku camp. For instance, Nakai Chikuzan of the Kaitokudō 懷德堂 Academy, who was no less vigorous than the Kimon school in his condemnation of the learning of Itō Jinsai 伊藤 仁斎 and Ogyū Sorai, wrote the following in 1782 (Tenmei 2):

The Yamazaki clan, in their handling of books, do not go beyond the Four Books, the Elementary Learning, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsilu), and Zhu Xi’s Collected Writings and Classified Sayings. They don’t even venture much into the Five Classics and Zhu Xi’s Outline of the Comprehensive Mirror (Tongjian gangmu). As for other works and histories, they completely forbid them and don’t even show them to their students... As for the practice of learning, they only lecture on books, and the students only take down notes on what they have heard. They have no other skills... They just handle affairs with a pretentious air, making waves where there is no wind, falling into the kind of rigorism that leads to impassioned contention with others.23

In the same writing, Chikuzan expressly excludes the “Ansai school” from within the ranks of Shushigaku. Nawa Rodō’s 部波魯堂 Gakumon genryū 学問源流 (The Fountainhead of Learning, 1799) is well known as the greatest compendium (?) of this “bad image.” Rodō criticizes the limited range of books studied, the devotion to copying the records of the master’s lectures and keeping them from the eyes of non-believers, the unusual passion for maintaining uniformity within the school, and the disciples’ refusal to mix with the

23 Chikuzan sensei kokujitoku 竹山先生國字讀 6. The last phrase is an allusion to Analects 17:16.
followers of other schools. For the time being, let us leave aside the question of how accurate this image was. If the pole of value judgment is reversed, however, exactly the same tendencies could be seen in a favorable light. For instance, in regard to the authoritarian nature of the teacher and the uniformity of the disciples, the followers of the Kimon school and the new Kimon school must have answered their critics with a strong sense of pride: If our teacher represents the vanguard of the Way, why is it bad to follow faithfully in the direction he has shown? Why are we criticized for seeking uniformity in the face of the truth? To give one example, the disciples of Nishiyori Seisai 西依成齋, who studied under Wakabayashi Kyōsai and continued his “Bōnangen” line of learning, praised his “conduct” in the following terms: “In understanding the meaning of the classics, he earnestly believed his teacher and never departed from his teachings... When disciples recorded his words, there was nothing which did not accord precisely with his teacher’s teachings.” Even more recently, Hiraizumi Kiyoshi’s 平泉澄 Ansai sensei to Nihon seishin 関齋先生と日本精神 (Master Ansai and the Japanese Spirit, 1932) quotes precisely the words of Nawa Rodô summarized above and adds admiringly: “Even though the school had several thousands of disciples and was transmitted for two hundred years, the import of the teaching was preserved without variation. Truly one cannot but say it is magnificent to behold!”

The sort of “emanation theory” explanation of the meaning and role of the Ansai school in Japanese intellectual history that was popularized by the new Kimon school in modern Japan was merely a correlate of the school’s appearance of continuity and self-completingness through time. It postulated that the “spirit” inherent in the character and thought of the founder, Ansai, was passed down without interruption by generations of disciples, developing into one of the great moving forces of the imperial restorationist movement. Needless to say, this tune played in close harmony with the pre-war “national essence” (kokutairon 国体論) ideology. The essence of Ansai’s learning was seen as lying in the elucidation of the unique origin of the Japanese nation and the great righteousness (taigi 大義) between lord and vassal and father and son grounded in that unique origin, and in the exaltation of the moral duties (meibun 名分) of revering the emperor and driving out the hegemon and of distinguishing civilization from barbarism and native from foreign. This essence, further, was carried on through the two centuries of the Tokugawa shogunate to gush forth as the somō jōi 勇王攘夷 movement of the baku-matsu 期間 period, contributing to the glorious enterprise of the Meiji Restoration. This argument became the undercurrent of a whole series of scholarly books, including not only the work of Hiraizumi mentioned above, but also Itoga Kunijirō’s 石部国次郎 Kainan Shushigaku hattatsu no kenkyū 海南朱子學発達の研究 (A Study of the Development of Zhu Xi Studies in Shikoku, 1935). 25 Gotō Saburō’s 後藤 三郎 Ansai gakutō no

24 Bōnangen 望楠軒 was the name of Kyōsai’s academy, based on Keisai’s alternate name of Bōnanrō 望楠楼 (“the tower overlooking the camphor tree”). The nan (camphor tree) in both names is an allusion to Kusunoki Masashige 楊正成 (d. 1336), a famous loyalist general who supported Emperor Go-Daigo’s 後醍醐 attempt to restore imperial rule by overthrowing the Kamakura bakufu in 1331 (tr.).
25 “Kainan Shushigaku” refers to the Tosa lineage of Cheng-Zhu studies that began with Minami-mura Baiken (who had studied under the Rinzai monk Keian 桂庵) in the late Muromachi period, a line which included Tani Kichū 谷時中 (1598-1649), Ogura Sansei 小倉三省, Nonaka Kenzan
 kokutai shisō 閣齋学統の国體思想 (The National Essence Thought of the Ansai School, 1941), and Yamazaki Ansai to sono monryū 山崎閣齋と其門流 (Yamazaki Ansai and His Lineage, revised and enlarged edition, 1943), edited by the Society for Biographical Studies (Denki gakkai). And this kind of view was by no means limited to “hijōji” 非常時 writings [works published in the prewar militaristic period]. There is a pamphlet published in 1914 (Taishō 3) containing an epitome of Keisai’s works and the record of a ceremony held in 1909 (Meiji 42) on the 200th anniversary of Keisai’s death, commemorating the fact that Keisai had been granted the posthumous court rank of junior fourth grade. An essay included therein discussing the “influence” of Keisai enumerates the following instances of influence: 26

The Master’s vast influence on loyalist thought (kinnōron 勤王論) is clear from what was stated in the previous chapter. The Master’s learning influenced the Mito 水戶 school. The Master’s theories exerted influence (kanka 感化) in Tosa 土佐. The Master’s learning influenced Akita 秋田 domain. The loyalist thought of Hirata Atsutane 平田篤胤 was not necessarily all derived from Motoori Norinaga 萬葉庭长, we can also infer that some of its content came from the Master. Takeuchi Shikibu 竹内式部, the leader of the loyalist incident of Hōrei 寛永 (1751-64) drew from the school of the Master, as is shown in the lineage chart at the left. The world knows that the loyalist thought of Rai Sanyō 賴山陽 was derived from Bitō Nishū 尾藤二洲, his uncle and his teacher in his youth. In the Kaei and Ansei periods (1848-1860), Umeda Unpei Hemp田雲渕 of Wakasa 若狭, the leader of the loyalist shishi, belonged to the Master’s school, as did Arima Shinshichi 有馬新七 of Satsuma 薩摩. In Fukui 福井 domain, Yoshida Tökō 吉田東篁, the teacher of Hashimoto Keigaku 橋本景岳 (Sanai 左内), both men may also have belonged to the school of the Master.

After showing again a lineage chart of the entire school, the text concludes with the statement:

If we look back at the great enterprise of the restoration of royal government, even though it seems as though the Dai Nihon shi 大日本史 of Mito domain and the style of learning to which it gave rise, the three great teachers of National Learning...and the things advocated by men such as Takayama Hikokurō 高山彦九郎, Gamō Kunpei 菏生君平, and Rai Sanyō, harmonized and combined with one another to naturally engender the loyalist movement, the school that truly completed loyalism, mediating between these other schools from its base in Kyoto as an unbroken transmission from beginning to end, was the school of Yamazaki Ansai.

野中兼山, and Yamazaki Ansai. This school is also called simply “Nangaku” (Southern learning) to distinguish it from the Kyoto-based Shushigaku line of the Hayashi school. (tr.) 26 The pamphlet is entitled Keisai sensei ichō yōryaku, Keisai sensei nihyakunen saiten kiji 綱齋先生遺著要略・綱齋先生二百年祭典紀事. The essay quoted here is anonymous, but since it is the same as the essay called “Asami Keisai sensei jireki” 浅見綱齋先生事紀 in the book Yamazaki Ansai to sono monryū, it would seem that the author is Uchida Enko 内田遠湖.
That is to say, both the Mito school and the kokugaku school of Hirata Atsutane, which are normally cited as the genealogy of the somó joi movement of the bakumatsu era, are here situated and connected within the line running from Ansai to the Bônangen lineage of Wakabayashi Kyôsai, or within the development of Suika Shinto.

There is much room to find fault with this all-inclusive theory of "influence" with regard to individual instances. For instance, where is the lineage of Tachihara Tsuiken 立原翠軒, which played such an important role in Mito historiography? Or, with regard to Rai Sanyô, who is cited repeatedly above, how far can his thought and literary learning (let alone that of his father, Shunsai 春水) be explained through the Kimon tradition? There is also the problem of what sort of political dilemma is involved in the Kimon theory of "the great righteousness between lord and vassal," a question we will return to later. It is, rather, the very fact that this "emanation theory" has been accepted as plausible, along with the fact of the continuous compilation of the Engenroku from the Tokugawa into the modern period that, for better or worse, symbolically express the vivid coloring of the whole of the Kimon school.

2. Tensions and Riffs within the School:

But does the postulation of an equivalence between Ansai's learning and the learning of the Ansai school which is common to both the positive and the negative images really apply so naturally in terms of content? Can the existence of a single Ansai school, in place of a plurality of Kimon scholars or of different tendencies within the school, really stand as such a self-evident premise? It was Karl Marx himself who said "I am not a Marxist." His statement suggests the almost inevitable fate that awaits thought systems or world views from the moment they leave the hands of specific individuals to circulate within society at large. Marx could already make such a statement from observing the situation in the same period as he lived. When it comes to the historical development of a system of thought or theory, the problem becomes even more complicated. Actually, in spite of the monolithic appearance of completeness and continuity that set the Kimon school apart from other schools, if we go one step closer and look at the situation inside the school, what we find is a scene fraught far more by internal tension and opposition than any other school of Edo thought. As discussed earlier, Ansai did not even produce a philosophical work that can be said to represent the Ansai school, and there was not even a deliberate effort to publish commentarial books on the Four Books, the Jinsitu, and the other basic classics of the school. That is the extent to which the pattern of the personal inheritance of Ansai's learning by powerful disciples became the Kimon tradition. At first glance this looks like a strong guarantee of the self-identity of the school throughout the course of its historical unfolding. But there was ambiguity in this as well. The fact that the foremost among the direct disciples—those who left behind their notes on Ansai's lectures, commented on the teachings contained therein, or talked about the teacher's thought and style of learning in conversations—were no less virulent in their idiosyncrasies than Ansai himself is already sufficient to lead us to expect some difficulty in preserving the school's unity in terms of content. And in fact there was the incident in Ansai's later years when he imposed excommunication (zetsumon 絶門) or semi-excommunication
upon his most beloved disciples, Sato Naokata and Asami Keisai. Moreover, the repercussions of this incident expanded even more after Ansai’s death, so that the Shinto-leaning wing among Ansai’s disciples, including Ueta Konpai and Atobe Kôkai 藤部光海, broke off relations one after another with Naokata. The ideological problems involved in the excommunication will be taken up later. However, although the world speaks of “the three eminent teachers of the Kimon school,” if we consider that Miyake Shôsai entered the school when he was nineteen, less than three years before Ansai died, at this point in time he can hardly be put in the same category as the other two. In that case, what do we make of the fact that the two most gifted among Ansai’s direct disciples - Naokata and Keisai - were both excommunicated, not even being allowed to attend Ansai’s funeral? Moreover, if we look at the relationship between these two, while they were said by Shôsai to have been as close as brothers early on, in their later years, they ended up estranged to the point that they were only able to dispute with one another through the mediation of a third party. Regarding this, Shôsai wrote:

Keisai’s severing of relations with Naokata is also something that could not have happened in former times. If it does not suit one’s fancy, then scholarly inquiry itself would be unnecessary. Even if they were to exchange letters, what would there be to complain about? This also [like their attitude after being excommunicated] is not a good example for posterity.

Ironically, Shôsai himself ended up becoming estranged from Wakabayashi Kyôsai over his work Kôhan zensho zokuroku 洪範全書續錄 (Compendium on the Great Norm, Supplementary Record). Kyôsai’s character was as resolute and stern as his teacher, Keisai. Yet he wrote the following about his break with Shôsai to his disciple Yamaguchi Shunsui, showing neither self-admonishment nor self-justification:

The Heike 平家 clan was weak, but in their weakness the whole clan stayed on friendly terms with one another, facing life and death together. As for the Genji 源氏 clan, they were all clever in the way of the bow and arrow, and had more than their share of martial courage. However, fellow clan members injured and harmed one another, and, for one reason or another, they were never on friendly terms. Thus people speak of “the friend-eating of the Genji clan.” It is a shameful thing. Yet the followers of Master Ansai, while they seem each to have some genuine insights in their scholarship, are markedly lacking in interpersonal harmony. It is like the friend-eating of the Genji clan. I think this is something each one of them should be ashamed about, and I myself have been very careful in this regard. Though I, too, recently fell unintentionally into the company of the friend-eaters, I do not think it was any fault of my own.

There is a saying, “The truckling of the Hayashi 林 clan, the severing of relations of the Kimon.” It is not clear who first said it or at what time, but there is probably nothing that expresses so succinctly the two representative forms of Shushigaku in the Edo period. In

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27 Shôsai sensei zatsudanroku 尚齋先生雜談録, ken 乾, edition at National Diet Library.
a word, the closedness and exclusiveness of the Kimon school that distinguished it from other schools was, indeed, operative within the school as well.

The paradox inherent in the Kimon school's self-completing "one great lineage of learning" does not end here. At the stage of Keisai, Naokata, Shōsai, and Kyōsai, it was the divergencies brought about in the process of a "great disciple" inheriting the same teaching from the master. However, in the historical development of a school of learning, decline at the hands of epigones it is almost unavoidable. Moreover, in the case of the Kimon school, as the will to unify the personality of the master by carrying on his line of orthodox transmission intensified, the two tendencies of the school toward standardization and differentiation reproduced themselves in increasingly diminutive forms. Inaba Mokusai lamented:

The scholars of our school are not wise enough to see and believe what is the same in the teachings of our predecessors, so they devote themselves to arguing over small points of difference with the greatest acrimony. For this reason, the school splits into all kinds of sub-schools, making for a particularly bad atmosphere.29

In the Sentetsu sōdan zokuhen 先哲叡談續篇 (Collected Sayings of Former Philosophers, Continued), we also find the same observation regarding the tendency toward sectarianism promoted by the transition to epigones and men of lesser stature:

In the An'ei and Tenmei periods (1772-89), those in Edo who revered Yamazaki were as many as the stars in the sky. Although I have heard there are those who observe Yamazaki's teachings, most of them are lacking in scholarly accomplishments and do not practice writing. If we think about it, since Satō Naokata, Asami Keisai, and Miyake Shōsai passed away, the transmission of the teaching has gone through several changes, and the line of transmission is no longer one. Inevitably, the various branches and sub-schools have certain differences with one other.30

So as the tendency for the epigones of each of the three eminent teachers to form their own sects worked itself out, what sort of situation appeared?

Master Satō saw directly into the substance of the Way, and every sentence of his writing echoes with the wonderful principle. Later Confucians relied on his tone of voice and vainly repeated his sayings. This is making glosses on the substance of the Way. Master Asami wanted to make rigorous the teaching of names and duties and arouse the samurai's morale, so he wrote the Seiken igen 靖獻遺言 (Immortal Words of Acquiescent Self-dedication).31 Later students were of the kind who conform with the time and the fashion, and they just fatuously lectured on this text. This is making glosses on the "immortal words." Master Miyake was profoundly sincere and com-

29 Watanabe Yosai 渡邊予齋, Waga gaku genryū 吾學源流.
30 Vol. 7, entry on Hattori Rissai 服部栗齋.
31 A compilation of the writings and records of famous loyal ministers in China who were not favored by their times, such as Qu Yuan 屈原, Tao Yuanming 陶淵明, and Wen Tianxiang 文天祥, with references to the deeds of other loyal ministers through Chinese history (Shogakukan, Kokugo daijiten 國語大辭典).
passionate, and he was able to experience communication with departed spirits. Thus he wrote *Saishi raikaku setsu* 祭祀來格説 (The Theory that the Ancestors Come to Participate in the Worship Service). But we were frivolous and heedless, lacking true devotion, so that sometimes we managed to talk about having intimate communication with departed spirits. This is making glosses on the “worship service.” Thus we know that the interpretive dreaming of the Han and Tang commentaries is just what is going on today. Since my father and teacher [Inaba Usai] died, the learning of the Way has declined to this pass! 32

This is somewhat hard to understand if we do not know the works of the three eminent teachers, but basically it is describing a situation in which, because in each lineage the master’s style of learning was adhered to intently, *they fell into a kind of commentarial learning that followed only their external forms*. Originally in Ansai’s school, commentarial scholarship, memorization, or literary composition that forgot the necessity of “personal realization” (*tainin* 體認, a term of Zhu Xi learning especially emphasized in the Kimon school) of the Way of the sages was strictly rejected as “playing with things and losing the will,” as illustrated by the episode where, when a certain student asked Ansai about a phrase in the commentaries (*xungu*, J. *kunko* 訳話), Ansai immediately answered, “go and look in the dictionary.” 33 This is a good example of how in intellectual history there is frequently a “turn toward the opposite.”

At any rate, it seems that the historical course of the Kimon school was not simply a matter of one continuous line of development that formed a raging river leading up to the bakumatsu period. While it was a large school clearly demarcated from its surroundings, a distinctness which it took as a matter of pride, at the same time it had within it from the start an unlimited internal tendency toward sectarianization. To state it more precisely, it harbored an ambivalence between uniformity and fragmentation, and existed as a living school only within the posture of that ambivalence.

Why is it that such a dynamism was at work within the Kimon school?

Originally there were men of extraordinary talent among the various Kimon teachers, such as masters Asami and Satō. However, because they were excessively rigorous in disposition, both the disputes and the ceremonies within the school became overly extreme, and there were many cases in which they lost moderation and balance. Adhering rigidly to Zhu Xi’s “Letter to Li Jingzi 李敬子,” Naokata condemned the 46 rōnin of Akō 赤穗 as criminals. Keisai censured Miyake Kanran 三宅観瀧 for serving Mito domain, saying that it was not for the sake of the Way. For this reason he immediately struck Miyake’s name from the register of disciples. Similarly, because of a disagreement with Keisai over when it was right to accept official position, Naokata ended up cutting off his friendship of many years and refused to call on him for the rest of his life. This sort of thing was unknown among the disciples of Confucius and the disciples of Zhu Xi, and it can only be called narrow-minded. 34
This explanation by Ōhashi Takuan, blaming the “narrowness” of the Kimon scholars on their strict disposition, is commonsensical and easy to accept, but actually it is not really an explanation. In virtually all schools one can find internal disagreements because of “disposition.” For instance, direct disciples of Ogyō Sorai like Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 could be said to have been rigorous in disposition. Precisely for this reason Shundai could not tolerate the decadent wing of disciples such as Hirano Kinka 平野金華, and he criticized this sort of literati preoccupation within his school without end. Nevertheless, in this case nothing like “excommunication” or “severing of relations” appeared, nor did their disagreements become the talk of the town. In the case of the Kimon school, certainly, intense personalities and stern dispositions sufficient to engender to all kinds of anecdotes about Ansai and his three eminent disciples must have helped precipitate the severing of relations. However, why is it that men who already possessed a closed, exclusive, and intolerant “disposition” happened to flock together in the Kimon school, and why is it that this situation later repeated itself and gave rise to the school’s tendency to sectarianism? Would it not be better to approach the situation from the opposite direction, and say that a certain mode of thinking and sensibility inherent to the Ansai school molded those who studied in the school, in varying degrees, toward a certain type of temperament and mode of acting?

Let us seek the locus of the problem in the words of the Kimon scholars themselves. Naokata made the following remarks about two kinds of friendship:

Among the students in our school, there are those who associate for study, and those who associate because of their acquaintances. Those who associate for study are truly friends in the principles of the Way (dōgi 道義), and they remain friends for life. Those who associate because of their acquaintances, even though they meet for lectures and read books every day, are not friends in learning who share the same aspiration. In olden times, Masters Cheng [Yi] and Zhang [Zai] 張載 would meet at the Xingguo 興国 Temple and talk about what particular people said in former times. This is what we can call being friends in learning who share the same aspiration.35

That is to say, the fellow thinkers of the Kimon school did not associate directly because of interpersonal connections, but only through the mediation of the “study of the Way,” and that is the way it must be. These are the words of Naokata, who was said to have had a frank and easy-going character compared to Keisai and to have a relaxed attitude toward the rituals between teacher and student.36 Wakabayashi Kyōsai, while regretting the circumstances of his aforementioned break with Shōsai, replied as follows when his disciple Yamaguchi Shunsui offered to mediate between them:

Your considerateness in this matter is compelling, but it is of no use. Even though I dislike eating my friends, it is for the sake of scholarship (gakujutsu 學術) and giri 義理. Since there are points wherein I disagree with Miyake about what is giri, this severing of relations has come about. Yet if I were to put aside these points of dis-

35 Unzoroku 2.
36 For instance, the Engenroku 2, leaf 47 says he “was not strict about the formalities between teacher and disciple.”
agreement about *giri* and just associate with him on friendly terms, *that would be the same as the friendship of a worldly person*, who gives no deep thought to matters of principle.\(^{37}\)

To disregard *giri* (truth and justice) and just continue one’s relationship indiscriminately is to be a “worldly person,” not the proper attitude for a student of the Way (*dōgaku*). Shōsai, although not speaking specifically of his problem with Kyōsai, also affirmed the severing of relations in principle when it was done for the sake of the Way, striking back at the “worldly people” who criticized it:

Severing relations (*gizetsu* 義絶) with a fellow disciple for matters of principle is indeed something that should be. For those whose association is based on the Way, it cannot be otherwise. Zhu Xi also broke relations with one or two people. Worldly people reprove this, saying that because Master Yamazaki severed relations with people when it was not necessary, those like Keisai and Naokata are always carping about severing relations. But this is a purely natural thing.\(^{38}\)

Inaba Mokusai later wrote the following retrospective discussing the background of these paradigmatic splits in the school:

The falling out between Ansai and Naokata began over the interpretation of the phrase “reverence to straighten the internal and righteousness to square the external,” but in reality the disagreement was over the harmonization (*shūgō* 縦合) of Confucianism and Shinto. The break between Asami and Satō was because they revered different things. This can be seen by looking at their writings. The break between Miyake and Wakabayashi, although it began with their understanding of the “Great Norm” chapter of the *Book of History*, was also in the last analysis because of [Wakabayashi’s] taking the side of Shinto. All five of these gentlemen [broke relations] for reasons of scholarly lineage (*gakumyaku* 學脈). Later scholars often fell out with one another because of personal animosities. This should be considered shameful.\(^{39}\)

In this sort of Kimon school explanation, one cannot say for certain that there is no idealization of the circumstances and no self-justification. After all, can one really distinguish so clearly between friendship based on *giri* or scholarly lineage and friendship based on “acquaintances?” Conversely, were these cases of the severing of relations purely due to “scholarly lineage,” with no admixture of emotional elements? As a case in point, Mokusai admits that the situation between Keisai and Naokata was aggravated by the insults thrown out by the disciples on both sides on the basis of their preconceptions, especially by those who had never even met the other teacher. But that is only to say that *here, too*, such seamy dimensions of interpersonal relations are operating, which is, as it were, a self-evident matter. The problem, rather, lies in the relative weight occupied by scholarly principles and moral principles (*giri*) within the interpersonal relations of the Kimon school. An admixture of emotional problems does not necessarily contradict the

\(^{37}\) Zatsuwa zakki 3, leaf 20우-21オ

\(^{38}\) Zatsudanroku, ken.

\(^{39}\) Setsubaisō. Koshō zenkō 雪梅草，孤松全稿 33.
Rather, in certain cases, just because of the strength of commitment to the “Way,” human loves and hates may become more intense. Of course, there is a certain precondition that must be satisfied before interpersonal relations mediated by the Way and by scholarly concerns will produce a tendency toward the “severing of relations.” This is, above all, the thesis that “there is only one truth.” This thesis itself has been put forward by almost all religions in the East and West in modern as well as ancient times, and it is not unusual as a position in the halls of learning. Yet even in the case of religious faith, where in the absence of theological systematization a number of different interpretations of one truth arise, in many cases it does not go so far as to produce a schism. However, if this thesis is carried consistently through every single phrase and every single category of the “system,” then the one truth will be split up infinitely, so that it will harbor a tendency toward infinite differentiation. In the realm of scholarly learning, where a settlement regarding the truth or falsehood of a proposition is reached through a procedure of verification that accords with scientific “convention,” as in the case of mathematics or natural science, interpersonal relations do not in principle play a role. Even in the social sciences, in the consciousness of the researcher, his own personality is from the beginning separated from the object of research—in those cases where one cannot generally consider a situation where the result of cognition flows back into the mode of being of the subject of the cognition—then of course all matters remain events in the world outside of the self. Accordingly, even if a dispute arises premised on the existence of “one truth,” the discussion will proceed smoothly as a discussion of “differences of opinion” regarding the object. However, even in empirical science, if there is a common awareness that this proposition is founded on a “world view,” then the whole of one’s own personality is also on the line. Therefore, it seems we cannot confine differences of cognition entirely to the realm of events in the “external world.” Disputes regarding doctrine or ideology, not being amenable to empirical verification, are inevitably charged with a sort of magnetic force that totally draws in the human beings or the groups of human beings that are involved. These disputes may be shrunk in stature by the intellectual or moral level of the participants, which may give them an ugly aspect. However, anyone who simply ridicules doctrinal or ideological controversies as appalling or absurd, or believes that he has no connection with such bothersome problems, can only be someone insensitive to what “world views” are all about. It is the task of one who thinks not to turn his eyes from this desolate scene, but to consider how to control the pathology that accompanies this sort of magnetic force.

Confucianism, needless to say, is an ideological system centered on the cultivation of the self and the governing of others. It is also a system of learning. Therefore, in its very essence, it is not able to limit itself merely to the cognition of objective realities, but has a character that bridges both knowledge and action. Thus, when Song Neoc-Confucianism sharply separated itself from the exegetical Confucianism of Han and Tang and constructed an elaborate system of metaphysics, it fulfilled all of the conditions of dynamism for the sort of struggle over world view referred to above. It is well known that the Neo-Confucian scholarship of the Northern Song gave rise to virulent and majestic philosophical controversies from the Southern Song onward. Of course, the forms and the degree of factional struggle in China and Yi-dynasty Korea, with the examination system and the bureaucratic system in the background, were different than
they were under the *bakuhan* system of Tokugawa Japan. However, on the other hand, just because the Cheng-Zhu learning was systematized as the single truth known as the "Way of the sages," when *Japanese* scholars attempted to commit themselves body and soul to this total world view imported from China, they were confronted with difficult *ideological* problems that could not have arisen for scholars in China or Korea. These problems, of course, were not faced only by the Ansai school. However, even if other schools studied the same system of Zhu Xi thought, it seems that their study did not to the same extent reflect back to the subject as a total *self*-discipline of personal conduct centering on the complex ethics of how and under what conditions it was proper to serve in government. Nor, it seems, did commitment to the "single truth," and the multivalence of interpretation inherent in the permeation of this single truth into all of the particular aspects of the system, express itself in the form of acute internal antagonism in the way it did within the Ansai school. Rather, one would expect that they could take the scholastic logic and concepts of the Cheng-Zhu school on the level of knowledge or information, and could pride themselves on their "broad learning"—in fact, this was in general the character of Shushigaku as represented by the Hayashi school. From this point of view, it appears that the contemporary saying "the truckling of the Hayashi school, the severing of relations of the Kimon school" actually captured these two opposite types of approach to Neo-Confucian learning in a far deeper sense than was realized by those who repeated the saying.

Ueta Gensetsu was a man who played a role on one side in the excommunication of Naokata and Keisai, and he is said to have been both a "loyal retainer" and a "treacherous retainer" of Ansai.40 At the time of the incident, Gensetsu sent a notice of breaking off relations to Naokata and Keisai, and because of his strong leaning toward Shinto, he eventually became estranged from Shôsai as well. When Karasaki Genmei 唐崎彦明, a disciple of Shôsai, met Gensetsu's adopted son and successor, Isuke 伊助, Isuke said to him in the way of a warning:

I hear that you study under a fellow named Miyake Shôsai. Shôsai used to be good friends with Asami and Satô. Naokata was crafty, and Keisai was foolish. Shôsai was also probably led astray by them. Why don't you quickly change your plans and study with the correct Ansai lineage?

Genmei straightened his countenance and replied:

The correct Ansai lineage can be known quite well by studying the regulations of his school and his collected teachings, the *Bunkai kitsuroku*. What need do I have for your superfluous comments?

With this, he "then ceased from further association" with Isuke.41 Incidentally, Karasaki Genmei was the author of a book critiquing the Sorai school, called *Butsugaku benshô* 物學辨證. Further, Isuke's comment that "Naokata was crafty and Keisai was foolish" follows precisely the descriptions of them given by his foster father Gensetsu in his works

40 See *Engenroku* 1, leaves 17う and 18う.
41 According to *Sentatsu iji*. 
Hanmonron 乱門論 (On Rebelling against One's School) and A Critique of the Biography of Master Yamazaki by Mizutari Yasunao. In the above exchange between Isuke and Genmei, which ended in their severing relations, the word “the orthodox Ansai tradition” happens to be expressed as the core of the issue. What is the “orthodox tradition” of the Ansai school? This question itself is the pivot that defined from within the learning style of the Kimon school discussed at such length above, with its ambiguity between uniformity and differentiation. And it was the motive power underneath the endlessly advancing exclusiveness within the school surrounding commitment to the “single truth.” This question involved both the orthodoxy of the Ansai school as the correct transmission of the Cheng-Zhu line of Neo-Confucianism, and orthodox transmission within the Ansai school itself.

3. Doctrinal Orthodoxy vs. Political Legitimacy:

When Karasaki Genmei and Ueta Isuke both used the expression Ansai’s “orthodoxy” (seitō 正統), it was not just by a casual thought. In the Ansai school, the word “orthodoxy” appeared frequently, in the same meaning as “principle of learning” or “tradition of the Way.” To give two or three examples, this is the “orthodoxy” referred to when Satō Naokata criticized Itō Jinsai, as in the following passage: “Zhu Xi was the one person since Confucius, and a great worthy of the orthodox tradition of the learning of the Way. Those who have criticized him are merely common men—twisted Confucians and men of worldly learning since the Yuan and Ming dynasties.” In Inaba Usai’s “Talks on Learning,” as well, we find the passage:

The dispelling of heterodoxy by those who take responsibility for the Way is something inevitable and necessary that accords with the norms of Heavenly principle. To think that it is like the arguments between different schools of geisha and make mild and meek statements is to abase oneself. Even though the just and impartial mind of the sages and worthies has no prejudices like the vulgar, the extent of their concern for the young generation is like a physician who refuses to use an ineffective medicine for an important patient. The clarification of orthodoxy by the four great teachers of Northern Song Neo-Confucianism was also for this reason... Scholars who take up responsibility for the moral standards of the world must understand this very clearly.

Again, there was Wakabayashi Kyōsai’s response to Yamaguchi Shunsui’s statement that, though he had been bothered by doubts about such lines in the Mencius as, “I have heard about the execution of an ordinary man named Zhou, but not of the murder of a king,” he finally realized that Mencius “fully inherited the tradition of the Way passed down from Yao and Shun and was totally in accord with Confucius.” Kyōsai replied: “As you say, compared with the likes of Confucian and Yan Hui 颜回, this can hardly be the same. Be

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42 Hi Mizutari Yasunao sen Yamazaka sensei gyōjitsu 批水足安直撰山崎先生行實, in Engenroku 1.
43 Basshinbu ben 史源纂辨, Unzoroiku 2.
44 Gakuya 學話 2, Kinshiroku tairi 近思錄大意, recorded by Ui Kōtoku 字井弘篤, in author’s collection.
that as it may, the correct transmission (seiō 正統) of Confucius’s school does run through it.\(^{45}\) Waga gaku genryū, in criticizing Kyōsai’s sobriquet of Bōnan, says:

Why has Wakabayashi always taken the correct and complete as his standard? Is the transmission of the learning of the Way really like that? I have my doubts as to whether he has insight into the substance of the Way. Nevertheless, Ansai’s doctrinal amalgamation and Keisai’s Seiken igen both represent a gradual trend which has finally brought us to this... Ogino Uji’s 荻野祐重 slighting of Keisai and Miyake’s censure of Wakabayashi are both cases of protecting the orthodox line of Cheng and Zhu.

Setting aside any question of the validity of this view, the term “seiō” is here being used in precisely the same way as in the previous examples. What all of these cases have in common is that a certain doctrine or principle is first taken as premise, and on that basis the “correct lineage” of this learning or ideology is proposed. That is to say, the concept of seiō corresponds almost exactly to the European concept of “orthodoxy.” If that was all there was to it, the matter would be quite simple. However, what about the following use of the same concept of seiō?

Zhu Xi’s Collected Writings and the Elementary Learning both give priority to the love between father and son. But in the Abbreviated Transcription of Zhu Xi’s Writings compiled by Ansai, the righteousness between lord and vassal as given priority. This is continued in Keisai’s later work, Seiken igen. Even though Keisai continued Ansai’s intent, Ansai’s mind was not so narrow. Even though the followers of Wakabayashi expounded Keisai’s theory of correct lineage (seiō), Keisai’s learning did not believe like them in the power of shamanistic spells. What a pitiful decline! How can one not give careful thought to this sorry state of affairs?

What is being argued here is: (1) Ansai reversed Zhu Xi’s order of the ethical relationships between father and son and lord and vassal; (2) although Keisai’s Seiken igen expounded this point of view of Ansai, it exhibits a more narrow perspective than Ansai; and (3) further, by the time we get to the sub-school from Keisai’s disciple Kyōsai, its Shintoistic side has already fallen into shamanistic superstition. As I will discuss later, the thesis that a small deviation at the beginning will become enlarged with historical development until it exhibits a manifest heterodox nature is an argument that has often been used in East and West by those claiming to stand for orthodoxy. However, the problem at hand is not the validity of Mokusai’s argument. What is more interesting is the phrase “expounded Keisai’s theory of correct lineage (seiō).” “Theory of correct lineage” in this case does not refer to the orthodoxy of Keisai’s teaching. Concretely, it is the exaltation of Japan’s “single imperial line” monarchic system that was promoted strongly in Keisai’s works Seiken igen and Satsuroku 箭錄 --the same “correct lineage” as that spoken of in Kitabatake Chikafusa’s 北畠親房 Jimnō shōtōki 神皇正統記 (Record of the Legitimate Succession of the Divine Sovereigns). In Kitabatake’s case, the ideological connection of this line with the Zhu Xi school’s theory of great righteousness and allotted duty (taigi meibun) is not necessarily clear. In Keisai’s case, however, the “theory of correct lineage”

\(^{45}\) Zatsuwa hikki 2, leaf 22 to ω.
developed by Zhu Xi in his Outline of the Comprehensive Mirror is taken as the theoretical model, and, with the theory of the distinction between civilization and barbarism in the background, the idea was emphasized that, even according to the standards of the Zhu Xi school, the Japanese political tradition is superior to that of China.

That is to say, we are here confronted with a concept of “correct lineage” on another level. In the latter sense, the concept is not an argument about the expounding or explication-as-truth of a certain doctrine or ideology. In Chinese history, this was the argument over whether imperial succession or changes of dynasties had been carried out “with the correct pedigree” or by illegal and improper usurpation or rebellion, and further the problem of whether a dynasty that began by usurpation should be considered “legitimate” (seitō) if it manifested the actual ability to unify China, or whether such legitimacy should only be granted to rulers or dynasties that preserved the name of legitimacy, even if they were driven out of the heartland of China. The Song dynasty witnessed a vigorous inquiry into the concept of correct lineage, represented not only by Sima Guang’s 司馬光 Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 and Zhu Xi’s Outline, but also by the writings of such scholars as Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, Su Dongpo 蘇東坡, Liu Yan 劉弇, Chen Shidao 陳師道, and Bi Zhongyou 比仲游. In all cases, it was the latter meaning of “correct lineage” that they were concerned with. This theory of correct lineage can be considered as one expression of that problem referred to in political science and sociology as “the legitimacy of rule,” i.e., the problem of giving qualifications to a specific ruler or ruling system such that it is able to procure the obedience of the ruled without relying solely on violence. At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, in Bunmeiron no gairyaku 文明論之概略 (A Synopsis of the Theory of Civilization), Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote:

In a state there is something called [in English] “political legitimation.” “Political” means government, and “legitimation” means “orthodox” (seitō) or “of true pedigree.” Here I will translate it provisionally as “political lineage” [seitō 政統]. What it means is the true pedigree of government such that, when that government is carried out in a state, it will be accepted by the whole people of that state.

It is a shame that Fukuzawa’s masterful translation of this concept did not catch on. At any event, in order to avoid a confusion between the two meanings of seitō, for convenience I will henceforth refer to the problem of orthodoxy revolving around a doctrine or world view as “O-orthodoxy,” and the argument regarding the orthodoxy of a ruler or system of rule as “L-orthodoxy.”

In Chinese, the opposite of O-orthodoxy—that which is premised on the truth value of a doctrine or world view—is called “different learning” (yixue, J igaku 異學), “teachings which do not line up” (yiduan, J itan 異端), “different teaching” (yijiao, J ikkyo 異教), or “warped theory” (xieshuo, J jasetsu 歪說), where “different” and “warped” have a strong connotation of “incorrect,” “alien,” “dangerous,” and often “evil.” Let us consider these words in comparison with the English words that are the opposite of “orthodoxy”—“heresy” and “heterodoxy.” Yiduan, for instance, appears first in the Analects 2.16. As shown by its definition in the Cheng-Zhu school as “something which is not the Way of the sages but has been constituted as another system of teaching, such as the teachings of Yang Zhu 楊朱 and Mo Zi 墨子,” it includes not only heresy in the narrow sense, but also “other teachings” (“paganism”) such as Buddhism. However, as
the consciousness of orthodoxy became exacerbated in the history of Confucianism, the word came to be used for “the heterodoxy within our own school,” corresponding precisely to the English word “heresy.” In substance, also, the weight came to be put more on “dispelling heresy” (pixie, J. hija 隐邪). In the Kimon school, as well, the same situation pertained.

On the other hand, in the history of Confucianism, the opposite of L-orthodoxy was not, at least primarily, yiduan (“heterodoxy”) and yijiao (“illegitimate teachings”). In Song learning, frequently used terms included “the lineage of the hegemons” (batong, J. hatō 霸統), “the irregular line” (runtong, J. juntō 閥統), “illegitimate deception” (jianwei, J. sengi 非僞), and “rebellious usurpation” (cuanzei, J. sanzoku 篡賊). I shall not enter into a discussion of these various terms here, but it should be immediately clear that all of them are related to changes in the ruler or ruling system. In short, the question of correct lineage on the level of L-orthodoxy is a problem that arose in the realm of political history or political philosophy within Confucian learning, particularly within Song Neo-Confucianism. In the editorial preface to Satō Naokata zenshi 佐藤直方全集 (The Complete Works of Satō Naokata), published in 1941 by the Japan Society for Classical Studies, we find the following words:

If we look broadly at the Kimon school today, it generally takes the Keisai branch as the correct lineage, giving fervent lectures on his Seiken igsen, venerating Nankō 永公 [Kusunoki Masashige], and believing that thus they have captured the essence of the Kimon learning. But I cannot help doubting if such is really the tradition of the Kimon school. True, the theory of correct lineage is noble. But does it represent the whole of the Kimon learning?

Of course, the passage “takes the Keisai branch as the correct lineage” is referring to O-orthodoxy in the sense of “conceiving of the Keisai branch as the correct lineage of the Ansai school.” But if we do not take the later passage “the theory of correct lineage is noble” as referring to the theory of dynastic legitimacy, i.e., L-orthodoxy, then the passage “does it represent the whole of the Kimon learning?” makes no sense. It is not clear to what extent the author of this preface was aware of the distinction and the relationship between the two levels of the concept of “correct lineage.” However, the fact that both usages of the word appear in this short paragraph discussing the Kimon school is not without interest. For there are extremely deep implications in dismissing this problem as a confusion of words.

The fact that O-orthodoxy and L-orthodoxy are concepts on different levels that refer to different subjects does not mean that they are unrelated. On the contrary, these two problems of “orthodoxy” have always been intertwined in various ways within religions, doctrines, and world views in both East and West. In the history of Christianity, a teaching centering on ideas such as “my kingdom is not of this world” and “give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar,” doctrinal conflicts concerning O-orthodoxy conflicts—which in themselves were concerned with apolitical doctrines—were transformed into political struggles or even international religious wars. At such times, when specific political powers adopted Christianity as their ideological support, it was inevitable that conflicts on the level of O-orthodoxy would become intermingled with those on the level of L-orthodoxy. This was even more so when secular powers made Christianity or a certain
Christian sect into a “state religion,” as in the case of Caesaro-papism. In the case of Islam, where the idea of the unity of government and religion was incorporated into religious doctrine, the interrelation and intermingling of the two types of “orthodoxy” were bound to appear in an even higher degree.

What about the case of Confucianism, which is our present concern? Confucianism, in the last analysis, was always a teaching for “governing the state and bringing peace to the realm.” Thus, even more than for any of the other major world religions, O-orthodoxy and L-orthodoxy were tied together by internal necessity. I have taken the trouble to distinguish between the two levels of orthodoxy precisely because of my belief that, in order to see the structural relationship they possess in Confucianism, it is first necessary to understand their difference of level. Even in the case of Neo-Confucianism, with its magnificent system of cosmology and its great emphasis on “self-cultivation,” this was no exception. It is well known that both the animated controversy within Song learning over which of the three kingdoms—Wu 吳, Shu 蜀, or Wei 魏—inhaired the “legitimate mantle” (zhengtong) of the Han royal house, and the controversy over the standards of legitimacy that was intertwined with the study of the Spring and Autumn Annals, arose with a highly worrisome political situation in the background—the pressure exerted on China by the northern “barbarian” dynasties such as Liao 遼 and Jin 金 in the transitional period between Northern Song and Southern Song. However, the “theory of correct lineage” of the Zhu Xi school was constructed as one link in its total world view, transcending this sort of direct political motivation. In his work Zizhi tongjian gangmu faming 資治通鑑綱目發明 (A Clarification of the Outline of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), Yin Qixin 尹起莘 spoke of the spirit of Zhu Xi’s Outline in the following terms:

Of its great constant principles and great laws—such as respecting ruler and father and suppressing rebels, revering the correct lineage [meaning L-orthodoxy] and suppressing false usurpation,... revering the Middle Kingdom and despising barbarians—there are none that are not connected to the greatness of the three bonds and the five constants.

That is, the establishment of correct learning was considered an indispensable task for the grounding of the L-orthodoxy of the dynasty as well. On this premise, to borrow the terms of a Qing follower of the Zhu Xi school, in the tradition running through Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu there is an original coherence between the two dimensions of “orthodoxy”—the lineage of learning (xuetong, J. gakutō 學統) and the lineage of government (zhitong, J. chitō 治統)—but there is an awareness of a lack of this coherence in the development from the Spring and Autumn through the Warring States periods. When the “lineage of learning” is lost and heterodoxies run rampant, the “lineage of government” becomes confused, and there is an endless succession of rebellions and usurpations. Therefore, it was a fundamental conviction at the root of the Cheng-Zhu school that to stabilize the disordered, disunited realm and rectify the morals of society, it is first necessary to clarify the orthodox transmission of the Way by dispelling heresy in the realm of thought and world view. The fact that, in Reflections on Things at Hand, the

46 See Xiong Huanchuan 熊環川, Xuetong 學統 (The Lineage of Learning), (Kangxi 24, i.e., 1685), juan 53, esp. the preface of Wang Ximing 王新命.
chapter called “Recognizing Heresy” was placed just before the concluding chapter also reflects this belief. And ever since Ansai, in his maiden work, *Hii 闢異* (Dispelling Heterodoxy), proclaimed, “The myriad words and phrases of the school of Cheng and Zhu have no other intention than to lead scholars to preserve the correct Way and reject heterodoxy,” the scholars of the Kimon school, each in faithfulness to the spirit of their teacher, have wagered the very *raison d’être* of their school to grapple with the intellectual task thrown upon them by “orthodoxy” in both of its meanings, attempting to pursue this orthodoxy completely within Japan’s own history and cultural climate.

4. The Universality of the Way vs. the Particularity of Japan

The principal heterodoxies that Ansai had in mind in *Dispelling Heterodoxy* in this point precisely follow the Cheng-Zhu school in China, that is, the schools of Yang Zhu and Mo Zi, and particularly Buddhism. As for early-modern Confucianism in general, Buddhism continued to be known within the Kimon school by the name *itan*. However, beginning in the Genroku period, when the direct disciples of Ansai were active, heresies which Ansai could hardly have imagined--such as the Jinsai school and the Sorai school--arose at a rapid pace. The Ansai school, with its keen consciousness of orthodoxy, naturally had to turn the blade of its “dispelling heterodoxy” against them. Buddhism, from which Ansai had struggled so hard to free himself in his youth, was already, for Keisai, nothing more than an ideology that could be driven off with one kick. “Someone asked, ‘What about the heterodoxy known as Buddhism?’ [Keisai] answered, ‘If you know the Way of the sages, it is something that does not even merit talking about. It is a ridiculous thing.’” 47 In its place, Keisai wrote a work that refuted point by point Itô Jinsai’s work *A Proof that the Great Learning Was Not Written by Confucius*, as well as a critique of Jinsai’s *Go-Mō jigi 語孟字義* (The Meaning of the Words of the Analects and the Mencius).47 Keisai, incidentally, was a convert from the Jinsai school. Even Naokata, whose easy-going and unrestrained manner was often contrasted with Keisai’s severity, was no less vehement in his defense of orthodoxy and denunciation of heterodoxy than Keisai and Kyōsai. Naokata wrote the following of Jinsai:

Jinsai directly rejects Cheng and Zhu, presenting himself as the transmitter of the orthodox line from Confucius and Mencius. If so, how does he see himself? He even went so far as to get the stamp of approval of the Indophiles, to the great delight of both sides. What a decline of the learning of the sages! I have looked at his works *A Proof that the Great Learning Was Not Written by Confucius* and *The Meaning of the Words of the Analects and the Mencius*, and he does not even understand the literal meaning of the Great Learning, the Analects, and the Mencius. How could he judge the validity of their underlying principles? To criticize the teachings of Cheng and Zhu on the basis of such a shallow understanding is the height of audacity.48

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47 Jinsai’s Kanbun work was called [in Chinese] *Daxue fei Kong-shi zhi yishu bian* 大學非孔氏之遺書辨, and the title of Keisai’s work added another bian 辨 before this title.
48 *Unzōroku* 1.
In his postscript, he quotes the famous saying of Mencius that “He who is able to speak so as to refute Yang Zhu and Mo Zi is a disciple of the sages,” comparing himself to Mencius in his fervor to refute heretical doctrines. Truly, the struggle against heterodoxy had turned into a struggle over the “orthodox line from Confucius and Mencius,” and moreover into a struggle against “the heretics within our own ranks” who were born in Japan. *Hi Soratagaku* (A Critique of the Sorai School), by Kani Yōsai, was probably the first work which proclaimed in its title the intent to offer a counter-critique to Sorai. And Kani was an unalloyed follower of the Kimon school, in the line of Miyake Shōsai. In the writings of the Kimon school published around the Genbun and Hōreki periods (1736-1764), the shadow of the Jinsai and Sorai schools is visible everywhere. The “of itself” (an sich) orthodoxy of Ansai’s learning could not avoid being transfigured into the “for itself” (für sich) orthodoxy of the Ansai school.

Even so, the Kimon school was able to turn its spearheads and beat its drums in unison against the deviations or departures from the Way of the sages represented by the Wang Yangming school and Japanese Ancient Learning. However, the premise inherent in the conception of orthodoxy that holds that “truth is one,” through the sort of dynamism we have seen above, came to be reflected back within the Kimon school as a questioning of the orthodoxy in Ansai’s teaching. Since this question was brought forth in every aspect of Ansai’s teaching, as a possibility it was split up according to the various fine categories of the interpretation of the Cheng-Zhu teachings, and no sect of the Kimon school was able to escape it. At the same time, the greatest problem regarding the orthodoxy (O-orthodoxy) of Ansai’s learning was its encounter with Shinto, especially in the fact of its development into the doctrine known as Suika Shinto. Here, as well, the issue was deeply connected with L-orthodoxy, but to avoid confusion, I will first discuss it by focusing on the reception of the Cheng-Zhu teachings as a world view—which gives meaning to the universe, society, and the self.

In this case, if one cites only the thesis of the unity of Shinto and Confucianism, there is nothing that can be said to be a special characteristic of the Kimon school. This was a position seen widely in Edo Confucianism in general beginning from Hayashi Razan 林羅山 and going through scholars such as Nakae Tôju 中江春樹, Kaibara Ekken, 熊澤蕃山, and Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行. It is actually quite difficult to find scholars who, like Muro Kyūsuke, argued clearly against this unity theory. On the other hand, within doctrinal Shinto as well—as can plainly be seen in the development from Ryōbu 典部 Shinto to Ise 大內 Shinto, Yoshida 吉田 Shinto, and Yoshikawa 吉川 Shinto—the transition from the medieval period to the early modern period was a process of switching the object of “doctrinal amalgamation” (shingō) from Buddhism to Confucianism. If there is something that distinguishes the encounter with Shinto within the Kimon school from the above-mentioned “mutual fraternization” of Confucianism and Shinto from both sides, then it is to be found not so much in the scriptures and various oral traditions of Shinto (in that aspect, the continuity of Suika Shinto with its predecessors in doctrinal Shinto is strong, and one can say that the full-scale compilation and definition of scriptures was begun after Ansai’s death), but in the point that it confronted without flinching the task of fulfilling the demand for universality and completeness implicit within the conception of orthodoxy, as well as the question of how far this
demand could also be realized in the “faith-truths” of Shinto. How can the Way of the sages and the Shinto of Japan coexist as “one truth?”

As a rule there were no words as much loathed in the Kimon school as “eclectic faith” (zatsushin 雜信) and “doctrinal amalgamation.” This was true not only among the Confucian wing of the “three eminent teachers,” who either rejected Shinto or refused to enter deeply into it, but also within the Suika lineage. Katō Sōan 加藤章庵, who is classified with the Shinto-Confucian dual-learning branch of the Kimon school, wrote in his Shogaku shikimoku 初雪式目 (Code for Elementary Learning):

In learning one avoids miscellaneous learning; in books one avoids miscellaneous books; in making friends one avoids miscellaneous people; in talking one avoids miscellaneous talk; in affairs one avoids miscellaneous tasks; in the mind one avoids miscellaneous thoughts. This is the formula for entering true Confucian learning.⁴⁹

This is truly a fitting expression of the puritanism of the Kimon school. However, the same book also says, “Shinto is the Confucianism of Japan, and Confucianism is the Shinto of China.” Even if one does not make the interchangeability of Confucianism and Shinto into such a total proposition, Keisai reported that the dictum, “the Book of Changes is China’s Book of the Age of the Gods, and the Book of the Age of the Gods is Japan’s Book of Changes,” was a frequent saying of Ansai’s.⁵⁰ What is important here is that, unlike the proposition of Hayashi Razan and others that Shinto is the Kingly Way (wangdao, J. 王道), there is a premise that the Book of the Age of the Gods or “Shinto” speaks uniquely about the distinctive Way of Japan, and the Book of Changes or the Confucian classics speak uniquely about the distinctive Way of China, not that one of them has been borrowed or imported by the other. That is, there is a pure Shinto and a pure Confucianism (concretely, the Cheng-Zhu teachings), and in content the two are conceived of as flowing together as “one universal truth” through a “wonderful correspondence” (miaoqi, J. 妙契).

The one and only principle of the universe is the sacred principle of life. Even though there are differences between the land where the sun rises and the land where the sun sets, yet in their Ways there is something that mysteriously corresponds. This is something that we human beings should revere and think upon deeply.⁵¹

It is precisely this theory of a “wonderful correspondence” that was the basis of the coexistence in the Ansai school of both the strict denunciation of “eclectic faith” and “doctrinal amalgamation” on the one hand, and the positive defense of or tolerance of Shinto as the “Way of Japan” on the other.

Of course, the subjective rejection of doctrinal amalgamation does not necessarily mean there is no doctrinal amalgamation objectively within the teaching. With regard to the passage in the Kojiki 古事記 where the god Izanagi cuts the god Kagutsuchi into five sections, Ansai had written:

⁴⁹ Engenzokuroku 洋源続録 1, leaf 33ウ.
⁵⁰ Zatsuwa hikki 5, leaf 7オ.
⁵¹ Köhan zensho 洪範全書, preface, Zenshai 全集 1.
One is inclined to say that this is precisely the same as the five in the River Chart and the Luo Writing (河圖洛書). But this is the doctrinal mixing of Ryōbu [Shinto], and it is not good. It is not a matter of making such forced analogies... No matter what it says in the Confucian books, the Way of Japan's age of the gods is what it is. 53

But no matter how much Ansai argued that his matching of Confucian ethical concepts with Shinto words was not just forced analogy, or argued for the independence of Shinto from Confucianism, his phonetically based correspondences, like that between the element earth and the core Neo-Confucian virtue of reverence, 54 lacked persuasiveness even in the Edo period. It did not necessarily have to wait for Motoori Norinaga's and Hirata Atsutane's vilifications of the Sinitic "forced analogies" in Suika Shinto before people could see through the identification of Amaterasu with Yao and Shun, or of the god Sarutahiko with Confucius. The leading Kimon scholars, who were trained in the subtle metaphysics of the Cheng-Zhu school, could hardly have been unaware of the weakness of this sort of Shinto theology. Rather, the fact that their doubts did not surface until the incident of Ansai's excommunication of Naokata and Keisai was most likely because, from his position of rejecting eclectic faith, Ansai was implementing a kind of "separation of usage" in his lectures and explanations of doctrine such that the two "Ways" were completely separated. Tani Shinzan 谷山 said: "When Master Ansai talks of Confucian books, he says not a word about Shinto. When he talks about Shinto, he says not a word about Confucian books. It is as if one was in a different seat and hearing the words of a different man." 55 It seems that, while Ansai assigned the study of Cheng and Zhu to his Shinto disciples as a sort of compulsory course, he did not compel those who were "majoring" in Confucianism to audit his lectures on Shinto. One can only guess what Ansai's inner psychological state was at such times. However, in his final years, it appears to be a fact that while he maintained this format, his Shinto disciples had suddenly come to occupy the seats of honor at his lectures on Cheng-Zhu learning (i.e., his lectures for both Shinto and Confucian disciples). This is suggested by Shōsai's comment that, "Before, Master Ansai used to put Keisai and Naokata in the seats of honor. The fact that since they began to say this and that about Shinto they have been relegated to the lower seats is an error of

52 According to the "Hongfan" (洪範) chapter of the Book of History, the River Chart was found on the back of a dragon-horse that emerged from the Yellow River in the time of Fu Xi 伏羲, and became the basis of the eight trigrams, and the Luo Writing was found on the back of a sacred tortoise that emerged from the Luo River in the time of King Yu 禹, and became the basis of the nine divisions of the Hongfan. (tr.)


54 This type of correspondence, extending from the cosmological to the ethical level, appears frequently in Suika Shinto, and is already seen in a text of 1671 (Kanbun 11) called Fujimori Kyōbei seishōki 藤森弓兵政所記. The god Kashikone is equated with kashikomi (deep awe and respect), the tightening up of the soil (tsuchi shimari) which produces metal is equated with tsutsushimi (reverence), and so on. (See Jindaikan kōgi, and Ryusaku Tsunoda, et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition [New York: Columbia University Press, 1958], II: 358-360. [tr.])

55 Zokusetsu zeiben 俗説贅辨.
[his] advocacy of Shinto.” And, independently from this, Inaba Usai reports another instance of Naokata’s characteristic sarcasm in his observation:

Master Yamazaki’s Shinto has been thriving, and his Shinto disciples have been placed in the seats of honor, while those who have already received Shinto initiation are in the peripheral seats (matsuzaka 末座).56 Master Naokata said: “Today, too, there were a lot of idiots sitting in the seats of honor!”

Keisai and Naokata were not so mean-spirited as to get into an overblown argument over something as trifling as seating order, but the above episode tells us something about how, without destroying the principle of rejecting mixed faith, Ansai gave more weight to the Shinto wing of his school in his later years. It also serves as evidence against those who argue that, in view of the fact that when Naokata and Keisai entered Ansai’s school he had already received Shinto initiation from Kikkawa Koretaru 吉川惟足, the Shinto problem could not have been the ideological background behind their excommunication. The problem that was covered up by Ansai’s separation of Shinto and Confucianism surfaced in Ansai’s later years. The confrontation with Naokata and Keisai over the interpretation of the Book of Changes’ concept of reverence and righteousness as internal and external occurred in the same period (about 1679-80) and with the Shinto problem in the background. Moreover, Ansai’s unique interpretation of “internal” in the phrase “reverence to straighten the internal” as not the mind, but all five items in the Great Learning series from “investigation of things” to “cultivation of the person,” and of “external” in “righteousness to square the external” as the remaining three items from “ordering the family” to “bringing peace to the realm,” is internally connected with his Shintoistic understanding of the concept of “reverence.”57 On top of the incident that Kyōsai reports of their arguing down of an old Shintoist,58 this disagreement was probably enough to bring about the falling out with their teacher. The main point is that, for Naokata of course, and for Keisai as well, in spite of the theory of “wonderful correspondence,” the doctrine of Suika Shinto could not be considered as something on a par with the Neo-Confucian teachings of Cheng and Zhu.

According to Keisai:

56 The seating of initiates in the peripheral seats symbolizes the difference between the Confucian and Shinto methods of learning and teaching. In Confucianism, since learning is a life-long task, there is no question of a one-time event wherein one is initiated into the secret transmission. The three eminent teachers all criticized such Shinto customs.
57 Ansai rejected the interpretation of “inner” as “the mind” as Buddhistic, and insisted on regarding body and mind on the same level in the process of self-cultivation. This accords with the fact that Shinto rituals of purification (misogi, harai) were believed to cleanse the body of defilements, not the mind. (For more details on the background and interpretation of the excommunication, see note 15 to the original text of the present study [pp. 667-669]).
58 Reportedly, an elderly Shintoist whom Ansai revered visited Ansai frequently, and their long conversations delayed Ansai’s lectures. Naokata’s and Keisai’s attempt to take the matter up with the old man greatly angered Ansai (see Yamazaki Ansai gakusha, p. 669, note 15 [tr.]).
The Shintoists of today say that the "reverence" of China is *gongfu* (effort, practice), while the "reverence" of Japan is more exalted because it is the original substance of the Way. Though it is Ansai's Shinto, he was always averse to the doctrinal amalgamation with Buddhism (*ryōbu shugō*). He overemphasized the rising and falling (*yokuyō* 抑揚) within the same *qi* 氣 as the great surpassing (*dāguó* 大過). The Suika Shintoists took this in the wrong way, and failed to understand his original meaning.\(^{59}\)

Even though there is nothing as superb as the Way of the ancestral spirits and gods (*kishin* 鬼神), because the character *shin* 神 (gods) was put before (*the character Way* *dào* 道) and taken to be the Way, the tradition of the shamans and shamanesses (*kanko 神子, *kannagi* 神女) came into being.\(^{60}\)

Because Master [Keisai] spoke of the defects of the Shintoists, what he says citing the words of Master Yamazaki [is that] men like Tamibe [Izumoji Nobunao 出雲路信直, known as the most outstanding theologian in the Suika school] are called *negi* 在宜 [a middle rank of Shinto priests]. Since principle is one, there is no such thing as doctrinal amalgamation... The Shintoists of today only speak about what sectarian transmission they have received, but they do not look into the one unchanging principle. This is a shameful thing.\(^{61}\)

Here, the denunciation of "doctrinal amalgamation" is in every case clearly based on the "principle is one" (=one truth) standpoint of orthodoxy, and this has become the *basis* of the critique of the Suika Shinto school.

When we get to Wakabayashi Kyōsai, Keisai's eminent disciple, the inclination toward Shinto becomes even more definite. Holding that "the Way of the Sun Goddess was originally taught by Sarutahiko,\(^{62}\) who also taught the state," and therefore that "Sarutahiko is the patriarch of Japanese *dōgaku*," he clearly affirmed the significance of the Blue Warrior Festival (*kōshinsai* 庚申祭).\(^{63}\) However, even for Kyōsai, the basic proposition that "since there is no duality in principle, there is no such thing as a different Way for governing people in China and Japan" remains the same. He attacked the Suika school, saying that "those who transmit the Shinto of Yamazaki" "say foolish things like," since "in our country the Way of our gods is complete in itself," "it is bad to draw in the

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\(^{59}\) *Keisai sensei isho* 綱齋先生遺書 2, leaf 26鈍, copy in collection of Kano bunko 寛野文庫, Tōhoku University. *Doguo* here may refer to the 28th hexagram of the *Yijing* (tr.).

\(^{60}\) Ibid. 2, leaf 27鈍. Kanko and kannagi were shamans or shamanesses who "served the gods and played holy music in order to placate the gods, or transmitted the will of the gods through mediumistic trance or spirit possession" (*Kōjien*).

\(^{61}\) Ibid. 3, leaf 8鈍.

\(^{62}\) According to *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* mythology, Sarutahiko led the way when Ninigi no Mikoto descended from heaven to earth to found the Japanese state. He was enshrined in Ise province. In the *Nihon shoki* he is taken as the god of actors and the god of the crossroads. (tr.)

\(^{63}\) *Zatsuwa hikki* 1, in *Nihon shisō taikei*, vol. 31, p. 479. The *kōshinsai* was a medieval Buddhist and Shinto festival of Daoist origin in which, for Shinto, Sarutahiko is worshipped and people observe an all-night vigil. This festival became particularly popular in the Edo period (tr.).
Confucian books to preach it." This was because of his perception that since his teacher "gave his best energies to the study of the Confucian classics," he had no time left for the study of Shinto, while, to Kyōsai's regret, in the end no successors to the orthodox lineage of the Way (dōtō) appeared within Suika Shinto. In that case, beyond abstract concepts like "wonderful correspondence" and "mutual issue," just how were Confucianism (or the Cheng-Zhu school) and the Shinto of Japan to be connected to one another within one universal truth? In this point, Kyōsai offered an interesting theory of the universal stages of historical development concerning ideology. As stated above, the Shinto of Japan was originally the same in essence as the Book of Changes of China. However, after that, in China, "sages arose one after another," developing this ancient tradition, "according with the time and the circumstances, each opening up his own path, defining the substance of the Way and the methods of learning, distinguishing the affairs of government, the substance of government, and the methods of government, filling [the world] with moral principles (giri) as Heaven and Earth developed." In the case of the Shinto of Japan, on the other hand, unfortunately no sages and worthies appeared, so that the Way did not get systematically put in order and refined. As a result, "the unsophisticated Way of the sagely gods of ancient times came directly down to the present day." Thus, "understandably, looked at with our present civilized eyes, it is something this is hard to accept." In other words, if looked at with an eye that has seen the Confucian classics, which are products of the "civilized" stage of human development, Shinto appears as something "ridiculous." But to reject it outright just for that reason is mistaken, for something innocent and unsophisticated should also be esteemed. Actually, the same sort of view was also present in embryo in Keisai.

It is because of the facts (koto 事) of the ancient age of the gods that it is called the "age of the gods." Zhu Xi also spoke of the sagely gods of ancient times. [This is when] heaven and man were not far separated. Before the Way of man had been opened up, things were in their natural state (shizen 自然). Thus it is called the age of the gods [the divine age]. Therefore the Book of Changes is the Way of the gods (shintō 神道)... Things were gradually transformed through the development of culture (bunka 文化), but this development accorded with the nature of that age.

Therefore, as an ideology, the concept of "Shinto" "could hardly have existed in ancient times." It is only that "the form of what the sagely gods did in ancient times was given that name in later generations." This is close to the later conception of the school of Ancient Learning. It is just that Keisai's positive view of the history of the "opening up of culture" reflects, of course, his awareness of the development that culminated in the Cheng-Zhu learning. By being situated thus within a universal history that transcends any specific ethnic group or culture, both Shinto and Confucianism come to express the "one truth" within their own stage of historical development. In Wakabayashi Kyōsai, who so attacked those schools of Confucianism that made "a reckless rejection of Shinto," "more

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64 Ibid., p. 481.
65 Ibid. 3, leaf 16бо.
66 Ibid. 1, pp. 483-84.
67 Keisai sensei isho 3, leaf 9う.
than the sort of Shinto that performs purification by the straw festoon (shimenawa シメ ラ), it is the flat refusal to accept anything strange or hard to explain that is interesting (omoshiroi 面白い). Here it is enough just to note that there is an attack on shamanistic Shinto, to the point of using paradoxical language. Both Keisai and Kyōsai, after all, had been baptized by Confucian rationalism, and the difference between them and Naokata and Shōsai—insofar as it relates to this “universalism of the Way”—was not as great as it was portrayed by the later scholars of the Suika wing.

Of course, while Satō Naokata similarly inherited Ansai’s “one principle in the universe,” he affirmed Cheng-Zhu learning as a total world view and rejected Shinto—and therefore also the theory of “wonderful correspondence”—totally.

Within the universe, there is only one principle. Therefore there is no place for the existence of two Ways. If Confucianism is correct, then Shinto is heterodox. If Shinto is correct, then Confucianism is heterodox (ja 邪). How could there be a principle by which one could follow both of them? I do not comprehend the meaning of the mixed faith of our master.

Here, the rejection of “mixed faith” in Ansai’s teachings has been turned around and directed to Ansai himself. This passage is taken from Tōron hikki 討論筆記 (Record of Discussions), which was written in 1700 (Genroku 13), that is, eighteen years after Ansai’s death. Overall, this work vehemently denounces the “honoring [of Ansai] on the surface but belittling underneath” in the writings of “a certain man of letters” (this probably refers to the Nangakuden 南學傳 of Ōkayama Shizan 大高山芝山). “In recent times,” we read, “Master Yamazaki Ansai revered and believed in Zhu Xi, and obtained much from Zhu’s writings. The richness of his broad learning and the correctness of his arguments truly constituted the first propagation of the orthodox school of Confucianism in our land.” The above-quoted criticism of mixed faith was written as an addendum to these words of homage, which placed Ansai in the highest position of honor. And with regard to Shinto itself, as well, while Naokata carefully reserved his judgment regarding its ultimate meaning, he also said finally: “How can I manage to just truckle to what I like [in his teachings] while avoiding the unpleasant task of judging the learning of our teacher?” That is, while he was conscious of the suspicion—or rather a backlash close to hatred—on the part of the Shinto wing of the Kimon school, he dared to demonstrate an attitude not so much of personal kowtowing to his teacher, but of choosing to be faithful to the “true” Way that his teacher taught.

We cannot, however, overlook the following sort of attacks introduced there that were made against the position of Naokata and his camp:

To be born in our country but revere the Way of another country is to be like a person who does not respect his own parents but respects someone else. There is no greater unfiliality and disloyalty than to forget the grace of the gods and lose the righteousness between lord and retainer. Why don’t such people quickly reform themselves and return to their roots?

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68 Zatsuwa hikki 1, p. 484.
69 Tōron hikki 討論筆記, in Unzōroku 2.
This was a question put by “a certain person” who was formerly in very close contact with Ansai and under his influence, but it is not mentioned exactly who the person was. Yet Naokata himself also thought that his teacher had “gone too far” in declaring that a person who does not follow the Way of Japan—concretely, Japan’s “teaching of the divine country” that appears in such sources as the “Age of the Gods” book of the *Nihon shoki* and the *Nakatomi no harae* 中臣祓—is a “son of a foreigner” who cannot be said to be the son of his own father and mother. The idea that, as a Japanese, to forget the Way of Japan and follow the “teaching of a foreign country” is to be an unfilial and disloyal “alien” is actually a refrain that was being chanted noisily all around us in this country until very recently. The “certain person” referred to above was not necessarily Asami Keisai. However, the small difference in viewpoint that led Keisai—who saw a universal truth in the Cheng-Zhu school of Confucianism—to a parting of the ways with Naokata, was unmistakably rooted in this. Keisai went so far as to say:

> The fact that the gods of our country are said to be different from the gods of China is because everyone is muddled in their thinking... The term “heavenly emperors and earthly emperors” existed in ancient China as well. Because the country of China is well endowed with people and resources and has a large territory, sages arose in rapid succession, establishing the teaching of moral principles and the way of man on the basis of the natural way of heaven and earth. Therefore, the way of ancestral spirits, men, and gods was also made correct and clear, so that it did not degenerate into the strange and heterodox. But the Shinto of Japan degenerated into the mystical and mysterious, becoming a shallow and base form of learning.

Here, he rejected the claim of the Shinto wing regarding the uniqueness of the gods of Japan and their Way. But what was the real identity of the magnetic force that drew Keisai toward the kind of Japanism seen in his *Seiken igen kōgi* and *Satsuroku* and which also became a gradually intensifying crescendo in the Bōnangen lineage? In reference to the approaching death of Ansai, Miyake Shōsai said to his daughter’s husband, Kume Teisai:

> Regarding the idea that, at the time of death, even if it is not one’s true wish to die at the hands of a woman, unlike the daimyōs who have their stipends, if one is poor and has no choice in the matter, then it is acceptable, Master Yamazaki said: “How could this be said to be the Way of Japan?” Even though there is nothing at all misguided in this, it is wholly the fault of Shinto. However, things which cannot be spoken outside should not go beyond this room.”

Ueta Gensetsu of the Shinto wing transmitted the same words in an affirmative vein: “In his dying command, [Ansai] said regarding the idea that ‘a man does not die at the hands of a woman, and a woman does not die at the hands of a man’ that this is the ritual of a foreign country, but it is not so in our country.” Whether or not Shōsai emphasized

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70 *Zatsudanroku, ken.*
71 *Engenroku* 1, leaf 14才.
“things which cannot be spoken outside” because this was something said especially in regard to Ansai’s approaching death is even more unclear. However, one gets the feeling that, regarding the Way (or customs) of Japan and the Way of an alien country there was already an air of something taboo hanging over the Kimon school.

This problem is intertwined in substance with the theme of L-orthodoxy discussed below, but for the present I will approach it from the point of view of the manner in which the universal “Way” relates to particular peoples or states like Japan and China, i.e., from the point of view of the connection between universality and particularity.

Asami Keisai argued:

The Way of the sages should be revered. To revere it by doing things such as pretentiously receiving the Confucian classics--this is what is called heresy (Itam). Having been born in Japan in this time of Great Peace, we are able to live peacefully through the grace of our rulers and nourish our lives. To be partial toward a foreign country is a great heresy. Even now, if Confucius and Zhu Xi should attack Japan on the orders of an alien government, we should be the first to march forward and blow off their heads with our cannons... This precisely is what is called the great righteousness (taigi) between lord and vassal... Worldly Confucianists read [the Confucian] books and in their hearts become aliens... People imitate the people of alien countries because they do not know the true Way.72

This same argument appears in works such as Sentetsu sōdan 先哲叢談 (Collected Sayings of Former Philosophers) in the form of the episode in which Ansai said to his disciples that if Confucius and Mencius came and attacked Japan, it is the Way of Confucius and Mencius to take them prisoner. This episode had such appeal as an expression of the independence (shutaisei 本體性) of the Japanese people in refusing to blindly follow a foreign ideology that it was put into the school textbooks. However, even Naokata himself, who became Keisai’s opponent in the matter of the “Middle Kingdom” and the “Land of the Gods,” regarded the autonomy of Japan in its international relations as a totally natural principle. He retorted that if Confucius and Mencius invaded another country by military means, since this would be an action in conflict with their own “Way,” one should follow the Way and fight against them. Yet Confucius and Mencius, he continued, could hardly be expected to take an action so contradictory to their own teachings. In regard to the terms “Central Efflorescence” (Zhonghua, J. Chūka 中華) and barbarian (yidi, J. iteki 夷狄) as well, he said that without any regard to the level of their morality, the goodness or badness of their customs, and the extensiveness of their territories--and whether or not they had sages like Kings Wen 文王 and Wu 武王--the Middle Kingdom (Chūgoku) was still the Middle Kingdom, and Japan had qualities in which it was not inferior to China (Kara 唐). Therefore, if one achieved sagehood through learning, China (Kara Chūgoku) would also feel ashamed. In regard to the controversy over the definition of civilization (chūka) and barbarism (iteki), Keisai himself also said that the very use of the terms chūka and iteki in the course of this controversy was an “imitation of China.” What was important, he insisted, was that the Japanese not blindly follow the books or teachings of an alien country, but take Japan as their standard of thought and action. To

72 Asami sensei gakudan.
do so, moreover, was itself the spirit of the Zhu Xi school's concept of "great righteousness and moral duty" (taigi meibun). In other words, the controversy about the terms "Chinese" and "barbarian" could not be said to be a very productive question in itself. Rather, the idea that the Japanese should take Japan as the "subject" and alien countries as the "object"--that is, that duty should be understood in terms of "inside" (one's own country) and "outside" (alien countries)--was opposed in substance to the idea that if the Way is established with the state as its foundation, it means that one should respect the Ways of each country (Europe, India, and so on), in which case one finally falls into a "relativism of the Way."

The quickest way to illuminate simply where the problem lies is to bring in an ideologue of the Shinto wing of the Kimon school who put forward a thoroughgoing particularism. Miyake Shōsai confronted Tani Shinzan with a question similar to the argument that Naokata put forth in Tōron hikki that the idea of the Way of Japan and the Way of some country leads in the end to a pluralism of Ways: "If it is true that for one born in a certain country the Way of that country is the true Way, then I think that Buddhism should be considered the true Way in India." Shinzan calmly responded:

This is a simple matter not worthy of discussion. The Way that says there are times when it is permissible even to kill one's ruler exists in that country [China]. When we look at it from the point of view of this country, we think it is preposterous. Nevertheless, even if a person of that country points this out, the people will just not listen, saying that such is the true Way of the sages. To make matters worse, in other countries too there are foolish people who agree with this idea [an allusion to those in Japan who affirmed the theory of revolution]. If this is the case, why should we extend our care (sewa 世話) even to the Indophiles [the Buddhists in our midst]?73

When Shōsai lamented that:

The way the Shintoists say at the drop of a hat "our country, our country" is really distressing. Theoretically speaking, when people speak out "Your Excellency" [kubōsama 公方様, used here in reference to the shogun], it is the same as having to hold their tongue.

Shinzan would admonish:

Having to hold one's tongue toward the shogun (kubōsama) is not selfishness (watakushi 私), but a natural principle (dōri no tōzen 道理の當然). Those in the service of Edo should take the shogun as fundamental. Those in the service of a domain (kuni 国) should take the lord of that domain as fundamental. The people of Japan should take Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神 as fundamental. The people of China should take Confucius as fundamental. This is the highest point of reasonableness (dōri 道理). You are also a Japanese. In spite of that, to advocate discarding Amaterasu and taking Confucius as the fundamental--is this not the most grievous error?

73 Shinzan sensei shukan 秦山先生手記, ge 下, letter dated 4th day, 1st month, Kyōhō 3 (1718).
Along with regional "particularism," it is also necessary that morals be set up at various levels according to the different degrees of closeness of the human relationships involved. If we counterpose the spirit of East Asia against the Western way of the "southern barbarians," then within East Asia, China (Kara) and Japan are counterposed. Within Japan, again, the affiliations of people with regions such as Edo and Tosa can be split up further ad infinitum. Then within each level a more distant universalism can be seen as "abstract," and a closer individuated particularity can be seen as "concrete" (in this sense, blood relations are the most "concrete"). Since a concrete "domain" (kuni, e.g., Tosa) is uchi while Edo is soto, to disregard the near and concrete kuni and idolize Edo is a preposterous attitude. Such "affiliationism" with region and group is precisely at the 180-degree opposite pole from the following gibe of Naokata:

Someone said that the Confucians imitate China in foreign (i 異) things, and that if one is born in Japan it is a natural principle (ri no tozen 理 當然) that one study the Way of Japan. The Master [Naokata] replied, [I] have imitated Japan [sic.], but this is because in Japan there is no teaching like the Analects and the Great Learning. Now why is it that, although you were born in Edo, you like shaved bonito fish (katsuobushi 剃節) from Tosa and other things from distant places? It must be because these things are not available in Edo. Likewise, scholars imitate China because these things do not exist in Japan. And that is not all. Why do you wish for life after death? Even that is the teaching of India.74

The identification of the genesis theory--i.e., because shaved bonito is produced in Tosa, it is "affiliated" with Tosa--with the theory of semantic appropriateness (imi datörön 意味妥當論) gives particularism its special characteristics.75 Together with this, one can judge that things like an inclination for "objectivity" are generally empty abstractions and that, concretely, they are observations from a specific foreign country. Thus, for instance, Tani Shinzan saw Miyake Shôsai's statement that "since there is no duality in heaven and earth, the Way is also without duality" as "something said looking at Japan from the point of view of China," criticizing it as having a heart that is partisan to another country--an unpardonable thing." "Because it is the Way that we know, I think it is proper to take our own country as the subject (shu 主) and other countries as the object (kyaku 客)."76 Here one has no alternative but either to see Japan as the subject (shuitai 主體) or to see "foreign countries" as the subject. The "subjectivity" of Japan, if we can use such an expression, cannot be conceived except for a Japan-centered image of the world based on distinctions between domestic and foreign, intimate and non-intimate, and near and far. If we look at it in this way, then we must say that even the above condemnation as "truly the son of an alien," which for Satô Naokata was completely out of the blue (shingai 心外), is, from the standpoint of Shinzan's type of affiliationism and particularism, an extremely natural sort of evaluation.

74 Usai sensei gakusei 渡齋先生學話 1, Yoron 余論, Masanobu roku 元信録
75 Therefore, if we follow this "logic," it becomes mistaken to say, for instance, that Christianity is a Western religion or a religion that developed indigenously in the West. This is because Christianity is a religion that was born in the Orient.
76 Shinzen sensei shukan, ge.
In that case, standing between the “universalism” represented by Naokata—based upon a complete acceptance of the Cheng-Zhu learning—and the “particularism” of Shinzan, what sort of philosophical or logical position does the “wonderful correspondence” theory of Asami Keisai occupy? Keisai, as well, based himself on the premise of the trans-national universality of the “Way,” as shown in the following statements from his lectures on the “Diagram of the Sagely Learning” (Seigaku zu 聖學 圖), which he drew on the basis of Cheng-Zhu theory.

In China and Japan alike, teachings that depart from this constitute misguided words and heretical theory (bōgen jasetsu 妄言邪說). The phrase “valid for both far and near” [tső enkin 通遠近, a phrase in his Seigaku zu] means that it is true in China, in Japan, and in all countries... At any rate, if one does not depart from this yardstick, then it is one principle regardless of the country in which it is taught.77

Therefore, in the controversy over the identity of the “Middle Kingdom” (Chūgoku), as well, he held firmly to the position that:

The Way taught in the Confucian books is the Way of heaven and earth. What we study and develop [in Japan] is also the Way of heaven and earth. Because there is no distinction in the Way between subject and object, between here and there, then if we study this Way on the basis of the books that reveal the Way, this Way is the Way of our heaven and earth. For instance, whether one speaks from [the point of view of] China, our country, or India, fire is hot and water is cool, crows are black and herons are white, parents are worthy of love and lords are difficult to abandon. There is no question of saying that something is the Way of this country.78

In this Keisai was no different from Naokata and Shōsai. It is easy to see that Tani Shinzan was ferociously attacking this position of his teacher. Keisai wrote a letter to Shinzen in which he stated:

The Way of heaven and earth is not something which one distinguishes as belonging to Japan or China like one compares teabowls and medicine containers. If one only compares customs and national essences, then, in addition to the correct lineage (seitō) of ruler and subject, there is room to consider the differences between Japan and China in specific matters of interpersonal ethics.79

In scathing terms, Shinzan replied:

First you speak of the Way of heaven and earth, and then you speak of the correct lineage of heaven and earth. In always speaking of the matter (sata サタ [沙汰]) of heaven and earth, you are not revering Japan, but are captivated by China. I believe that

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77 Sho senpai kokujī hikki 諸前輩字筆記, Seigaku zu kōgi 聖學圖講義, leaf 12-14.
79 Genroku 11 (1698), fifth month, first day.
you speak like this in part as a stratagem... Indeed, since you so adulate the Chinese, before long you ought to be able to get a salary increase from China!80

From the point of view of Shinzan’s thoroughgoing particularism, even the author of the Seiken igen was, lamentably, nothing more than a badger of the same lair as Naokata and Shōsai. In the above words of Keisai, the phrase “the correct lineage of ruler and subject” (the level of L-orthodoxy) is precisely where Keisai and Naokata decisively parted ways. Even so, in view of its theoretical basis, Shinzan could not grant his approval. Against Keisai’s statement that, “If, apart from the correct lineage of heaven and earth, there is another line (ha 派) that has the continuity of a correct lineage, then Confucius and Zhu Xi were both liars, and so was Mr. Yamazaki,” Shinzan took the position that:

The correct lineage of heaven and earth is the same as the correct lineage of ruler and subject, and the correct lineage of ruler and subject is the same as the correct lineage of heaven and earth. In this country, if the correct lineage of ruler and subject is correct, the correct lineage of heaven and earth is correct. In the western land [China], because the correct lineage of ruler and subject is not established, even though heaven and earth exist, their correct lineage is not established. Truly, Confucius and Zhu Xi did not lie. This is already made clear in Master Yamazaki’s Kōyō 狂操. 81

The conflation of O-orthodoxy and L-orthodoxy in the argument here was something that ran through the entire Kimon school, so it is insufficient to set this particular argument apart. The true dispute between Keisai and Shinzan, rather, lies in whether one argues for the superiority of Japan’s unbroken imperial line from the universal standard of the “Way of heaven and earth” (Keisai), or considers the very premise of a Way that transcends national essence to be an aberration (Shinzan). And whether one likes it or not, the structure of the Japanese myths recorded in the Kojiki and Nihongi 日本紀 is not favorable to Keisai’s theory of “wonderful correspondence.” For here, the myths regarding the beginning of heaven and earth are directly tied to the myths concerning the birth of the Middle Country of the Reed Plains (ashihara no nakasu no kuni 萼原中國)82 and its rulers, so that the gods of Heaven, Amaterasu, and the successive generations of tennō are all connected together in one lineage. No matter how much Chinese ethnocentrism exists in the “Way” of Chinese Confucianism (including the chüka thought that regards China as the center of true civilization), its concepts of the Way of Heaven and the Mandate of Heaven are ideals that transcend any concrete ruler, including even Yao and Shun, and they are the standard by which the value of actual rulers or dynasties is judged. The Chinese books and Chinese “myths” that became the model for the myths of the creation of heaven and earth found at the beginning of the Nihon shoki were miscellaneous writings and stories that were totally ignored by Confucianism, to say nothing of Neo-

80 Shinzan sensei shukan 1.
81 Ibid.
82 It should be noted that in the myths “Middle Country” refers to the land of Japan being in the middle between Heaven and the underworld. However, the conflation of this with the name of China (Chūgoku), written with the same characters, is of course closely tied with the controversy being examined here (tr.).
Confucianism. Ancient legends and stories regarding the birth of the universe and the world (the legend of Pan Gu 盘古, etc.) had no necessary relationship with either the metaphysics of li 理 and qi 氣 or the ethical norms of the five relationships and the five constant virtues. In contrast, in the Japanese myths, the gods of Heaven were linked in one lineage to the gods who gave birth to the country, and the gods that gave birth to the “country” were linked in one lineage to the ancestor gods of the imperial house, the “rulers.” All forms of Japanism that based themselves on these myths had no choice but to universalize the imperial ancestral gods themselves into world gods and either see Japan as the “parent country of all countries” or else cut Japan off from the world and confine it in a closed uniqueness that had no connection to the logic of universality vs. particularity. Without even waiting for the Hirata school of National Learning, the Japanism of the Kimon school—premised on the structural characteristics of the Japanese myths—led inevitably to the conclusion that, just as there are no two suns in the sky:

The Son of Heaven can also only be one in the ten thousand countries. In that case, the Son of Heaven of another country has the status of a feudal lord (shokō 諸侯) and cannot be said to be the true Son of Heaven. 83

In the face of this, the position that a universal truth and universal justice transcending state and ethnicity existed in a concrete mode in Confucianism in China and in Shinto in Japan (whether or not one uses that name), and that there was a “wonderful correspondence” between them, fades by comparison. The reverse side of the proposition of wonderful correspondence is that both Confucianism and Shinto contain a partial error and a partial injustice, which means that the two concrete Ways and countries are illuminated and exposed by a standard that transcends them both. The idea that “Heaven and man are only one” (tenjin yuiitsu 天人唯一) held up by the Suika wing of the school, not to mention the correlation between and unity of the Way of Heaven and the Way of man, was finally incompatible with the logic of the premise on which the theory of wonderful correspondence was based.

Wakabayashi Kyōsai relates: “Master Keisai said frequently that when what he said was heard by the Confucianists, they would say he was misled by Shinto, and when it was heard by the Shintoists, they would say he had forgotten Shinto.” 84 Evidently, Keisai was aware of his own condition of being attacked from both sides—on the one hand by Naokata’s brand of universalism (which was, from Keisai’s point of view, dogmatic), and on the other hand by the Japanism of the Suika wing, which was not willing to grant to Cheng-Zhu learning anything more than the role of a handmaiden to Shinto. All the same, the virulent sort of Japanocentrism expressed in the Lectures on the Seiken igen—the position that, although if each country takes itself as the center and takes other countries as barbarian, the different standpoints will conflict with one another, it is just this mutual discord that is the correct moral principle (giri)—appears to bring Keisai closer to Shinzan without limiting the confrontation with Naokata to the problem of abdication and antdynastic rebellion. In the passage of Keisai’s quoted previously, he says “to be partial toward another country is a great heresy (itan).” This definition of heresy has already

83 Wakabayashi Kyōsai, Zatsuwa hikki 9, Bōnan shobun 望梅所聞, leaf 39才.
84 Zatsuwa hikki 9, leaf 7ウ.
deviated from the idea of heresy relating to the interpretation of doctrine (the problem of O-orthodoxy), showing that Keisai has slipped unawares into an “either-or” mode of framing the problem wherein it becomes necessary to choose between being “partial to” one’s own country or being infatuated with “another country.”

When Naokata, who unlike most scholars of the Kimon school managed to get by without either a sinic nom de plume (go 姓) or an alias (azana 字), was asked it would not present a problem if he went to China for books or something, he answered: “Even if I went to China, I would still be Gorō Saemon.

Nowadays it is difficult to explain the Way to people from China. You can see it even with the Koreans. Even though that place is the origin, it is different (i). That is the way you’d expect it to be. Even though India is the source of the Buddhist Dharma, it gradually moved here. In India now it seems that one cannot even preach the Buddhist Dharma.

Since Naokata made such a clear separation between the genesis of the Way and the actuality of China (or India), one wonders why Keisai relegated him to the company of the heretics who are “born in Japan...but are partial to a foreign country.” However, as mentioned earlier, one cannot deny that an image of the world that made the Way belong to the “country” (kuni) possessed a magnetic force powerful enough to attract Keisai in spite his belief that “in the Way there is no distinction of subject and object, here and there,” to the extent that he would cast even on Miyake Shōsai the suspicion of having “a heart that is partisan to a foreign country.”

It is likely that a synergism of two moments is in operation here. The first is the problem that the principle of discrimination between superior and inferior, noble and base, intimate and distant, has always constituted the content of Confucian ethics. The problem of human beings in general, apart from the particular human relationships between lord and vassal, father and son, husband and wife, and elder and younger brothers, basically holds no place within Confucian ethics. Since an ethic for human beings that transcends these particular relationships can only be applied in the form of an extension of the basic ethics of the five relationships and five constants, other people can naturally only be treated in a way that corresponds to their degree of intimacy with oneself (or with a group that has been identified with the self). If one were to act otherwise, it was thought to be a fall into the “universal love” of Mo Zi. It is a fundamental premise of the ethics of discrimination that a mere human being or individual is only an abstract concept, that people exist “concretely” only as particular relationships, as the Japanese people, as a lord, as a vassal, and so on. One large factor that has persistently hindered the taking root of the idea that no matter where a person lives in the world, in no matter what concrete situation, he or she possesses inalienable rights as an individual, even in the modern period, is this ethics based on the degree of closeness of interpersonal relationships, backed up as it is by

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85 It should be noted that the “other” (i 異) in “another country” is identical with the “other” in the words for “heresy” (itan 異端) and “heterodoxy” (igaku 異學), and that it often carries the same connotations of alieneness and incorrectness (tr.).
86 Usai Sensei gakuswa 1.
87 Unzōroku 2, fifth edition, leaf 88才 to 亀.
natural human emotions and instincts. Accordingly, there is probably no Confucian who
could deny in principle the *giri* which Keisai preached in the following terms: “Other
people have parents, and I also have parents. To act so that my own parent does not get
swindled, even if somebody else’s parent is swindled, is the *giri* of a son.” Although this
is a problem of a choice made in a dilemma situation, looked at in the light of a universal
standard of justice that transcends the consideration of whether the parent is mine or
someone else’s, the thought that in certain situations it might be right to make the opposite
choice has by definition no room to materialize. The order of priority is determined from
the start according to the degree of intimacy of the particular relationship. As far as this
kind of particularism of ethical *content* was concerned, even the person most representa-
tive of universalism in the Kimon school, Satō Naokata, could be no exception. The
problem of the trans-regional, trans-national appropriateness of the Confucian world-view
*itself* should not be confused with the particularism inherent in the definition of ethics in
terms of the five relationships.

Second, however, under the historical and cultural conditions that pertained in
*Japan*, this particularism was expressed as a propensity of thought which made the Way
belong to the “country,” a propensity in which the image of the world in terms of degrees
of relatedness to the self crystallized around the unit of “country” (*kuni*). The fact that in
Japan the category of civilization (*chūka*) vs. barbarism (*iteki*), which originally centered
on a cultural conception of civilization, was grasped in the relationship of “our country”
vs. “other” (*yoso* はそ) countries at the level of the state and the nation, was no more
than one of its corollaries. Here I will not discuss how complex a modality was given to
this ethics of inner (*uchi*) and outer (*yoso*) by the multilayered nature of the concept of
“country” (*kuni*), which included meanings extending from one’s native village all the way
to the rulers and the government. Suffice it to say that the Japanese people of *today*,
bathed in international criticism for their low level of concern with the problems of Indo-
Chinese refugees or political exiles (i.e., for their view of such matters as “someone else’s
problem” [yosogoto 他人事]), may not be in a position to simply scoff at Keisai’s
discrimination between “someone else’s parents” and “my own parents,” or even at
Shinzan’s objection to “extending our care to the Indophiles” in his own country.

(To be continued.)